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Abstract 
Jakobsen’s ideal policy is a strategy of coercive diplomacy that comprises of a 
credible threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly 
with little cost, a deadline for compliance, an assurance to the adversary against 
future demands and an offer of carrots/incentives for compliance. Although derived 
to understand why Western coercive diplomacy had failed to make aggressors stop 
or undo their actions; Jakobsen claimed the logic of the ideal policy should remain 
valid for preventing acquisition of Weapon of Mass Destruction.  
 
In 2006 North Korea conducted a nuclear test, signifying the failure of the Treaty 
for Nuclear Non-proliferation and US coercive diplomacy. However, in 2003 Libya 
took the decision to surrender its WMDs. Arguably Libya’s decision was an 
example of US coercive diplomacy backed by credible threat, demonstrated by the 
US invasion of Iraq. Nuclear proliferation is one of the most significant issues in 
international security; therefore, developing effective counter proliferation strategies 
is of interest to academics and policymakers.  
 
Using Jakobsen’s ideal policy as a framework this study conducts a focussed 
structured comparison of US coercive diplomacy, from 1992-2006, aimed at 
preventing North Korea and Libya from obtaining a nuclear weapon. It is the only 
independent study to use Jakobsen’s ideal policy to conduct a comparison. 
Furthermore, it contains first-hand accounts from policy makers involved in the 
cases. The key finding is states do not employ a form of coercive diplomacy in the 
form of the ideal policy over the issue of nuclear proliferation, as they are unwilling 
to set deadlines and make direct threats. The thesis argues that the ideal policy has 
utility as an analytical framework to conduct a structured comparison; however, 
cannot be used to form accurate predictions of whether a strategy will be successful.  
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Introduction 
On the 9 October 2006 North Korea (NK) conducted its first nuclear test.
1
 This test was 
not only a failure of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but 
a failure of the United States’ (US) strategy of coercive diplomacy which had sought to 
prevent the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from attaining a nuclear 
weapon. The Clinton administration had set several escalating demands aimed at freezing 
NK nuclear programme; this finally culminated in 1994 when on the brink of war former 
US President Carter intervened enabling both sides to de-escalate and reach an accord 
under the Agreed Framework (AF). The AF appeared to lead NK to dismantle its 
plutonium based nuclear programme in return for oil and two Light Water Reactors 
(LWR). However, opponents of the deal argued that NK was in effect being rewarded for 
bad behaviour and would continue to cheat by developing a uranium based nuclear 
programme.  
 
The Bush administration entered office divided over whether to maintain the AF. 
Furthermore, after 9/11 the rhetoric became more aggressive with Bush identifying NK as 
a member of an ‘Axis of Evil’.2 Moreover, US implied threats were given credibility by 
the invasion of Iraq over the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In late 2002 
convinced that they had evidence of a secret NK uranium enrichment programme, the US 
effectively pulled out of the AF by ceasing oil shipments, which in turn led to NK 
breaking safeguards and becoming the first state to withdraw from the NPT. During 
Bush’s second term, the US tried an approach, which in effect emulated the AF, offering 
incentives and assurances that led to the signing of the ‘September 2005’ agreement. 
                                                          
1
 BBC, ‘Text of N Korea's announcement’, 9 October 2006, BBC News Channel, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6032597.stm, accessed 28 Aug 2015.  
 
2
 George Bush, ‘State of the Union Speech 2002’, 29 January 2002, 
http://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/speeches/speech-4540, accessed 28 Aug 2015. 
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However, so close to their goal, NK continued past the nuclear threshold unperturbed by 
a few final implied US threats. 
 
Whilst NK was resisting US coercive efforts, Libya on 19 December 2003 decided, not 
only to reveal its clandestine nuclear weapons program, but also to dismantle it; 
seemingly without any formally agreed conditions. The Bush administration argued that 
Libya’s decision was ‘a product of the President’s strategy which gives regimes a 
choice. They can choose to pursue WMD at great peril, cost and international isolation. 
Or they can choose to renounce these weapons, take steps to re-join the international 
community’.3 Furthermore, the White House stated that ‘actions by the United States 
and our allies have sent an unmistakable message to regimes that seek or possess 
weapons of mass destruction: Those weapons do not bring influence or prestige. They 
bring isolation or otherwise unwelcome consequences.’4 Moreover, the administration 
directly linked Gaddafi’s decision to the Iraq war with Bush stating that: 
Nine months of intense negotiations involving the United States and Great 
Britain succeeded with Libya, while 12 months of diplomacy with Iraq did not. 
And one reason is clear: For diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible, 
and no one can now doubt the word of America.
5
 
 
However, opponents of this view argue that Libya’s surrendering of its nuclear weapons 
programme was the culmination of the previous administration’s policy of sanctions and 
                                                          
3
 Robert S Litwak, Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11, (Washington D.C., Woodrow 
Wilson International Center Press, 2007), pg.169; White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact 
Sheet: The President’s National Security Strategy to Combat WMD-Libya’s Announcement’, 19 
December 2003, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-8.html, 
accessed 29 October 2015. 
4
 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘President Bush: Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD 
Programs’, 19 December 2003, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-9.html, accessed 29 October 2015. 
 
5
 George Bush, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘State of the Union Address 2004’, 20 
January 2004, http://www.whitehouse.goc/news/releases/2004/01/20030120-7.html , accessed 29 October 
2015. 
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diplomacy, and was not a result of the Iraq war.
6
 Others argue
7
 that Gaddafi’s vision 
had shifted from being a Pan-Arab leader to being an African regional leader. This 
change of vision meant that Gaddafi no longer saw political utility in supporting 
Palestinian terrorism, as it blocked Libya’s reintegration back into the International 
Community (IC) and the subsequent economic rewards that would strengthen his 
position within Africa. 
 
The apparent success of US counter proliferation policy in Libya, at the same time as 
US counter proliferation policy was failing in NK, has made comparison of the cases 
particularly tempting for scholars and policy makers. Furthermore, nuclear proliferation 
is one of the most significant and difficult issues in international security; therefore, 
studying and developing strategies aimed at dealing with the issue has academic and 
practical utility. However, the primary focus of this thesis is not to draw specific 
conclusions on Libya and NK as individual cases, there are several studies that do that, 
but to examine the utility of Jakobsen’s ideal policy as a strategy of coercive diplomacy 
employed to prevent states attaining nuclear weapons. This study uses the ideal policy 
as a framework to conduct a structured focussed comparison of US coercive diplomacy 
aimed at preventing NK and Libya obtaining nuclear weapons from 1992-2006. 
Furthermore, it examines whether the ideal policy has utility as a conceptual framework 
for examining and predicting the outcome of similar nuclear proliferation cases. A more 
detailed statement of the contribution and research objectives will be found later within 
this chapter; but so it can be fully appreciated, I will first explain in more depth 
Jakobsen’s ideal policy.  
 
                                                          
6
 Author’s interview with Ambassador Martin Indyk, in person, 14 March 2013. 
 
7
 Tiran Rothman, ‘A State's Choice: Nuclear Policy in a Changing World between Libya and North 
Korea’, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol.23, No.3 (2007), pg.304. 
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Jakobsen’s Ideal Policy 
The theoretical underpinning of the strategy of coercive diplomacy fits within the realist 
paradigm; as the strategy at its most simplistic relies on the logic of power, with a more 
powerful actor coercing a lesser power to meet a political objective. Jakobsen’s ideal 
policy builds upon theories expressed in two core works
8
 on coercive theory; Thomas C. 
Schelling’s Arms and Influence (1966) and Alexander L George9 et al Limits to 
Coercive Diplomacy (1971); and to an extent Lawrence Freedman’s concept of 
‘Strategic Coercion’. However, I also argue within this thesis that strands of coercion 
theory can clearly be seen in classic work such as On War by Clausewitz.  
 
George and Schelling employed different approaches to the development of theory; 
Schelling deductively deriving theories based on the assumption of unitary rational 
actor. George started with an abstract theory of coercive diplomacy; then by using a 
comparison of different case studies, derived empirically components of a strategy that 
could be utilised by policy makers.
10
 Neither approach has dominated the subsequent 
study of coercion.
11
 From Schelling, Jakobsen adopted the assumption of a unitary 
rational actor; therefore, arguably negating the requirement for detailed information on 
the opponent or a sophisticated behavioural model. Jakobsen was influenced by 
George’s attempt to operationalise conditions for success and identify key variables 
                                                          
8
 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Coercive Diplomacy’, in Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.230;  Michael Berger, ‘How resisting democracies can defeat 
substate Terrorism:  Formulating a theoretical framework for Strategic Coercion against Nationalistic 
substate Terrorist organisations’, (PhD Dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2010), https://research-
repository.standrews.ac.uk/bitstream/10023/889/6/Michael%20Andrew%20Berger%20PhD%20thesis.PD
F, accessed 25 January 2014, pg.32;  Lawrence Freedman, ‘Strategic Coercion’, in Lawrence Freedman 
eds, Strategic Coercion Concepts and Cases, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998), pg.1. 
 
9
 It should be noted that Simons contributed to the second edition - Alexander L George & William E 
Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 2nd
 
revised edn, 1994). 
 
10
 Op.cit. Berger (2010), pg.33. 
 
11
 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory’, International Studies 
Perspectives, Vol.12, No.2 (2011), pg.157. 
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affecting a strategy of coercive diplomacy. Furthermore, he adopted George’s 
methodology of conducting a structured focussed comparison of case studies in order to 
test the ideal policy. From Freedman, Jakobsen adopted the assertion that the level of 
force within a coercive strategy is not dependent on the capabilities that are employed, 
but on whether the opponent has the choice of whether to comply with the demand. For 
example the use of a small Special Forces (SF) unit to physically remove an enemy 
from a position is not coercive as it leaves the opposition no choice; whereas, the overt 
deployment of a full Carrier Strike Task Group (CSTG) that leads to the enemy moving 
from its position before physical force is applied would be coercive, as the opponent 
moves by choice.  
 
Jakobsen argues that coercive diplomacy is ‘a strategy involving the use of a threat of 
punishment and/or limited force short of full-scale military operations to persuade an 
actor to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked on’.12 Interested in why post- 
cold war Western attempts at coercive diplomacy often failed, he derived the ideal 
policy as a ‘theoretical framework’ in order ‘to explain why coercive diplomacy 
succeeds or fails when employed against military aggressors’.13 Jakobsen argues that if 
the ideal policy is correct then coercive diplomacy will succeed when the following 
three conditions apply: 
1.  Credible implementation of the ideal policy comprising; 
a. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives 
quickly with little cost. 
b. A deadline for compliance 
c. An assurance to the adversary against future demands. 
                                                          
12
 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the cold war, a challenge for theory 
and practice, (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 1998), pg.1. 
13
 Ibid. pg.3. 
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d. An offer of carrots for compliance. 
2. Opponent prefers to comply rather than to lose a war. 
3. Opponent acts rationally and does not miscalculate or suffer from misperception. 
Similarly, failure is expected if one of the following three conditions is present;  
1. Failure to implement the ideal policy. 
2. Opponent makes a conscious choice to fight a war it expects to lose rather than 
comply with the coercer demand. 
3. Opponent miscalculates or suffers from misperception.14 
 
The ideal policy was initially derived and tested by Jakobsen against the scenario where 
coercive diplomacy was being employed to undo/stop acts of aggression by states. 
Jakobsen examined the Bosnian conflict, Haiti and Iraq-Kuwait conflict and found a 
correlation between the use of the ideal policy and outcome.15 In a later study, Jakobsen 
examined nine coercive diplomacy exchanges that aimed to stop states from attaining 
nuclear weapons, finding that four resulted in temporary success, two failures, one 
cheap success and two were ongoing (NK & Iran). However, he asserted that the ideal 
policy was not implemented in any of the WMD exchange cases as it proved impossible 
to use force to deny the adversary’s objectives quickly with little cost.16 This study 
confirms Jakobsen’s findings that states do not adopt the ideal policy when trying to 
prevent nuclear proliferation. Although I argue that this is because states are unwilling 
to set a hard deadline; as doing so may commit them to act in order to maintain 
credibility.   
                                                          
14
 Jakobsen, Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the cold war, a challenge for theory and practice, 
pg.33. 
 
15
 Ibid. pg.131. Of 13 exchanges examined, 11 outcomes were predicted correctly. Of the 13 exchanges 
only 3 used the coercive diplomacy in the form of the ideal policy. Of the 13, 10 predicted in failure of 
coercive diplomacy (as it did not employ the ideal policy) and 8 resulted in failure 2 in success.  Of the 3 
that were predicted to succeed (as they did employ the ideal policy) all 3 resulted in success.   
 
16
 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Coercive Diplomacy’, in Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.234. 
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Jakobsen identified that the ideal policy does not say why the policy was chosen.  
However, he asserts that the willingness of states to employ coercive diplomacy is 
dependent on three interrelated variables; the interest perceived to be at stake, the 
perceived prospects of military success and the level of domestic support.
17
 For each of 
these variables he then coded them high, medium or low. Furthermore, for the 
‘perceived interest at stake’ variable he identified that there was a code above high that 
he termed vital. The coding ‘vital’ applied to circumstances where the sovereignty of 
the state itself was deemed to be threatened. As Jakobsen’s study was concerned with 
the use of Western coercive diplomacy to make an opponent stop or withdraw from an 
act of aggression on another actor, he discounted the ‘vital’ coding as for his cases the 
sovereignty of Western states was not being threatened. For the case of acts of 
aggression Jakobsen identified three combinations, which he called patterns, of the 
variables that should lead to states being willing to threaten force. Using the same logic 
I have added an additional pattern, ‘vital’ interest driven, which reflects that in the case 
of nuclear proliferation the coercer may in fact feel its sovereignty or existence is at 
stake and be willing to threaten the use of force even with low military prospect of 
success or low domestic support.  
 
Jakobsen’s patterns predict that the Clinton administration should not have threatened 
force against NK and should have threatened Libya. However, in reality Clinton was 
actively considering a pre-emptive strike and a surge of a 100000 troops into South 
Korea (SK) to deter any aggressive action when UN sanctions were announced. He was 
not considering any use of force against Libya over WMD or terrorism related issues. 
Any use of force against NK had a high risk of escalating into a very costly conflict in 
both blood and treasure. In comparison threatening Libya with force would have had a 
                                                          
17
 Op.cit. Jakobsen (1998), pg.5. 
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lower risk of escalating into a more serious conflict and would have been significantly 
cheaper than a war with NK. Therefore, using the patterns of interests alone does not 
explain the differences in outcomes. I will now explain how this thesis contributes to 
our understanding of coercive diplomacy. 
 
Contribution 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the discipline of strategic studies in two 
distinct ways; firstly, it is the only study to critique Jakobsen’s ideal policy and his 
theory on when states are willing to threaten the use of force. Secondly, it is the only 
study that conducts a structured focussed comparison of NK and Libya using Jakobsen’s 
ideal policy as a framework. This research is significant as, although the thesis is 
primarily about examination of Jakobsen’s ideal policy, it is studying in-depth coercive 
diplomacy as a strategy for preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
 
Another significant contribution is that the study contains primary source material from 
key coercive theorists such as Schelling, Art and Jentleson. Furthermore it contains 
primary evidence from key policy makers involved in the cases such as Gallucci, Wit, 
Welch and Joseph. A full list of those interviewed can be found at Appendix A. 
 
Research Objectives 
The research puzzles that I aim to answer are: 
1. Does Jakobsen’s ideal policy remain valid when applied to the context of state 
attainment of nuclear weapons?  
2. What are the factors, conditions and variables unique to coercive diplomacy 
being employed against states seeking nuclear weapons that may need to be 
incorporated into the ideal policy?  
9 
 
3. How can the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy be improved in order to 
prevent states attaining nuclear weapons? 
 
The behaviour being examined is specifically how states use coercive diplomacy as a 
strategy to prevent other states attaining nuclear weapons. As will be discussed in 
chapter 2, there are fewer cases of coercive diplomacy to stop/undo nuclear proliferation 
than attempts to stop/undo acts of aggression. Therefore, even if all known cases of 
these phenomena were studied, it would still not be enough to statistically validate the 
findings. However, by looking in-depth at a few case studies valuable insights on the 
ideal policy, and coercive diplomacy, have been gained. Clearly as more cases arise, 
statistical methods may be able to give greater confidence in the validity of any 
generalisations. 
  
As this thesis is about testing the utility of Jakobsen’s ideal policy as a strategy of 
coercive diplomacy in a different context than the one it was derived for, there is no 
requirement to test other theories of coercive diplomacy.  
 
Case Studies 
A more detailed explanation of the case selection will be covered in chapter 2. The US 
was chosen as it is the only state that has repeatedly used coercive diplomacy for 
counter proliferation policy objectives. Whilst other cases were considered, such as Iran 
and Iraq, NK and Libya have been chosen as between 1990 to 2003 they were both the 
targets of US coercive diplomacy that had the goal of stopping those states attaining 
nuclear weapons. NK continued its programme and exploded its first nuclear bomb in 
2006; therefore ultimately the US policy clearly failed. Libya appears to have given up 
its WMD programme in 2003; therefore, it appears to be a demonstration of successful 
10 
 
US coercive diplomacy. As the coercion occurred roughly at the same time, the specific 
military and diplomatic capability of the US was the same in both cases; therefore, the 
difference in results must be dependent on other factors. By comparing the case studies 
the research objectives have been met. Whilst studying Iran and Iraq would have 
increased the number of episodes, it would still be insufficient to statistically validate 
any findings, but would have reduced the depth of analysis of each of the chosen case 
studies.  
 
Key findings and arguments 
The main finding of this research is that states do not adopt coercive diplomacy in the 
form of the ideal policy when trying to prevent other states from developing nuclear 
weapons. The key reason that the ideal policy is not implemented is that states are 
unwilling to set deadlines and make direct threats to states that they are seeking to attain 
nuclear weapons. These elements of the ideal policy are not adopted as states do not 
want to limit their options and be forced into acting for the sole reason of maintaining 
credibility.  
 
Secondly, I argue the use of the ideal policy as an analytical framework is useful as a 
starting position to conduct a structured comparison of the cases; however, Jakobsen’s 
ideal policy cannot be used to form accurate predictions of exactly how states will 
behave. Fundamentally, this is because what is a rational decision is dependent on the 
objectives of the decision maker, the information they have access to which in turn 
constructs their perception of the context of the crisis that they are within. Therefore, a 
rational model will form predictions based on the assumption that participants have full 
information of the context that they are making their decision within; which is 
11 
 
impossible. An individual actor may have the vital information needed, but will never 
have all the information. 
 
Coercive diplomacy remains, as Jakobsen points out, a difficult strategy to employ.  
Furthermore, I agree with Jakobsen that the best approach for states is to avoid using 
coercive diplomacy by using other strategies to prevent nuclear proliferation. Primarily 
through reduction in established states nuclear stocks, increased international 
agreements backed by initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), that 
seek to disrupt proliferation networks, and the use of diplomatic bargaining and the 
offering of security assurances. Offering incentives may have a place, but there is a risk 
that this in fact encourages states to obtain or carry out nuclear hedging. The use of 
positive rewards will make some see the actual act of having a programme as a way to 
rewards. This in turn will increase the likelihood that in sometime in the future that they 
will cross the nuclear threshold; as spending money on developing a programme to drop 
it for little gain would be perceived as a waste; so momentum to keep the programme 
going if no rewards are forthcoming is maintained. 
 
I also argue that it is highly unlikely that states, in particular democracies, will be able 
to significantly improve their attempts at coercive diplomacy. Democracies will be 
rarely willing to make direct threats of force that are sufficiently credible and backed by 
a clear deadline; they will be unlikely to be able to offer incentives that can be sustained 
with changes in the mood of domestic audiences; they will also find it difficult to 
provide credible assurances that subsequent governments will abide by. This is also 
most likely the lessons that proliferators are obtaining from study of these cases.    
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Furthermore, I contend that in all the episodes studied within this thesis the opponent 
acted rationally in the pursuit of their objectives. The key objective of both NK and 
Libya was regime survival. For NK obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a 
deterrent or a bargaining chip to trade for the resources and money it required to exist. 
Even if it miscalculated US resolve and the crisis escalated into conflict it clearly had 
good reason to believe that it would be a limited conflict that the regime could weather 
and then use to its advantage internally. Furthermore, the determination of whether an 
act was rational is dependent on the level of analysis (i.e. individual actor, state or 
system) and the objectives of the actor being assessed. Individuals construct their reality 
based on the information that is given to them; therefore, rationality can only be judged 
by assessing whether under that construct they carried out actions that would logically 
lead them closer to achieving their objective. Therefore, the ideal policy based on 
deductive logic and a system level of analysis will determine a different rational 
outcome from that of a rational actor at the individual level with uncertain and limited 
information.  
 
This study also supports the argument of many scholars
18
 that context is important. 
Strategy cannot be applied like a mathematical formula and lead to certain success. The 
differing context of the case studies and in particular the motivation of the leaders and 
strategic position of the states involved hugely impacted on the outcomes if the cases 
studied. This is particular evident in the US’ willingness to use force. The rational 
formulae determined by Jakobsen would indicate that Clinton should have threatened 
force against Libya and not NK. However, he was at the brink of making a decision that 
could have easily escalated to a costly war with the DPRK and did not threaten Gaddafi 
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directly with force. The context, psychology of the main actors, and data available to 
them all played into producing an outcome different from that a detached rational 
calculation would predict. Studying and comparing these cases is only useful in that it 
gives us guidelines that may work in similar circumstances.  
 
Another point, which backs up theoretical points raised by George and Schelling, is that 
there is a clear blurring between coercive diplomacy and deterrence when looking at the 
demands made in the case of nuclear proliferation. Telling a target that there is a red 
line that if they cross will result in a reaction would commonly be taken as a deterrent 
threat. However, if you are telling an opponent to stop an action that they have already 
started that is coercive diplomacy. Therefore, telling an opponent to not pass a certain 
point of a nuclear programme (i.e. do not enrich uranium to 80% or move spent fuel 
rods) sits in a blurred line between these strategies. They have moved towards the line, 
but not necessarily across it.  
 
I also argue that for nuclear proliferation there is a strategic window where coercive 
diplomacy is viable strategy. This window starts at the moment that enough intelligence 
can be obtained to make a convincing case to gain the international and domestic 
backing to be able to implement an effective strategy of coercive diplomacy. It finishes 
the moment that the target demonstrates or is believed to hold an effective delivery 
system and nuclear weapon; as at that point coercive diplomacy becomes too risky and 
deterrence becomes the most likely course of action. 
 
Limitations of the thesis 
There are limitations to this thesis; firstly, I have only studied 4 episodes which are not 
enough to derive any statistically viable relationship between prediction and outcome. If 
14 
 
this is to be achieved, more cases, as they arise, will need to be studied in a similar 
manner. 
 
I have only had access to open source material and experts who were willing to be 
interviewed. I have then had to make judgements and interpretations of what this limited 
data means in relation to Jakobsen’s ideal policy. This process increases the risk that 
what I have concluded compared to the actual reality may diverge. If I had access to key 
members of the Libyan and NK governments and their internal documents I would 
perhaps have arrived at a different interpretation of events.  
 
Normative premise 
One criticism that could be levelled at this study is that it is immoral, as it is looking at 
methods that more powerful states can develop strategies to influence less powerful 
states through the use of threats of force. Furthermore, that coercive diplomacy as a 
threat based strategy is illegitimate as it specifically states within the UN charter that 
‘all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’.19 
 
Both these points are valid. However, the research is primarily focussed on testing 
Jakobsen’s ideal policy; therefore, is theory testing and a valid academic pursuit to 
examine a phenomenon that is already in existence. Secondly, those lessons that may be 
taken by policy makers are likely to improve the ability to stop nuclear proliferation 
with subsequent positive effect on international security.  
 
                                                          
19
 UN Charter, Chapter I: Purposes and Principles, Article 2, Point 4. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml, accessed 29 Aug 2015. 
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Furthermore, there is value in studying illegitimate phenomena. It would not seem 
strange to study crimes; even if such studies would offer criminals lessons on how to 
improve their profession, as it usually provides greater insights into how these crimes 
could be dealt with better or prevented. Improving our understanding of coercive 
diplomacy may in fact lead states to try more innovative upstream proliferation 
prevention measures, as it is clear that coercive diplomacy is difficult to implement 
successfully.  
  
Thesis Structure 
The first chapter will examine coercive theory with the aim of introducing the key 
concepts that will be drawn upon within the rest of thesis. It will primarily be a review 
of the relevant literature; however, original quotes from key theorists will be included. 
The chapter is tailored to look at the work underpinning the ideal policy; therefore, is 
primarily focussed on the theories of Schelling, George, Freedman and Jakobsen.  
However, it will start by looking at Clausewitz arguing that there is a clear connection 
to coercive literature. Furthermore, criticism and key conceptual points from other 
coercive scholars such as, Byman&Waxman, Art and Schultz will be included. It will 
conclude that there are three key areas of debate that emerge from the literature; 
terminology, the assumption of a rational actor and what constitutes the coercive use of 
force. 
 
The second chapter will examine in more depth positivism, the assumption of a 
rationality that underpins the ideal policy; recognising that whilst there are valid 
criticisms of both, they are a legitimate approach for this thesis to adopt. The chapter 
will then set out the key empirical issues that were considered in undertaking this study, 
followed by derivation of the analytical framework and claims that are to be examined 
16 
 
within the thesis. The next section will derive the criteria for case selection, determining 
cases that meet the criteria and justifying my selection of Libya and NK. Finally, I will 
point out some of the key studies that have been done on these cases regarding nuclear 
proliferation; highlighting that this research is different as it is the only one to use 
Jakobsen’s ideal policy as an analytical framework to conduct a structured focussed 
comparison with.  
 
The case studies take place over two chapters (Chapters 3&4). In both of the cases I 
have further subdivided them into two exchanges. The first exchange covers the period 
of the Clinton administration and the second exchange covers the period of the Bush 
administration. This division is due to a clear change in the rhetoric, and to a degree the 
policies, of the administrations. Furthermore, by in effect having 4 rather than 2 cases it 
adds validity to the findings. In chapter 5, I conduct a comparison of the two cases and 
discuss the empirical findings. The final chapter then provides an overall conclusion to 
the thesis; tying the empirical findings in with the conceptual and theoretical discussions 
of the previous chapters and answering the research questions. The chapter also 
highlights areas where future research could be conducted. 
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Chapter 1 – Coercion and Coercive Diplomacy Theory 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the key concepts and themes from coercive theory 
that will be drawn upon throughout this thesis. Furthermore, it aims to clearly establish 
the gap in the current literature that this thesis will occupy; which is primarily that it is 
the only independent critique of Jakobsen’s ideal policy. The study of coercion firmly 
sits within the strategic studies discipline of International Relations (IR) with many of 
its roots found in past masters such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz.
1
 Furthermore, the 
theoretical underpinning of strategic studies, and in particular the study of coercion, can 
be viewed as pertaining closest to the realist paradigm, as coercive strategy at its most 
simplistic relies on the logic of power, with a more powerful actor coercing a lesser 
power to meet a political objective.  
 
Whilst there have been other theories put forward on various coercive exchanges
2
, the 
theory of interest to this thesis is set out by Jakobsen in The Western Uses of Coercive 
Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and Practice (2002). Jakobsen’s 
ideal policy is of particular interest as it uniquely draws upon the work of Thomas 
Schelling, Alexander George and Lawrence Freedman to derive an ideal policy that 
could be used to examine Western uses of coercive diplomacy. Jakobsen tested the ideal 
policy using George’s structured focussed comparison methodology against cases where 
coercive diplomacy was applied to undo acts of military aggression.
3
 Key to this thesis 
is Jacobsen’s argument that although the ideal policy was ‘developed to apply to 
counter aggression only, but its logic should hold for attempts to counter terrorism and 
                                                          
1
 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, On the Nature of War, (Ware, Wordsworth Editions’ Limited, 
1997), pg.5 - “Warfare therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will”.   
 
2
 The most notable of these will be covered within this chapter include Schelling, George, Robert Pape, 
Bruce Jentleson, Byman&Waxman, Art&Cronin et al, Freedman et al.  
 
3
 Jakobsen, Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the cold war, a challenge for theory and practice, 
pg.7. 
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WMD acquisition as well’.4 Furthermore, he tested his nuclear proliferation hypotheses 
on nine cases; finding that four resulted in temporary success, two failures, one cheap 
success and two were ongoing, none of the exchanges implemented the ideal policy as it 
proved impossible to use force to ‘deny the adversary’s objectives quickly with little 
cost’.5 However, there is no evidence within the literature that the ideal policy has been 
independently critiqued or examined. 
 
The theoretical underpinning of the ideal policy is primarily developed from the work of 
Thomas C. Schelling’s Arms and Influence (1966), Alexander L George’s The Limits of 
Coercive Diplomacy (1971)
,
 and
 Lawrence Freedman’s chapter on ‘Strategic Coercion.6 
There are fundamental differences to the approach of Schelling and George. Schelling 
applied a deductive approach to assert that rational adversaries often use the threat of 
military force as part of their diplomacy.
7
 Furthermore, he introduces the concept of 
‘compellence’ to explain how states use the threat of hurting the opponent to aid in their 
diplomatic bargaining. Alexander George built upon an abstract theory of coercive 
diplomacy by using a comparison of different case studies to derive components of a 
strategy that could be utilised by policy makers.
8
 George coined the term ‘coercive 
diplomacy’ emphasising that it was a defensive variant of Schelling’s concept of 
compellence and that it was a strategy that could include a more ‘flexible diplomacy 
that can employ rational persuasion and accommodation as well as coercive threats’.9 
                                                          
4
 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Coercive Diplomacy’, in Alan Collins eds, Contemporary Security Studies, 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.231. 
 
5
 Ibid. pg.234. 
 
6
 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Strategic Coercion’, in Lawrence Freedman eds, Strategic Coercion Concepts and 
Cases, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1998). 
 
7
 Op.cit. Berger pg.32. 
 
8
 Ibid. pg.33. 
9
 Alexander L George & William E Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, (Boulder, 
Colo.:Westview Press, 2nd
 
revised edn, 1994),  pg.7.  
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The different approaches to theory building have been largely reflected in the studies of 
coercion that have followed with neither approach dominating.
10
 
 
As stated the focus of this thesis is to determine the utility of Jakobsen’s ideal policy as 
an analytical tool for examining coercive diplomacy employed to prevent states 
attaining nuclear weapons. Therefore, this chapter will first examine where the coercive 
theory sits within the academic literature; examining theories of past masters such Sun 
Tzu and Clausewitz. It will then argue that, although Schelling claims to have ‘learnt 
nothing’ from Clausewitz, there are clear connections between their approaches and 
concepts. It will then examine connections between limited war theory and coercive 
theory before arguing that whilst they are connected, if not overlapping, concepts it is 
useful to maintain a separation as the term ‘war’ is difficult to define and would confuse 
the use of coercion where physical force has not been initiated.   
 
I will then examine the coercive theories developed by Schelling, George and Freedman 
that underpin Jakobsen’s ideal policy. Furthermore, I will review Jakobsen’s assessment 
of these theories and the ideal policy in more depth. The chapter will conclude that there 
are three clear areas of debate within coercive theory; Firstly, there is a lack of 
consensus on the terminology leading to several different terms such as limited war, 
strategic coercion
11
, military coercion
12
, coercion, compellence and coercive diplomacy. 
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 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory’, International Studies 
Perspectives, Vol.12, No.2, (2011), pg.157. 
 
11
 Op.cit. Freedman (1998), pg.15. ‘strategic coercion’ as the ‘deliberate and purposive use of threats to 
influence another’s strategic choices’ 
 
12
 Stephen J.Cimbala, Coercive Military Strategy, (Texas, Texas A&M University Press, 1998), pg.14. 
‘My concept of coercive military strategy includes but is not limited to, coercive diplomacy.  Coercive 
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“compellence” as well as some uses of conventional military action within the compass of coercive 
military strategy.’ 
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This often leads to terms such as coercive diplomacy, compellence and coercion being 
used interchangeably, which questions their delineation as concepts. Secondly, there is a 
debate to the utility of using the assumption of a unitary rational actor, as many coercive 
theorists argue that it does not describe how states behave and needs to be replaced by a 
more sophisticated empirically grounded behavioural model. This issue of rationality 
will be examined more comprehensively within chapter 2. The last area of contention is 
what constitutes an acceptable level of force within a coercive strategy. Furthermore, I 
argue that there is a clear gap in the literature on coercive diplomacy as there has not 
been a detailed study, other than by Jakobsen, which tests the utility of the ideal policy 
when employed to prevent states from attaining nuclear weapons as a strategy or as an 
explanatory/predictive framework. Therefore, little theoretical consideration has been 
given to the specific problems that this goal may have to a strategy of coercive 
diplomacy. 
 
Theoretical grounding of Coercive Theories 
Coercion, the ability to achieve your objective through the use of a threat, is not a new 
concept and has always been an element of human relations. Sun Tzu writing in the fifth 
century BC stated that ‘Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the 
pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true 
pinnacle of excellence’.13 Although, this statement is arguably about achieving 
objectives by peaceful means, be they politico-diplomatic, economic, or ideological; 
before resorting to force
14, Sun Tzu’s does describe an act of violence to attack an 
enemy’s strategy and persuade him to a particular course of action when making this 
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 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Ralph D Sawyer, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 1994), pg. 
177. 
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statement.
15
  
 
Clausewitz’s states ‘if this influence of the political object is once permitted, as it then 
must be, there is no longer any limit, and we must be pleased to come down to such 
warfare as consists in a mere threatening of the enemy and in negotiating’.16 This 
statement indicates the utility of threatening the use of force in order to achieve an 
objective without actually having to resort to military action; in effect ‘coercion’. 
However, there is little recognition of Clausewitz’s theories relating specifically to the 
study of coercion. Often Clausewitz’s work has been seen to be arguing for nothing but 
decisive battle and resorting to the utmost use of force; however, even his critics such as 
Liddel Hart claim this interpretation ‘arose largely form his disciples too shallow and 
too extreme interpretation of it, overlooking his qualifying clauses’.17 Furthermore, as 
will be discussed later in this chapter Clausewitz’s work has often been connected to the 
concept of ‘limited war’ which is subtly different from coercion. 
 
Schelling, who is viewed as producing one of the first definitive work on coercion
18
, 
argues that he ‘didn’t learn anything from Clausewitz’19 and that ‘Clausewitz was not 
much on coercion, he didn’t really view war as a bargaining process, he saw it as a zero 
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sum game, it all depended upon skill, manpower and resources’.20 However, there are 
connections between both Schelling and Clausewitz’s work and approach. For example 
Clausewitz argues that ‘war therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our 
opponent to fulfil our will’21 and that ‘occupation of the enemy’s territory, not with a 
view to keeping it, but in order to levy contribution upon it, or to devastate it’.22 
Furthermore, he points out that ‘war should be viewed above all things according to the 
probability of its character, and its leading features as they are to be deduced from the 
political forces and proportions’.23 Therefore, Clausewitz recognises that war is about 
compelling the opponent to meet your objective and that the amount of force used 
should be dependent on that political objective. It is true that Clausewitz argues that 
primarily this should be through the destruction of the enemy’s army24 as this in turn 
denies them the ability to resist and forces them to comply with your demands. 
However, it may be through more limited measures such as causing ‘devastation (hurt) 
within the enemies’ territory. The means used depends on the importance of the ends 
and the differing proportions (or capabilities) of the opposing sides. This leads to the 
concept of limited and unlimited objectives which will be discussed further in this 
chapter.   
 
In turn Schelling argues that ‘war is always a bargaining process, where states issue 
threats, proposals, counter threats, assurances, concessions and demonstrations in the 
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pg.29. 
 
23
 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Translation JJ Graham, New and Revised Edition, Vol III, (London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), pg125.   
 
24
 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Translation JJ Graham, (Ware, Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997), 
pg.38. 
23 
 
form of actions rather than words, or actions accompanied by words.’25 Schelling also 
states that ‘the threat that compels rather than deters, therefore, often takes the form of 
administering the punishment until the other acts’.26 Therefore, Schelling recognises 
that the power to hurt through military force is useful in order to achieve a political or 
bargaining objective. However, he does appear to slightly contradict his former 
statement, as he points also out that a state may not need to ‘enter a bargaining process 
if it has enough military force to achieve its objectives through its own strength, skill 
and ingenuity’.27 Therefore, in this instance it would appear that ‘war; is not ‘always’ a 
bargaining process; as no conversation is required and the desired objective is just taken 
by ‘brute force’. An analogy for this would be that a skilled thief does not need ‘enter 
into a process of bargaining’ with a jewellers if he has the capability to steal what he 
desires; unless you make the tenuous argument that the bargain is the thief gains a 
‘diamond’ and the jewellers ‘nothing’.  
 
Clausewitz makes a similar point but rather than viewing coercion as a strategy that the 
stronger power can choose to adopt from a position of strength, he argues that 
bargaining occurs when one side does not have the capability or will to take by ‘brute 
force’ stating:    
When political objects are unimportant, motives weak, the excitement of forces 
small, a cautious commander tries in all kinds of ways, without great crises and 
bloody solutions, to twist himself skilfully into a peace through the characteristic 
weaknesses of his enemy in the field and in the cabinet, we have not right to find 
fault with him, if the premises on which he acts are well founded and justified by 
success.
28
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Another common aspect of their concepts is Schelling recognises what Clausewitz 
would have termed ‘friction’; however, as Freedman points out ‘whereas Clausewitz 
saw friction as undermining all but the most dogged of strategies, Schelling saw how 
these uncertainties might be used creatively, if recklessly’.29 Some of the similarities in 
their arguments are due to the deductive approach adopted; both form an abstract 
concept based on the assumption of a rational actors. Rapoport even categorises 
Schelling as a ‘Neo-Clausewitz’ because of his use of the assumption of rationality; 
although he does recognise that whilst Clausewitz viewed the world in terms of a zero-
sum game; Schelling’s emphasises is on how enemies can cooperate in order to achieve 
mutual advantage.
30
 Both Schelling and Clausewitz point out that the rationality of their 
model may not reflect the complexity of reality.   
 
A key difference between Schelling and Clausewitz, is the former’s theories are 
articulated for a situation where coercion is being used in a state of war; therefore, he 
does not touch upon diplomacy in any depth. This is evident from Clausewitz’s 
definition of strategy as ‘the theory of the use of combats for the object of war’31 
whereas Schelling states strategy ‘is not concerned with the efficient application of 
force but with the exploitation of potential force.  It is concerned not just with enemies 
who dislike each other but with partners who distrust or disagree with each other’.32 
Therefore, Schelling’s definition is more expansive and includes conflict before military 
force has been used.  
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An assumption of rationality and the derivation of an abstract theory underpin both 
Schelling and Clausewitz’s work. Furthermore, both recognise the use of military forces 
to ‘compel’ an opponent to achieve your objective. However, whilst Clausewitz’s work 
was never completed and is contradictory in places; Schelling’s study is complete and 
focussed on coercion. Furthermore, Schelling’s analysis is rooted in the more 
recognisable nuclear age where states have enormous potential to hurt an opponent from 
great distance without committing conventional forces. As one of the key theorists 
underpinning Jakobsen’s work, this chapter will now examine Schelling’s work in more 
depth. 
 
Thomas Schelling – Coercion and Compellence 
Schelling’s theories on coercion are primarily expressed in The Strategy of Conflict 
(1960) and Arms and Influence (1966). The key contribution of Schelling’s work to the 
field of coercion is the concept of ‘compellence’. Schelling terms the use of threats to 
bring about some desired action as ‘coercion’; although he does emphasise that coercion 
could include deterrence; that is, ‘preventing action, as well as forcing action through 
fear of consequences’ which he termed ‘compellence’.33 Schelling did use the term 
‘coercive diplomacy’34, although he does not define the term, but from the context it 
would appear to be interchangeable with compellence. Schelling himself states: 
To be honest, where and when I used the term coercive, my guess is if I was to 
use the term today, since compellence has become pretty widely understood as 
part of the vocabulary, I think I would only use coercive if it meant either or 
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both, as in deterrence or compellence, which are both forms of coercion…….if I 
use the term coercive diplomacy I probably meant either one.
35
 
 
 
Fundamental to Schelling’s concept of compellence is that it involves initiating an 
action that will only cease if the opponent responds as demanded.
36
 Therefore, where 
the objective of a deterrent threat is often ‘communicated by the very preparations that 
make the threat credible’, a compellent threat tends to communicate what is required to 
be compliant with the demand, and is less likely to communicate the exact nature of the 
threat.
37
 Compellence is therefore recognised as being more difficult as it is an action 
that is trying to get a target to change its behaviour, rather than to maintain the status 
quo. In contrast, deterrent threats are easier for the target to appear to have ignored or 
submit to without loss of face.
38
 
 
As coercion requires finding a bargain that an adversary will accept
39
 and the threat of 
damage to come it is a strategy heavily reliant on communication between opponents. 
Therefore, Schelling argues that it is the ‘pace of diplomacy, not the pace of battle, that 
governs actions; and while diplomacy may not require that force is used slowly, it does 
require that there is capacity to cause further damage’.40 Pape argues that Schelling’s 
compellence strategy is a risk based strategy as it indicates to the opponent the risk of 
the hurt that will follow if they maintain a particular course of action. However, he 
points out that this strategy may be ineffective if trying to deny an opponent an 
objective, as slowing down the use of force ‘may improve the ability of victims to 
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adjust, and so may be unable to threaten even as much damage as punishment 
strategies.’41   
 
Schelling argues that a compellent threat has to have a definite deadline, otherwise it 
becomes a ‘ceremony with no consequence’ if ‘too little time is given compliance 
becomes impossible; if too much time is given then compliance becomes unnecessary. 
Thus compellence involves timing in a way that deterrence usually does not’.42 Another 
aspect of a compellent threat identified by Schelling is that it requires assurance to be 
given to the target that compliance will result in the threat not being undertaken. This is 
essential ‘as the object of a threat is to give somebody a choice to comply’.43 If the 
target has no assurance that their compliance will lead to a more positive outcome, they 
may believe that it is not worth the risk of complying.  
 
A common criticism of Schelling’s is the strategies of deterrence and compellence in 
practice often merge.
44
 Byman and Waxman argue that in effect coercive and deterrent 
threats are extreme ends of a spectrum of threats.
45
 A finding of this thesis is that in 
certain contexts they do become blurred; however, that does not detract from the utility 
of having the extreme ends of the concepts defined.  
 
Governments can be broadly categorised into types such as democracies, dictatorships, 
authoritarian etc. The type of government has a clear influence on the way that they 
would coerce or how they would respond to coercion. This is apparent in Kenneth 
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Schultz’s Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy where he clearly demonstrates that 
democracies are restrained in the type of threats they are willing to make due to the 
inherent need for internal democratic debate during policy making.
46
 However, Schultz 
also asserts that any threat that is made by a democracy is more likely to be credible 
than an equivalent threat from a nondemocratic counterpart, as democracies only 
threaten when there is clear resolve to carry out the threat if required.
47
  
 
Several authors
48
 argue that Schelling’s abstract rationality fails to provide an adequate 
description of how states actually behave. Byman and Waxman argue this ‘fosters static, 
one-sided thinking about coercive contests. It encourages analysts to think about costs 
and benefits as independent variables that can be manipulated by the coercer, while the 
adversary remains passive and re-evaluates their perceived interests’.49 However, some 
argue that Schelling was not rational enough and that he inadequately understood the 
central theorems of game theory and did not apply it fully; although others have 
countered this asserting that his work shows that it is possible to be clear, precise, and 
logically rigorous without being overtly mathematical.
50
   
 
A more in-depth analysis of rationality will be undertaken in Chapter 2. However, a 
critique that perhaps shows the misunderstanding of some authors on Schelling work is 
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given by Jermy who states that Schelling theories are flawed as ‘any theory founded on 
the idea of rational behaviour in war was – and is – flawed because, as Clausewitz 
explains and the record shows, armed conflicts and war are political conditions where 
human behaviour is often at its most irrational.’51 However, Schelling, like Clausewitz, 
did not expect actors to always act rationally, but asserted that the assumption of 
‘rationality’ was a useful starting point for the production of theory.52 The fact that 
Schelling’s theories, like those of Clausewitz, do not automatically translate into a ‘how 
to formulate a strategy of coercion’ that a practitioner might want does not diminish 
their utility to understanding the concept of coercion.   
 
Peifer argues that Schelling’s ‘distinguishing between “brute force” wars and coercive 
wars has caused successor theorists to neglect Carl von Clausewitz and Julian Corbett’s 
concept of limited and unlimited war, and instead focus on coercive war as a distinct, 
more openly political form of war than traditional war’.53  Furthermore he argues that it 
is ‘more useful than distinguishing between “coercive wars” and “brute force” wars, is 
to think in terms of limited and unlimited wars. Far more useful than the coercive-brute 
force dichotomy of modern coercion theory is the traditional distinction between limited 
and unlimited wars’.54 It is true that Schelling ignores Clausewitz; however, discarding 
coercive theory for limited war theory, has its own conceptual problems.  
The key issue is defining ‘limited war’, and in particular ‘war’. Clausewitz stated ‘if we 
only require from the enemy a small sacrifice, then we content ourselves with aiming at 
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a small equivalent by the War, and we expect to attain that by moderate efforts. The 
enemy reasons in very much the same way’.55 Therefore, Clausewitz asserted that war 
either had a limited or unlimited objective. A limited objective required limited 
resources to achieve it. This concept was developed further by Corbett who argued that 
‘limited wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the belligerents, but upon the 
amount of that strength which they are able or willing to bring to bear at the decisive 
point’.56 Furthermore that: 
A war may be limited not only because the importance of the object is too 
limited to call forth the whole national force, but also because the sea may be 
made to present an insuperable physical obstacle to the whole national force 
being brought to bear. That is to say, a war may be limited physically by the 
strategically isolation of the object, as well as morally by its comparative 
unimportance.
 57
 
 
 
Corbett’s view was that sea powers could choose how much force to apply to achieve an 
objective as a concern of a counter strike or reprisal into their territory was minimal.
58
 
In the nuclear age the concept of limited war developed in importance with theorists 
such as Osgood in 1957 pointing out that: 
A limited war is one in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which 
they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not demand the utmost 
military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be 
accommodated in a negotiated settlement……It demands of the belligerents 
only a fractional commitment of their human and physical resources. It permits 
their economic, social, and political patterns of existence to continue without 
serious disruption.
59
 
 
 
Schelling in both Strategy of Conflict and Arms and Influence discusses various aspects 
of limited warfare. Within the Strategy of Conflict he argues that: 
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The problem of limiting warfare involves not a continuous range of possibilities 
from most favourable to least favourable for either side; it is a lumpy, discrete 
world that is better able to recognise qualitative than quantitative differences, 
that is embarrassed by the multiplicity of choices, and that forces both sides to 
accept some dictation from the elements themselves.
60
 
 
Furthermore, he points out that ‘in limited warfare, two things are being bargained over, 
the outcome of the war, and the mode of conducting the war itself’.61 He also explains 
that thresholds can be reached by ‘implicit bargaining about the rules of behaviour, 
about what one would do, or stop doing, according to how the other side behaved’.62 
Therefore, he clearly does set out scenarios where ‘warfare’ can be restrained to a more 
limited form. It is important to note that Schelling states ‘warfare’ not ‘war’. 
 
It is hard to define ‘war’. To Clausewitz defining war was ‘abstruse’ and he viewed it as 
‘nothing but a duel on an extensive scale’63; a view that implied physical conflict. Colin 
Gray usefully differentiates between war and warfare asserting that ‘war is a 
relationship between belligerents; it is the whole context for warfare’64 and that 
‘although war must be characterised by organised violence, belligerents employ many 
of the policy instruments available to them. War can be prosecuted in several ways, 
among which the battlefield may not be the most important’.65 Grays’s statement still 
implies that physical conflict is undertaken during war. War must involve the 
undertaking of physical conflict between the belligerents; otherwise states would always 
be at war, as they will always be engaged in political, economic, cultural competition or 
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disagreements with an opponent. The United Kingdom (UK) is not viewed to be at 
‘war’ with Argentina despite political disagreement, including the use of UK military 
deterrence, over the issue of the Falklands Islands.  
 
However, Schelling’s conceptualisation of coercion and compellence do not necessarily 
take place within a state of ‘war’ and can be applied to a range of objectives; whereas 
the concept of limited and unlimited war is fundamentally concerned with the objective 
of limiting a war from escalating to ‘total war’. As Freedman points out limited war: 
Requires that belligerents choose not to fight at full capacity, in order that a 
conflict neither gains in intensity nor expands in space and time. This is different 
from accepting those natural limits imposed by resources and geography, and 
also from circumstances in which a strong state employs only limited forces to 
deal with opponents with inferior capabilities. Against inferior opponents 
complete victories can still be achieved with limited effort. To be a ‘limited 
war’, the limits must be accepted by both parties.66 
 
It may be that coercive strategies are required to limit a war; and this is why there 
appears to be an overlap between the concept of ‘limited war’ and ‘coercive theory’. 
Furthermore, the kinds of capabilities required to conduct limited wars are often the 
same required to conduct effective coercion.
67
 However, focussing purely on ‘limited 
and unlimited war’ would limit the study of coercion to ‘in war’ scenarios. This is not to 
say that Schelling’s idea of ‘brute force’ is not without difficulties that will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
There are clear overlaps in the concept of limited and unlimited objectives/war and 
Schelling’s concept of coercion/compellence. Whilst this may lead to some confusion; 
there is utility in distinguishing coercive theory from limited war. Furthermore, for the 
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purpose of this study I will remain focussed on the coercive theory that underpins 
Jakobsen’s ideal policy.  
 
Alexander George – Coercive Diplomacy 
Alexander George’s work is the other key theoretical contributor Jakobsen’s ideal 
policy. Jakobsen was particularly influenced by George’s development of structured 
focussed comparison to develop theory through analysis of case studies where coercive 
diplomacy had been employed. Furthermore, George was the first theorist to 
specifically define ‘coercive diplomacy’, thus separating it from Schelling’s 
compellence. George was critical of the way in which game theory and rational choice 
had been applied to the study of coercion and did not believe that it was possible to 
operationalise abstract theories sufficiently by means of logical deduction.
68
 Instead, he 
opted for an inductive approach seeking to identify the conditions inﬂuencing coercive 
success and replacing Schelling’s rational unitary actor assumption with an empirically 
derived behavioural model of the adversary.
69
  
 
George distinguishes coercion from coercive diplomacy, asserting that the latter 
emphasises the use of threats and the exemplary use of limited force to persuade a target 
to back down. If force is used, it is just enough to demonstrate determination to protect 
one’s interests and to establish credibility of one’s threat.70 Therefore, coercive 
diplomacy is an attractive strategy because it offers the chance to achieve reasonable 
objectives in a crisis with less cost in blood and treasure. Furthermore, it is likely to 
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have fewer political and psychological costs, and less likely to escalate than with 
traditional military strategies. Moreover, a crisis resolved by means of coercive 
diplomacy is also less likely to damage future relations between the two sides than 
war.
71
 George does not use the term compellence for two reason; firstly he wished to 
‘distinguish between defensive and offensive uses of coercive threats’; Secondly, he 
wanted to empathise the ‘possibility flexible diplomacy’, ‘rational persuasion and 
accommodation’ as well as coercive threats.72  
 
George identifies three types (shown in table 1) of demands that a coercive diplomacy 
strategy can be built around. He asserts that it is ‘a defensive strategy that is employed 
to change a status quo situation in his own favour’.73 Moreover, he argues that 
‘defensive uses are quite distinct from offensive ones, wherein coercive threats can be 
employed aggressively to persuade a victim to give up something of value without 
putting up resistance’.74 However, George’s Type C (Persuade opponent to make 
changes in government), as he recognised
75
, clearly could be viewed as offensive. 
Freedman point out that ‘there are few more offensive demands that can be made, for 
this is a challenge to basic sovereignty’ and that ‘the insistence that coercive diplomacy 
is defensive is neither tenable in practice not useful analytically’.76 Under the same 
logic, I would argue Type B and C in some scenarios could be viewed as offensive as it 
is possible that they could challenge sovereignty. For example the 1999 NATO 
bombing campaign against Serbia for its refusal to sign an agreement which it believed 
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compromised its sovereignty by having NATO troops stationed within Kosovo and its 
unwillingness to withdraw troops from the region.
77
 Therefore, the separation between 
offensive and defensive is so context dependent that it is of little use analytically. 
 
Three types of Defensive Coercive Diplomacy
78
 
 Coercive Diplomacy 
Deterrence Type A Type B Type C 
Persuade opponent 
not to initiate an 
action  
Persuade 
opponent to stop 
short of the goal. 
Persuade opponent 
to undo the action. 
Persuade 
opponent to make 
changes in 
government. 
Table 1.1 
 
George argues that the abstract model is ‘an incomplete deductive theory’79 that is 
limited for several reasons; Firstly, it assumes a rational opponent.
 80
 Secondly, it gives 
policy makers only limited aid in devising a policy using coercive diplomacy for any 
specific situation.
81
 Thirdly, it cannot be used to predict whether coercive diplomacy 
will be successful in a specific situation.
82
 In order to overcome these limitations, 
George sets out four tasks need to undertake to develop an effective strategy, they are; 
Fill in the variables of the abstract model, identify the variant of the strategy of coercive 
diplomacy to be applied, replace assumption of rational opponent with an empirically 
derived behavioural model and then take contextual variables into account. George 
asserts that the variables to be filled in are: 
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1. What to demand of the opponent? 
2. Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand? 
3. What punishment to threaten for noncompliance, and how to make it sufficiently 
potent and credible? 
4. Whether to also offer positive inducements and, if so, what ‘carrots’ to offer 
together with the ‘stick’ to induce acceptance of the demand?83 
 
What to demand of the opponent seems obvious; however, as George points out there is 
a relationship between demand and motivation; highlighting the more a demand affects 
the targets vital interests, the more motivated the target will be to resist. Therefore, only 
demands reflecting the coercer vital interests should be made, as only then will the 
coercer have the motivation to carry out threats. The competing motivations of the 
coercer and coerced George termed ‘asymmetry of motivation’.84 Determining the 
‘sense of urgency’ required is a difficult area of this concept? George points out that this 
can be done by communicating a time based deadline or by ‘actions such as alerts and 
deployments of military forces, which may be coupled with verbal communications 
indicating that time is short’.85 The latter method in particular has the possibility of 
miscalculation and inadvertent escalation. Another criticism is George’s use of 
‘punishment’ for noncompliance. Pape convincingly argues that denial strategies are 
more likely to succeed than punishment.
86
 This assertion is backed up Art’s study that 
found ‘high denial was present in four of the five cases of success’ studied.87  
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The offer of an incentive, or ‘carrot’, is an important element of George’s strategy. The 
magnitude and significance of the carrot can range from small face-saving concessions 
to substantial payments.
88
 The level of threat to positive inducements generally relies on 
two variables; firstly, what one demands of the opponent and secondly how strongly 
motivated they are to comply with that demand.
89
 
 
The second strategic task that that George identifies a policy maker needs to make is the 
preferred variant of coercive diplomacy to be applied. He identifies four variants of the 
strategy. Firstly, an ultimatum comprising of three elements; (1) a demand on the 
opponent, (2) A time limit or sense of urgency for compliance with the demand, (3) A 
threat of punishment for noncompliance that is credible and sufficiently potent to 
convince the opponent that compliance if preferable to other courses of action.
 90
 Lauren 
identifies four risks with such an ultimatum
91
; firstly, the opponent may reject the 
ultimatum; therefore, the coercer would have to decide whether to carry out the 
threatened punishment.
92
 Secondly, the opponent may reject the ultimatum because they 
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would lose face.
93
 Thirdly, the opponent may take the ultimatum seriously but decide to 
initiate war himself rather than accept the demand.
94
  Fourthly, the opponent may 
neither accept nor reject the ultimatum outright but may attempt to defuse its coercive 
impact by partially accepting the demand, hoping thereby to force the coercing power to 
settle for less.
95
 It is an argument within this thesis that the US did not adopt a definitive 
deadline as this would have committed it to action in order to maintain credibility.    
 
The 'tacit ultimatum' variant contains a specific time limit for compliance; however, the 
threat is not detailed but hinted through other means such as the movement of military 
forces.
96
 Another method is the 'gradual turning of the screw', where the coercing power 
neither creates a sense of urgency nor does it signal the nature of threatened 
punishment. Instead, its demands are accompanied by a threat that punishment will be 
gradually increased if compliance does not occur.
97
 The ‘try and see approach’ involves 
the communication of a clear demand, with no deadline, but a limited coercive threat is 
made.
98
 George does accept that in practice the ‘try and see’ approach and the ‘gradual 
turning of the screw’ may be blurred.99 The latter is the approach adopted by the US in 
the cases examined within this thesis.  
 
George’s third strategic task is to replace the general assumption of a ‘rational’ 
opponent with an empirically derived behavioural model arguing that policy makers 
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must derive strategy of coercive diplomacy with ‘sensitivity to the psychological, 
cultural, and political variables that may influence an adversary’s behaviour’.100 This is 
a valid argument; however, rationality will be discussed briefly later in this chapter and 
in more depth within chapter 2. 
 
The final task in making a coercive diplomacy strategy is to take account of contextual 
variables and success conditions. George identifies five contextual variables and nine 
conditions for coercive diplomacy to be successful. The three that seem particularly 
significant for influencing the outcome have to do with the opponent’s perception and 
are that an asymmetry of motivation operates in favour of the coercing power, that it is 
time urgent to respond to the coercing power’s demands, and that the coercing power 
will engage in escalation that would impose unacceptable costs. Furthermore, the clarity 
of the settlement terms
101
 is also deemed to be important. Kagan makes several criticism 
of this approach. Firstly, that the sheer number of variables (fourteen altogether) makes 
it difficult to apply George’s strategy as an analytical tool. A second criticism is that the 
variables are stated in too general and abstract form and are in need of greater 
operationalisation. Furthermore, that the division of the fourteen variables into 
‘contextual variables’ and conditions favouring success is misleading. Moreover, the 
relegation of different variables into one category or the other is unclear and 
confusing.
102
  
 
George argues that coercive diplomacy may, but is not required to, go beyond threats to 
the actual use of military force; but if force is actually used, it must be limited and fall 
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short of full-scale use or war.
103
 Furthermore, George argues that any use of force 
should demonstrate resolution and credibility, the actual levels to demonstrate these 
attributes depend on the specifics of the situation.
104 Therefore, like the issuing of 
demands, George points out that designing and implementing strategies based on threats 
is very difficult as it involves evaluating an adversary’s motives, perceptions, and 
values.
105
 Furthermore it is the target’s estimate of the credibility and potency of the 
threat, not the coercer that is paramount. This estimate will be affected by the targets 
psyche, perception and judgement. Therefore, the possibility of misperception and 
miscalculation by the opponent is a possibility.
106
   
 
Although George argues that demonstrative should mean only the ‘quite limited’ use of 
force, it is pointed out that in practice it can be difficult to determine what is ‘just 
enough force’ to demonstrate resolution and establish credibility, as this depends on the 
nature of the coercer’s goals107 and his capabilities. Furthermore, several theorists take 
issue with George’s argument that coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy arguing 
terms that normatively loaded terms such as ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ may not be of 
use, as the actors themselves will certainly disagree on what is offensive and what is 
defensive, as will some of the analysts who study these inﬂuence attempts. 108 
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Freedman - Strategic Coercion 
Jakobsen was also influenced by of Lawrence Freedman’s theorising on strategic 
coercion, particularly the assertion that the level of force that can be used within a 
coercive strategy is dependent on the choice the opponent has to defy a demand, which 
has been adopted by Jakobsen’s ideal policy. Furthermore, Freedman’s categorising of 
the umbrella concept of ‘Strategic Coercion’ is also initially adopted by Jakobsen.  
 
Strategic coercion is defined by Freedman as a ‘deliberate and purposive use of overt 
threats to influence another’s strategic choices’.109 Furthermore, that strategic coercion 
is close to George’s concept of coercive diplomacy.110 However, as stated Freedman 
diverges from George in arguing that coercive activity is not inherently defensive or 
offensive, nor does it necessarily involve specific modes of force. Moreover, he 
considers in more depth the importance of counter coercion and the influence of specific 
acts of coercion on strategic relationship over the long term
111
; on all these points, 
Freedman finds ‘Schelling work unsatisfactory’.112 
  
Freedman asserts that the ‘distinguishing feature of coercion is that the target is never 
denied choice’, but judges the cost of compliance and of non-compliance. Furthermore, 
he points out that because coercion is a ‘bargaining situation, the target may have the 
opportunity to issue counter-threats’. Therefore, ‘the negotiation in each instance will 
essentially be over what is deemed acceptable compliance but also over the costs of 
enforcement, or resistance, to the coercer’s will’. Moreover, ‘each act of coercion feeds 
into the set of assumptions and anticipations about the behaviour’ of the opponent. Due 
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to this interplay of actions, perceptions, and the affect they have on the cost calculus of 
both sides, Freedman argues that the study of coercion ‘cannot be considered simply to 
be about the design of efficient threats. It must also consider the way that strategic 
actors construct reality and their understanding of how their opponent constructs their 
reality’.113 An argument made within this thesis that connects to Freedman’s latter point 
is that individuals can act rationally based on the information that they have available to 
them, even if a more detached observer with more information can see that action not to 
be optimal.   
 
A further argument put forward by Freedman is that coercion occupies part of a 
spectrum with ‘consent at one end and control at other’. If no force is required then 
there is a presumption of consent, when no compliance is anticipated then 
overwhelming force may have to be applied to deny the target choice and to take 
control.
114
 For Schelling it is no longer coercion when a state takes what it wants 
through ‘brute force’.115 George and Simons, emphasise that force should be exemplary, 
or demonstrative, which as discussed earlier can be hard to determine. Authors such as 
Byman and Waxman point out that force needs to be ‘limited’ and less than Schelling’s 
brute force.
116
 However, this still does not clearly emphasise at what point coercion 
ends and another strategy is being adopted. To Freedman if the coerced has a choice 
(comply or not to comply), coercion is being used, no matter the level of force 
employed by the coercer. Choice as a determinant of the amount of force will be 
discussed more when examining Jakobsen’s work. 
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Another aspect examined by Freedman, is the use of denial and punishment strategies of 
coercion. Freedman agrees with Pape’s argument that denying a target an objective is 
potentially more reliable than a strategy that punishes a target if they undertake a 
specific prohibited action, as denial can be measured in more physical terms.
117
 
Freedman argues that this calculation is insufficient; therefore, he introduces the idea of 
enforcement costs, as this is the cost to the coercer in conducting an act of coercion.  
Furthermore, with denial the resistance and compliance costs to the coerced are 
interrelated, in that if resistance fails then compliance is automatic. However, with 
punishment the two are separated, as even if resistance to the coercer’s actions fails, 
compliance is still the choice of the coerced.
118
  
 
Karnad criticises Freedman’s ‘Strategic Coercion’ as it does not address the assessment 
of risk before undertaking a coercive action, although it is pointed out that this may be 
because a very large and consequential differential in military capabilities is assumed 
between the coercer and coerced. Therefore, it is taken that there is no risk to the 
coercer. However it is asserted that even the possibility of just a few fatalities and their 
consequences on subsequent decision making cannot be ignored.
119
 I would deem this 
criticism to be unfair, as although it is not necessary emphasised as calculating risks, 
Freedman’s discussion of compliance, resistance and enforcement costs120 would imply 
that in weighing up the costs of whether to use coercion, a coercer is in effect examining 
the risks that the employing the strategy may cost too much.  
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Jakobsen’s Ideal Policy 
This section will start by looking at Jakobsen’s views on Schelling, George and 
Freedman’s theories; before moving onto examine in more depth Jakobsen’s work on 
coercion. Although not clearly stated in Arms and Influence, Jakobsen identifies five 
conditions
121
 that Schelling deems necessary for compellence to be successful: 
 
1. The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to convince the adversary that the 
costs of non-compliance will be unbearable. 
2. The threat must be credible in the mind of the adversary; he must be convinced 
that the coercer has the will and capability to execute it in case of non-compliance. 
3. The adversary must be given time to comply with the demand. 
4. The coercer must assure the adversary that compliance will not lead to more 
demands in the future. 
5. The conflict must not be perceived as zero sum. A degree of common interest in 
avoiding full scale war must exist. Each side must be persuaded that it can gain more by 
bargaining than by trying unilaterally to take what it wants by force.  
 
Jakobsen claims that the limited number of factors is the strength of Schelling’s theory 
as it is easy to use, coherent and parsimonious.
122
 However, he also points out that the 
parsimonious nature of the theory limits its explanatory range
123
 and makes it of little 
use in developing policies to implement coercive diplomacy. Although, it should be 
noted that Schelling did recognise this weakness pointing out that ‘principles rarely lead 
straight to policies; policies depend on values and purposes, predictions and estimates, 
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and must usually reflect the relative weight of conflicting principles’.124 Therefore, the 
utility of Schelling’s work is that it offers useful theoretical insights into coercion, but 
does not offer detailed methodology on how to create a coercive strategy.  
 
Jakobsen also identifies several weaknesses with George and Simons’ general 
framework that limit its policy-relevance. Firstly, the large number of variables 
increases the risk of over-determination.
125
 Secondly, the high generality of their 
variables creates major problems with respect to operationalising them, therefore, 
enabling effective measuring. Thirdly, the framework was developed during the cold 
war when the scope for coalitional action was limited, and conflict was between nation 
states. As a consequence the framework does not take the possibility of fragmented 
opponents into account.
126
 Fourthly, George’s classic works have not been tested on 
new case studies. Even the second edition of Limits to Coercive Diplomacy does not 
test the original theory on new cases but repeats the inductive exercise conducted in the 
ﬁrst edition.127 Furthermore, George appears to mark coercive diplomacy out as a set of 
activities along a spectrum, rather than establishing a clear dichotomy. Moreover, as 
suggested earlier; that the insistence that coercive diplomacy is defensive is neither 
tenable in practice nor useful analytically.
128
 
 
Jakobsen originally identified that Freedman’s term ‘strategic coercion’ constitutes an 
umbrella concept incorporating all threat based strategies such as; compellence, 
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coercive diplomacy, blackmail and deterrence
129
 (as shown in diagram 1). Taking this 
viewpoint compellence can be seen to incorporate coercive diplomacy; however, 
whereas coercive diplomacy only covers reactive threats employed in response to 
actions taken by an adversary, compellence also involves threats aimed at initiating 
adversary action through a strategy of blackmail. Jakobsen further emphasises that it is 
the reactive nature that distinguishes coercive diplomacy from its sister strategy of 
deterrence, which involves the use of threats to influence adversaries not to undertake 
undesired actions in the first place.
130
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, there are those who do not recognise coercion as the overarching term and 
have different definitions. Art argues that: 
Some people talk about coercion as an overall category, then talk about 
compellence and deterrence, I find that confusing I talk about 
coercion/compellence and then deterrence, but if you're trying to push somebody 
do something that they don't want to do, which means it can mean either 
prevented from initiating an action or stop doing what they’re doing you can do 
it that, but I find that introduces an unnecessary level of confusion, so my 
personal way dividing it that I teach is that there is coercion/compellence and I 
use the terms interchangeably.
131
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Overview of existing terms concerning the use of threats (Diagram 1.1) 
 
Strategic Coercion (Freedman)                         
(Use of threats in general)  
Compellence (Schelling) (Aim: 
get target to alter its behaviour) 
Blackmail (George)            
(Aim: initiate target action) 
Coercive Diplomacy (George)        
(Aim: stop or undo action undertaken 
by a target) 
Deterrence (Everyone)                            
(Aim: prevent target action in the first place) 
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Furthermore, Cimbala recognises the variants of these strategies asserting that his 
concept of coercive military strategy: 
Shares with coercive diplomacy the explicit mixture of political and military 
actions toward the end of conflict termination or victory, but I would include 
some “deterrence” and “compellence” as well as some uses of conventional 
military action within the compass of coercive military strategy.
132
 
 
Jakobsen also points out that the term ‘(military) coercion’, rather than strategic 
coercion seems to be emerging within academia as the prominent term for describing 
the use of threats, however, he continues to use the term ‘strategic coercion’.133 
Therefore there is clear disagreement in the terminology within the field.   
 
Jakobsen uses George’s definition of coercive diplomacy stating it is ‘a strategy 
involving the threat of punishment and/or limited force short of full-scale military 
operations to persuade an actor to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked 
on’.134 He further adds that coercive diplomacy is attractive from a crisis management 
perspective, because it can be used to stop and/or reverse acts of military aggression 
with limited or, at the best of times, no use of force. Furthermore, that it is attractive to 
policy makers, as when successful, it is a low-cost strategy.
135
 Moreover, he points out 
that diplomacy and military force are both means to achieving a political objective, with 
the strategy of coercive diplomacy lying between the two extremes.
 136
 A similar view to 
this is that of Matthews who argues that: 
Crisis management and coercive diplomacy can be seen as alternative means of 
dealing with crisis – the former is the means adopted if the emphasis is on the 
avoidance of war as the major objective, the latter is the means adopted if the 
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major objective is the protection of furtherance of vital national interest. It is not 
that coercive diplomacy is absent in crisis management, it is that the latter 
consists more of a mixed pattern of threat and offering incentives to your 
opponent for compromise or even for backing down.
137
 
 
Building upon the work of Schelling and George, Jakobsen derives the ideal policy 
stating that if its logic is correct then coercive diplomacy will succeed when the 
following three conditions apply: 
4.  Credible implementation of the ideal policy comprising 
a. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives 
quickly with little cost; 
b. A deadline for compliance; 
c. An assurance to the adversary against future demands; 
d. An offer of carrots for compliance138. 
5. Opponent prefers to comply rather than to lose a war. 
6. Opponent acts rationally and does not miscalculate or suffer from misperception. 
Similarly, failure is expected if one of the following three conditions is present;  
4. Failure to implement the ideal policy. 
5. Opponent makes a conscious choice to fight a war it expects to lose rather than 
comply with the coercer demand. 
6. Opponent miscalculates or suffers from misperception139. 
 
In later work Jakobsen introduces the term the concept of the 3Cs; carrots, coercion and 
confidence-building
140
 arguing that: 
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Although the coercive diplomacy literature does incorporate all three, it still 
privileges coercion. Similarly, the literature on positive inducements privileges 
the carrots and the confidence-building mentioning coercion only in passing. 
The 3C framework represents a way of avoiding these conceptual pitfalls.
141
 
 
A comparison of Jakobsen’s ideal policy and 3Cs concept can be found at table 1.2. 
Ideal Policy
142
 3Cs; carrots, coercion and confidence-building
143
 
A threat of force to defeat the 
opponent or deny him his objectives 
quickly with little cost 
Use of coercion (threats, sanctions, limited force) generating 
fear of unacceptable escalation and a sense of urgency for 
compliance in the mind of the target. 
A deadline for compliance Adopts George’s ‘sense of urgency’.  
An assurance to the adversary against 
future demands 
 
Confidence-building measures assuring the adversary that 
compliance will be rewarded and not trigger new demands. 
An offer of carrots for compliance. 
 
Carrots allowing the opponent to save face and make the costs 
of compliance acceptable. 
 
Jakobsen’s definition of coercive 
Diplomacy; a strategy involving the 
threat of punishment and/or limited 
short of full-scale military operations 
to persuade an actor to stop and/or 
undo an action he is already embarked 
on’ 
 
Jakobsen’s definition Coercion ‘involves threats, sanctions and, 
if required, limited use of force in order to stop or undo hostile 
actions already undertaken by the adversary’. 
Table 1.2  
 
The most significant difference between Jakobsen’s ideal policy and his concept of 3Cs 
is that the latter does not require a clearly stated deadline; instead adopts the slightly 
vaguer ‘sense of urgency’ is conveyed. Whilst Jakobsen argues that the 3Cs enables 
exchanges to be viewed more ‘synergistically’; dropping the requirement for a clear 
deadline does enable more cases to be viewed as 3Cs case success. One of the key 
findings of this thesis, which will be discussed in chapter 5, is that states do not apply 
coercive diplomacy in the form of the ideal policy as they are averse to setting clear 
deadlines that commit them to action. George also found that ‘policy-makers may 
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consider it necessary to forgo resorting to an ultimatum’.144 However, as a framework 
for studying cases there is a difficulty that ‘sense of urgency’ is open to wide 
interpretation and could easily be misunderstood. 
 
The 3Cs concept would also indicate that Jakobsen has abandoned the definition of 
coercive diplomacy and the overarching conceptualisation of strategic coercion and its 
sub strategies. His definition of coercion (shown in table 1) is almost identical to his 
previous definition of coercive diplomacy; the key element that both share being the 
‘stop or undo’ an action already undertaken/embarked upon’. Therefore, Jakobsen uses 
the term coercion as if it was coercive diplomacy. This may also be a greater acceptance 
by Jakobsen of Byman and Waxman’s argument that deterrence and compellence are 
effectively the same strategy but at differing ends of a spectrum. This further 
complicates the issue of terminology that Jakobsen himself identifies. In previous work 
Jakobsen argues that: 
While agreement on the terminology would be nice, it is not necessary for 
theoretical progress and enhanced policy relevance. The problem caused by 
terminological confusion is not as serious as it appears at ﬁrst sight because most 
coercion theorists, as argued above, employ the terms compellence and coercive 
diplomacy. Moreover, it is futile to appeal to (coercion) theorists to refrain from 
proposing new terms and concepts. They will continue to do so in the hope that 
their concepts will catch on and generate citations.
145
 
 
 
The issue of terminology though is fundamental. If coercive theorists cannot agree on 
terminology and conceptual models; it is difficult to build more detailed depth into the 
theories. Instead coercive theory will continue to broaden with more models created; 
which in turn creates more difficulty in determining which are valid and worth further 
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exploration. Whilst this may be idealistic and a ‘futile’ pursuit; at the very least there 
should be a clear delineation between the terms ‘coercion’ and ‘coercive diplomacy’.  
 
It could be argued that Jakobsen’s move away from the ideal policy to the concept of 
3Cs invalidates the central theme of this thesis. However, there is still merit in applying 
the ideal policy as a framework and as will be discussed in later chapters it still offers an 
original contribution to coercive theory. 
  
In order to test whether credible implementation of the ideal policy leads to compliance 
or whether failure to implement the ideal policy led to non-compliance Jakobsen 
conducted a structured, focused comparison of the coercive diplomacy applied to Iraq 
during the gulf crisis in 1991, the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the crisis in 
Haiti.
146
 These three cases were broken further into 13 separate exchanges in order to 
increase the empirical accuracy of the findings. The ideal policy framework predicted 
correctly the result of 11 out of 13 coercive diplomacy exchanges.
147
 Although, 
Jakobsen acknowledged that this was not a perfect correlation, he argued that it passed 
the threshold for plausibility.
148
 In a later study he presents 36 coercive diplomacy 
exchanges stating that only three cases had applied the ideal policy. Furthermore, only 
six of the 36 exchanges were a lasting success, leading Jakobsen to the conclusion that 
coercive diplomacy is a high-risk and hard to use strategy.
149
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Jakobsen did apply the ideal policy to the object of WMD with the results shown in 
table 1.3. Although the detailed analysis underpinning these assessments is not 
presented in his published work.   
 
 
Jakobsen states that:  
To qualify as a case of coercive diplomacy, explicit threats, sanctions or limited 
force have to be employed by a Western coercer. Cases involving implicit 
threats and shows of force such as the crisis between the United States and 
China over Taiwan have consequently been excluded from the list.
151
 
 
However, he does categorise Libya as a case of coercive diplomacy, and one leading to 
cheap success, even though he acknowledges that there was only an implicit threat 
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Western use of coercive diplomacy to suspend or end WMD programmes 1990-
2005
150
 
Location Demand Adversary Coercive Strategy Outco
me 
Libya 
Round 1 
1992-
1997 
End WMD programmes; 
cease terrorist activities; 
hand over terrorist 
suspects; provide 
compensation. 
Libya Sanctions,  
Weak threats of 
force 
Threats of regime 
change. 
Failure 
Round 2 
1997-
2003 
End WMD programmes; 
cease terrorist activities; 
hand over terrorist 
suspects; provide 
compensation. 
Libya Sanctions, Implicit 
threats of force, 
Carrot 
Assurances 
Cheap 
Success 
North Korea 
Round 1 
1993-1994 
Freeze nuclear 
programme 
North 
Korea 
US Sanction, Threats 
of UN sanctions and 
force, Inducements, 
Assurances 
Tempor
ary 
success 
Round 2 
1997-2003 
End nuclear programme North 
Korea 
US sanctions, 
Indirect threats of 
force Inducements, 
Assurances 
? 
ongoin
g 
negotiat
ions 
Table 1.3 
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applied. Therefore, Jakobsen does seem to recognise that in reality implicit threats are 
still an element of a strategy of coercive diplomacy. 
 
Jakobsen, takes from George, the assertion that ‘carrots’ or incentives are required. The 
use of incentives within the ideal policy is as ‘sweeteners or face-savers to help an 
opponent fearing the coercer’s threat to comply with a minimum of humiliation’.152 It is 
argued that ‘increasing the opponent’s incentive to comply, ‘carrots’ help to prevent 
zero-sum situations (Schelling’s fifth condition), and give assurances against future 
demands more credibility’.153 As stated earlier though, the premise that by adding 
incentives this is no longer a zero-sum game is dubious. Any coercion based on the fear 
of a threat must see one side winning at the expense of the other; however, the 
incentives do lessen the size of the win and provide a mechanism for saving face. A 
significant problem for incentives though is view that they are seen as appeasement or 
rewarding bad behaviour which can be punished by the electorate.
154
 
 
Jakobsen identifies that the ideal policy does not say why the policy was chosen. 
However, he asserts that the willingness of states to employ coercive diplomacy is 
dependent on three interrelated variables; the interest perceived to be at stake, the 
perceived prospects of military success and the level of domestic support.
155
 From these 
factors Jakobsen hypothesis that states seeking to use coercive diplomacy to undo an act 
of military aggression will only threaten or use force in the following patterns: 
 
 
                                                          
152
 Op.cit. Jakobsen (1998), pg.30. 
 
153
 Ibid. 
 
154
 Miroslav Nincic, ‘Getting what you want, Positive Inducements in International Relations’, 
International Security Vol 35, No.1 (2010), pg 182. 
 
155
 Op.cit. Jakobsen (1998), pg.5. 
54 
 
Pattern  Interest Prospect of military 
success 
Domestic support 
Interest driven High Medium/high Medium/high 
Government driven  Medium High Medium/high 
Domestic pressure 
driven 
Low High High 
Table 1.4 
 
These factors will be examined more in chapter 2. 
 
Jakobsen notes several problems with determining the success or failure of coercive 
diplomacy. Firstly, even if the opponent has done as he was told it was not necessarily 
due to coercive diplomacy as compliance may result from factors unrelated to the 
coercer’s threat.156 Secondly, judging the success of the strategy is often viewed in 
black and white terms in terms of either success or failure. The reality is that often less 
clear, involving compromise between the opposing sides.
157
 A third problem is that it’s 
often difficult to isolate the effect that the threat of force or the use of limited force has 
had in a specific case. Compliance must be caused partly by fear for coercion to take 
place.
158
 Other theorists have also commented on the difficulty with implementing a 
successful strategy of coercive diplomacy. Peifer adopts a similar position to George 
stating that success is dependent on the political objective and motivations at stake and 
is a strategy ‘less to do with technological disparity than it does with the political issues 
in contention’. Therefore, even ‘the ability to strike from afar at minimal cost often fails 
to compel’. This may lead to an escalation where ‘limited wars from afar morph into 
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more substantial and costly interventions, occupations and small wars’.159  Similarly 
Willet argues that  
Effective coercion depends not so much on power itself as on its effective 
application, the demonstration of resolve and the ability to use the right force in 
the right way at the right time to change an enemy’s thinking, and to shatter his 
will as well as his military capabilities. Yet coercive effect is difficult to 
quantify.  Much analysis of the effectiveness of deterrence and coercion rests on, 
but habitually ignores, both the rationality of the opponent and the fact that the 
opponent may not share the same understanding.
160
   
 
Art argues that as coercive diplomacy is often used as the ‘default’ option by 
policymakers because the alternatives of doing nothing or using force are rejected and it 
is applied without consideration of whether it will be successful.
161
 A similar point is 
made by General Rupert Smith who points out that: 
What tends to happen is that for various reasons – such as a lack of political will 
and domestic support or lack of forces, or lack of a clear idea of the outcome, or 
all of these – we settle on the military achieving amelioration or containment: 
we deploy force.  Then, when other civilian measures and agencies – political, 
diplomacy, legal, economic – fail to resolve the matter as we wish, we seek to 
use military force or its threat to achieve the result we want by deterrence or 
coercion: we employ force. There is nothing wrong in this gradual response 
provided one know the desired outcome by the time deterrence measures are 
taken; for if such knowledge is absent then, as already described, one will 
achieve no more than containment.
162
 
 
Cimbala adds to this view pointing out that ‘theories about the coercive use of military 
power have suffered from disbelief on the part of military professionals and charges of 
America’s ethno-centralism laid down by scholars. There are good reasons for the 
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scepticism: coercive military strategies have been wrongly presented, and mistakenly 
applied, more than once.’163 
 
Jakobsen identifies that what constitutes limited force within coercive 
diplomacy/coercion is an area of debate;
164
 pointing out that ‘coercive diplomacy must 
be differentiated from strategies involving full scale use of force for either defensive or 
offensive purposes’.165 Further adding that: 
If limited force is used as part of a coercive diplomacy strategy, it is used as a 
signal intended to convince the opponent that non-compliance is too costly.  
When coercive diplomacy is successful, the opponent complies without having 
been defeated militarily first. In contrast, full scale use of force is employed to 
defeat the target.
166
  
 
He therefore, employs Freedman’s view that the use of force has to leave an element of 
choice with the target. A strategy employing the use of full scale force to deny the target 
this choice or consent is not considered coercion.
167
 He does point out that in practice 
though it is almost impossible to operationalise the level of choice given to an opponent 
and whether the use of force is limited or full-scale force.
168
 However, there is a range 
of views on this from Schelling’s anything less than ‘brute force’ to George’s 
‘exemplary or demonstrative’ use of force to demonstrate the credibility of future 
punishment. Other views are those of Art who expresses a position similar to George 
pointing out that that: 
There has to be some threat of force, or limited use of force, but I think to talk 
about coercive diplomacy as opposed to waging war, as trying to coerce short of 
victory or going out just to win, that coercive diplomacy should be closer to the 
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minimal use of force.  But as it is a definitional question I don’t believe people 
need to fall on their swords about it as long as they are clear about it.
169
 
 
Byman and Waxman accept that there is a distinction between ‘brute force’ and 
coercion which is dependent on the level of choice given to an opponent. Furthermore, 
they counter the argument that no state has been so ‘decimated in battle that it had a 
complete absence of choice’; although they counter this argument pointing out that: 
There are degrees of choice that must be considered. Generally, as an adversary 
absorbs more and more destruction the proportion of its decisions that are 
motivated by the threat of future destruction declines.  This is because the 
destruction of more and more of the adversary’s assets narrows the adversary’s 
range of options and, in some cases, leaves the adversary less and less to lose in 
the future.  Brute force, by contrast, eliminates the adversary’s options 
completely.
170
 
 
My position is that of Freedman and Jakobsen; that the level of force has to leave the 
opponent with a choice to comply with your demand. Therefore, as Jakobsen points out: 
Successful limited military operations such as the use of Special Forces to 
rescue hostages will be classiﬁed as full-scale force because they settle the issue 
at hand, whereas major air campaigns will be classiﬁed as limited use of force. 
This will have the unfortunate effect of making it easier for policymakers to 
characterize major use of air power resulting in massive human and economic 
costs as ‘‘limited use of force.’’ The Israeli destruction of Lebanon’s 
infrastructure during the July–August 2006 war with Hezbollah is a case in 
point.
171
 
 
Jakobsen identifies that some scholars would argue that the risk of misperception and 
miscalculation renders the ideal policy framework useless; as psychological biases 
cause threats to fail in most cases either because the ‘opponent misperceives the 
coercer’s signals (threats, carrots and assurances), or because the coercer misperceives 
the opponents interests’.172 However, he justifies the use of the rational unitary 
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assumption, as replacing ‘it with a more sophisticated model derived from 
psychological theories, strategic culture, and prospect theory would require too much 
information to be useful in theory building’.173 Furthermore, Jakobsen argues that the 
use of deadlines, clear demands and assurances against future threats prescribed by the 
ideal policy reduces the scope for misperception.
174
 Moreover, he claims that exponents 
of psychological theories tend to exaggerate the risk of misperception and that the risk 
certainly does not appear so great as to undermine the utility of the ideal policy 
framework Jakobsen analysis suggests that decision makers are capable of 
communicating effectively in times of crisis.
175
   
 
A controversial argument put forwarded by Jakobsen is that ‘The widespread 
assumption that a good understanding of the adversary and accurate intelligence is 
necessary for coercive success must be abandoned’ as essentially it ‘ is possible to 
coerce opponents you do not understand’.176 He then uses the examples such as the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, Kosovo crisis, Libya and NK as examples where coercion without 
understanding took place.
177
 He further adds that: 
It is only when effective coercion (coupled with positive incentives and 
assurances) leads to real negotiations that the coercer may obtain the 
understanding of the adversary’s motives required to use the insights provided 
by prospect theory, psychological theories, and area specialists to put together a 
package of positive incentives and assurances that may increase the likelihood 
that a mutually acceptable compromise can be reached.
178
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Whilst I accept that it is possible to coerce without necessarily understanding the 
opponent and that once you get them to the table you increase your understanding, I 
would strongly argue that coercion is never the less going to be far more effective if you 
understand the opponent in the first place. Therefore, investing in intelligence 
capabilities that enables you to target their critical nodes (WMD sites, banks etc.,), 
develop the evidence to gain credible domestic and international support, give the 
opponent the assurance and incentives that you know he wants will make coercion more 
efficient, effective and likely to succeed.     
 
Conclusion 
Coercion is a strategy that uses threats to achieve a political objective, therefore, the 
study of coercion, and the sub-strategy of coercive diplomacy, firmly sits within the 
Strategic Studies sub-field of international relations. Furthermore, with its emphasis on 
the threat of force to achieve a political aim its theories closely pertain to that of the 
realist paradigm which highlights the use of power and force to achieve a political aim. 
This chapter has primarily focussed on the coercion theories of Schelling, George, 
Freedman and Jakobsen as it is their work that has been directly built upon to develop 
the ideal policy that will be used as a framework for analysis within my thesis. There 
are three key areas of debate that emerge from the literature, terminology, the 
assumption of a rational opponent and what constitutes the coercive use of force. 
 
George does not use Schelling’s term compellence, which he asserts is imprecise, and 
clearly defines coercive diplomacy.
179
 In contrast Schelling uses the term ‘coercive 
diplomacy’180 in context that would appear to suggest the term is interchangeable to him 
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with the term coercion. Freedman’s work aids in clarifying the terminology with the 
introduction of the term ‘strategic coercion’ as an umbrella concept for a range of 
coercive strategies (Compellence, Deterrence, Coercive Diplomacy and Blackmail).  
However, as Jakobsen points out the term ‘(military) coercion’, rather than strategic 
coercion seems to be emerging within academia as the prominent term for describing 
the use of threats.
181
 As the focus of this study is to test the ideal policy, I will adopt the 
terminology derived by Freedman, and utilised by Jakobsen.  
 
There have been two different approaches to the development of coercive theory, a 
deductive approach based on the assumption of rational actors (Schelling camp) and an 
inductive approach that emphasises examination of case studies and the development of 
a behavioural model to explain states decision making (George camp). The number of 
studies that combine these approaches to theory building has been limited.
182
 Jakobsen 
justifies the use of the rational unitary assumption as the use of psychological models 
would require too much information to be useful in theory building.
183
 Furthermore, 
exponents of psychological theories tend to exaggerate the risk of misperception.
184
 
Therefore, he combines the use of the assumption of rationality to aid in developing the 
ideal policy and George’s structured, focused comparison methodology to test the 
generated hypothesis against relevant case studies.  
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A further area of debate is clarification of what constitutes the use of force within a 
coercive strategy. For Schelling it is no longer coercion when a State takes what it wants 
through brute force.
185
 George emphasises that force should be exemplary, or 
demonstrative, which can be hard to determine. Furthermore, authors such as Byman 
and Waxman point out that force needs to be ‘limited’ and less than Schelling’s brute 
force.
186
 However, this still does not clearly emphasise at what point coercion ends and 
another strategy is being adopted. A further argument put forward by Freedman is that 
coercion occupies part of a spectrum with consent at one end and control at other.  If no 
force is required then there is a presumption of consent, when no compliance is 
anticipated then overwhelming force may have to be applied to deny the target choice 
and to take control.
187
 Therefore, whilst the coerced has a choice (comply or not to 
comply), coercion is being used, no matter the level of force employed by the coercer. 
 
Jakobsen states coercive diplomacy must be differentiated from strategies involving full 
scale use of force for either defensive or offensive purposes. Therefore, coercive 
diplomacy is successful when the opponent complies without having been defeated 
militarily.
188
 He therefore, employs Freedman’s view on what constitutes limited force 
within coercion – in that the use of force has to leave an element of choice with the 
target.
189
 Jakobsen does point out that in practice it is almost impossible to 
operationalise the level of choice given to an opponent and whether the use of force is 
limited or full-scale force.
190
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A controversial argument put forwarded by Jakobsen is that coercion does not require 
accurate intelligence and a detailed understanding of the opponent.
191
 Whilst I agree that 
it is possible to coerce without understanding the opponent, clearly coercion will be 
effective if you understand the opponent. Therefore investing in intelligence capabilities 
that enables you to target their critical nodes (WMD sites, banks etc.,), develop the 
evidence to gain credible domestic and international support, give the opponent the 
assurance and incentives that you know he wants will make coercion more efficient, 
effective and likely to succeed.     
 
In latter work Jakobsen puts forward the concept of the 3Cs.  The key difference 
between 3Cs and the ideal policy is that the former does not require a clearly stated 
deadline; instead adopts the slightly vaguer ‘sense of urgency’ is conveyed. However, as 
a framework for studying cases there is a difficulty that ‘sense of urgency’ is open to 
wide interpretation and could easily be misunderstood. The 3Cs concept would also 
indicate that Jakobsen has abandoned the definition of coercive diplomacy, as his 
definition of coercion is almost identical to his previous definition of coercive 
diplomacy. Therefore, Jakobsen uses the term coercion as if it was coercive diplomacy. 
It could be argued that Jakobsen’s move away from the ideal policy to the concept of 
3Cs invalidates the central theme of this thesis. However, there is still merit in applying 
the ideal policy as a framework and as will be discussed in later chapters it still offers an 
original contribution to coercive theory. 
 
Jakobsen’s ideal policy is a recent addition to the academic study of coercive 
diplomacy. The ideal policy was derived and tested on case studies where the purpose 
of the coercive diplomacy was to undo an act of aggression. However, Jakobsen clearly 
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asserts that the ideal policy should be valid for seeking to prevent states from attaining 
nuclear weapons. By testing the ideal policy against states seeking nuclear weapons, this 
thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature and determine whether the ideal policy 
remains valid for this scenario. Furthermore, it will provide clear theoretical insights 
into attempting to use coercive diplomacy against states that are attempting to gain 
nuclear weapons that may be used to adapt the ideal policy and aid decision makers.     
64 
 
Chapter 2 – Positivism, Rationality, Empirical Issues 
and Case Selection 
 
This thesis aims to determine the utility of Jakobsen’s ideal policy as an analytical tool 
for examining coercive diplomacy employed to prevent states attaining nuclear 
weapons. Jakobsen specifically set out to explain why coercive diplomacy was 
successful, or a failure, in situations where the strategy was used to attempt to undo, or 
prevent acts, of aggression. Adopting a deductive approach Jakobsen derived the ideal 
policy framework from extant theories
1
, formed hypothesis that were tested using a 
method of structured focused comparison of selected case studies. He then made 
generalisations about the validity of the ideal policy for predicting the outcome of 
coercive diplomacy employed to undo/prevent acts of aggression. Therefore, Jakobsen 
adopted a positivistic
2
 research philosophy that tested the hypotheses empirically. This 
study will adopt the same positivistic approach to test whether the ideal policy is valid 
when applied to explaining coercive diplomacy directed at preventing state attainment 
of nuclear weapons. However, the positivistic approach and assumption of rationally 
that underpin the ideal policy is not without criticism; but as I will argue in this section 
both are legitimate starting positions for the initial development of theory.     
 
This chapter will start by examining positivism and the assumption of a rationality. It 
will then set out empirical issues for this study, followed by derivation of the analytical 
framework and claims that are to be examined within the thesis. Finally, I will derive 
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the criteria for case selection, determining cases that meet the criteria and justifying my 
selection of US coercive diplomacy against Libya and NK between 1993-2006. I will 
then briefly review the key studies that have already been undertaken on these cases. 
 
Positivism and Rationality 
The aim of this section is not to validate positivism as a whole, but to justify its 
selection as a legitimate approach for this study. This section will highlight the key 
criticisms and issues of using a positivistic approach. Fundamentally, the approach 
adopted within this thesis is the same approach used by Jakobsen, whose theory is being 
applied in a different way.  
 
Jakobsen argues that the strength of adopting a deductive approach is that it allows for 
parsimonious development of theory that can be tested. The strongest criticism of this 
approach to studying coercive diplomacy comes from George who argues that the 
difference between the physical sciences, who adopt a positivist view of the world, and 
social sciences is that human agents are reflective, as they contemplate, anticipate and 
can work to change their social and material environments.
3
 Furthermore, George 
argues that deductive approaches “black-boxes” around both the process of 
policymaking and the strategic interaction between states that leads to foreign policy 
outcomes.
4
   
 
George’s view implies that different humans exposed to the same variables (threats, 
ultimatums etc.) would not necessarily behave in the same manner; as human 
personalities and cognitive abilities vary; therefore a different course of action may be 
                                                          
3
 Alexander L.George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
(Cambridge, Mass:, MIT Press, 2005), pg.129. 
4
 Ibid. pg.267. 
66 
 
taken even in an identical situation. Furthermore, George was critical of the assumption 
of rationality as it did not reflect how humans actually behave. Instead he advocated an 
inductive approach that analysed how humans have actually behaved in particular 
situations then deriving valid generalisations.   
 
However, this argument is circular and distracts from the essential aim of research 
which is to advance our knowledge of a class of phenomena. Firstly, the debate seems 
based on the assumption that once a theory is developed it will not change. However, 
after deriving a theory, it needs to be tested, verified and refined. Therefore, if a 
deductively derived theory is disproved through empirical testing; the theory should be 
discarded or amended according to the empirical evidence. This is the approach that 
George himself adopted; in the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, as he started with an 
abstract model of coercive diplomacy, which he then built upon with inductively 
derived generalisations to form his strategy of coercive diplomacy. As Jakobsen points 
out ‘the best way to build cumulative knowledge is to systematically test and reﬁne 
propositions that have widespread acceptance within the ﬁeld but never the less remain 
unclear in some respects’.5 
 
The testing and resulting modification of a theory developed inductively must follow 
the same path; after several iterations of empirical testing and modification, the theory 
will either be discarded or amended to be more accurate at explaining, or predicting, the 
studied phenomena. George recognises that empirical testing is the key, pointing out 
that when studying decision-making processes and strategic interactions it is desirable 
to link deductive and empirical approaches together.
6
 Therefore, adopting a positivistic 
                                                          
5
 Op.cit. Jakobsen (2011), pg.158. 
6
 George&Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pg.267. 
67 
 
approach as a starting point followed by empirical testing is legitimate, as the only test 
of a theory’s validity should be if it can explain or predict empirical findings on the 
class of phenomena being studied.   
 
However, there are many criticisms of positivism; Mackenzie argues that the meaning 
of the word positivism has changed from a ‘rejection of the correspondence theory of 
truth, the denial of, or more correctly agnosticism about, the existence of a single reality 
independent of human beings’ to a ‘view that accepts a correspondence theory of truth, 
that there is a single reality independent of human beings’.7 Heidtman, Wysienska & 
Jacek expand further stating: 
According to early positivism, the abstract theoretical world is to be inferred 
from a real, external world. To logical positivism, abstract theoretical claims are 
to be tested in a real, phenomenal world (see the issue of protocol statements) 
and according to post-positivism, especially Lakatos and Toulmin, the abstract 
theoretical world should be a mirror reflection of the external, phenomenal 
world. Under all versions of positivism, the process of empirical theory testing 
should always be conducted external to the theory world, that is, in external 
phenomenal reality.
8
 
 
From this definition positivism is an inductive approach, and logical positivism is 
deductive. Therefore, the approach adopted by Jakobsen would arguably be a ‘logical 
positivistic’ approach. Positivism’s tenet that there is a real world independent of 
humans could be viewed to conflict with constructivist theories that claim agents 
construct their own truths about how the system is structured that leads to the way that 
they act within it. On the importance of this difference Mackenzie argues: 
There is a difference between saying that a statement is true and saying that it is 
‘true’. Each of these is important. If we want to know what someone will try to 
do, to understand her actions, we should look at what is ‘true’ for her. To 
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understand the outcomes of her attempts, we should focus not on what is ‘true’ 
but on what is true.
9
 
 
Applying a positivistic method only reveals what you believe to be true, until empirical 
testing reveals a deeper truth that better explains and predicts nature. For example 
Newtonian physics was replaced by Einstein’s theories as they explained more 
accurately the movement of celestial bodies; in turn these may be replaced by a new 
paradigm that can be verified empirically by improved technology. Therefore, you can 
never know for certain when you have reached the underlying truth/reality; as pointed 
out by Indick:  
I can’t provide an empirical account of the point of the movie until the movie is 
over. Similarly as a human, I am also a part of an ongoing process of human 
evolution (the development of the human species). My own mortality decrees 
that I will never observe the final endpoint of human development; therefore I 
cannot make an empirical theory about the meaning of life.
10
 
 
Indick also points out another paradox of positivism
11
 that: 
Empiricists contradict themselves, because if they believe that true answers can 
be tentatively accepted only when all other solutions are thoroughly disproved. 
Then they cannot accept positivism as the best solution to all scientific problems 
without falsifying all other methods. Empiricists have not accomplished this, 
they cannot claim that empirical arguments are a priori better or sounder than 
non-empirical arguments.
12
 
 
These are valid philosophical criticisms of positivism and beyond the scope of this 
thesis to address satisfactorily. However, it is my argument that the use of a positivistic 
approach is a legitimate approach for this thesis for several reasons; Firstly, it is the 
approach adopted by Jakobsen, and as the primary focus of the thesis is to validate his 
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ideal policy and conduct an original focused comparison of the cases, it is logical to use 
the same approach.  
 
A positivistic approach also grounds theories, as close as possible, to an observable 
reality; even if it is accepted that it may not be the underlying truth. Furthermore, the 
search for and verification of truth, even if you can never be sure if you have reached it, 
is what drives the improvement in our understanding of any class of phenomena. In the 
natural sciences you can, at the molecular level, isolate, test and verify theories in 
laboratory conditions that can be replicated. The social world has the same underlying 
truth and potential to be determined at the macro level as the natural sciences, as its 
components are essentially the same (matter and energy). The human body/brain obeys 
the laws of physics and reacts to the stimulus presented to it; therefore, theoretically you 
could predict how an individual would react in a range of environments and situations. 
However, clearly this is incredibly complex and beyond our current knowledge to 
extrapolate to this level. A more significant issue for strategic studies, and in particular 
the method being applied within this thesis, is that it is never possible to get to the 
underlying truth for several reasons. 
 
Firstly; in human situations although there may be one truth (what exactly happened) 
there is no way of fully determining what that actually was. The best that can be 
achieved is analysing primary sources. However, even individuals directly involved 
may not have fully grasped the situation (even if they think they did), they may have 
interpreted what they observed in different ways, and their memory is likely to change 
events over time. The variation between what exactly occurred and the resulting belief 
in what the ‘truth’ is may be further exaggerated by the way the analyst interprets the 
available data. As stated by Heidtman: 
70 
 
Sociologists study phenomena which are located in space and time and always 
embedded in a concrete historical context. They are partially known to the 
researcher from his/her experience (for example, the society in which he or she 
lives). Investigations fill blank spots in our picture of the social world with more 
and more data. ..........data collection needed to test a theoretical hypothesis is too 
often falsely identified with the recording of events that occur in society in 
conditions over which the researcher has neither control nor capacity to interpret 
them with the aid of his/her theory. Why is this the case? Because social reality 
is so complicated.
13
 
 
A similar point is also mentioned by Friedman:  
The inability to conduct experiments is not a fundamental obstacle to testing 
hypotheses by success of their predictions. But such evidence is far more 
difficult to interpret. It is frequently complex and always indirect and 
incomplete. Its collection is often arduous, and its interpretation generally 
requires subtle analysis and involved chains of reasoning, which seldom carry 
real conviction.
14
 
 
Another issue is that individuals within the system being studied may know the 
sociological/strategic theories themselves, that in turn affects the way they operate in 
that system; therefore, changing the theory.
15
 If an opponent understands the strategy 
that is being applied against it, it will look to find the counter-strategy; this in turn may 
make the original strategy no longer relevant. 
 
Furthermore, not everything can be proven empirically and other methods such as 
abstract rationalisation or theoretical mathematics might be the only basis of a theory. 
However, without empirical verification of these theories, you cannot be fully confident 
that they resemble the truth. There may be a raft of competing theories that logically are 
equally valid. The discovery of the Higgs Boson could not be achieved until 
improvements in technology; this discovery has validated certain theories over others 
that were based on predictions of theoretical physics. There may be other valid theories 
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that are impossible to empirically verify until further technological advance occur. The 
mathematical logic of the discarded models may not necessarily have been flawed; they 
just did not reflect reality.  
 
Separate, but related, to the use of positivism is the assumption of rationality used by 
Jakobsen. George was highly critical of the assumptions, particularly the assumption of 
rational actors. However, the only test of whether a theory is valid should be whether it 
explains, or predicts, the class of phenomena being studied. This view is most forcefully 
put by Friedman who asserts that: 
A hypothesis is important if it “explains” much by little, that is, if it abstracts the 
common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed 
circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained and permits valid 
predictions of the basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis 
must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account of, and accounts 
for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, since its very success 
shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained.
16
 
 
However, Brav, Heaton & Rosenberg are particularly critical of this view stating: 
Freed from the constraint that assumptions be causally ‘realistic,’ the researcher 
may pluck assumptions from anywhere in the assumption space. Assumptions 
can be rational, behavioural, make-believe, or just plain silly, so long as they are 
internally consistent and combine to generate models that make testable 
predictions whose predictive power improves in precision with further testing 
and refinement. But assumptions from a wholly unconstrained assumption space 
– even when internally consistent in any given model – are likely to imply 
‘causal’ explanations that are unconvincing because the assumptions are too 
much at odds with our beliefs about the world.
17 
 
 
They also emphasise that ‘assumptions that work for one type of prediction might imply 
a causal explanation that is at odds with the causal explanation implied by a different 
model that predicts well for a different type of prediction’.18 This in turn would lead to 
models that may be good for testing and predicting but not effective at explaining 
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phenomena. Clearly the closer assumptions are to reality; the more likely they are to 
increase our understanding of a specific phenomenon and offer practical utility.  
 
However, as Friedman indicates, when trying to make sense of complicated data to 
reveal a theory on a class of phenomena, it is necessary to make assumptions, in order to 
get to the important factors for the class, not just that one instance. I strongly agree with 
this view; assumptions are necessary in order to enable the research to focus on the key 
variables. Although, it is a fine orchestration that has to occur between setting 
assumptions that do not reflect reality in any form, but enable a coherent theory to be 
formed and tested, with those that reflect complexity of reality in such fidelity; that it 
makes it difficult to form a coherent theory and requires so much data to test it 
empirically that it is not an efficient study. Therefore, the question for this study is not 
whether making assumptions is wrong, but whether the assumption of rationality 
assumed with the ideal policy balances accuracy of assumption with the need to have 
theoretical coherency.    
 
The notion of rationality for the development of theory within strategic studies can be 
traced back to Clausewitz, who developed an abstract rational model to explain war. 
However, he clearly emphasised that there were frictions in the real world that meant 
the abstract did not translate to reality. He also emphasised that ‘non-rational political 
objectives can be implemented by rational means’19; therefore, separating the end 
product from the way that a strategy reached its goal. It may be viewed as irrational to 
start a war over an insult, but the way the military fights to win could be perfectly 
rational. However, Clausewitz did not clearly define what it was to act rational.  
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Within economics rationality was seen as agents making mathematically driven choices 
that led to the maximisation of a particular ‘utility’. As pointed out by Krugman: 
For most of the past two centuries, economic thinking has been dominated by 
the concept of Homo economicus. The hypothetical Economic Man knows what 
he wants; his preferences can be expressed mathematically in terms of a “utility 
function.” And his choices are driven by rational calculations about how to 
maximize that function: whether consumers are deciding between corn flakes or 
shredded wheat, or investors are deciding between stocks and bonds, those 
decisions are assumed to be based on comparisons of the “marginal utility,” or 
the added benefit the buyer would get from acquiring a small amount of the 
alternatives available.
20
 
 
However, theories based on rationality often fail to make accurate predictions or 
explanations. Other concepts such as bounded rationality were put forward in order to 
try and reflect how ‘people actually made decisions in the absence of perfect 
information and computational capacity. It accepted human fallibility without losing the 
predictability that might still result from a modicum of rationality’.21  
 
However, the concept of bounded rationality was also criticised for not reflecting actual 
human behaviour; most notable from Kahneman and Tversky, who demonstrated that 
individuals suffered from cognitive biases that affected their ability to make the most 
‘rational’ decision.22 Khaneman view was that:  
The only tests of rationality is not whether a person’s beliefs and preferences are 
reasonable, but whether they are internally consistent. A rational person can 
believe in ghosts so long as all her other beliefs are consistent with the existence 
of ghosts.
23
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The view that consistency in an individual’s actions with their own internal calculating 
mechanism is the determinant of rationality, not whether there actions from an external, 
detached, calculation would appear to be optimal; leads to a broadening of what can be 
deemed ‘rational’. For example if an individual perceives that the use of force will 
achieve their objective, even if the reality viewed by everyone else is it will not, it 
would be rational for them to use it. However, if they don’t believe that force will 
achieve their objective, yet they lash out any way that would be irrational. In turn if they 
believe that force would be the best method for achieving an objective, but chose not to 
apply it, that would be irrational.     
 
Another criticism of rational choice theories is that preferences cannot always be 
expressed within a utility function.
24
 As stated by Ellis:    
People's goals and purposes cannot be assessed scientifically or "objectively" — 
because, as individuals, they can choose from a wide variety of goals, none of 
which (except by arbitrary definition) can be assessed as unconditionally "good" 
or "bad." But once they pick a certain goal (e.g., succeeding at work, love, or 
psychotherapy) it can often be "scientifically" or empirically determined 
whether (1) they actually achieve it, and (2) they achieve the results they wanted 
by achieving it.
25
 
 
This is further emphasised by Byman and Waxman in the context of coercion who point 
out that although the ‘cost benefit model is quite useful because the ultimate goals of 
decision making can be derived from profit motive. Politics, however, lacks such 
clarity. Some leaders value power, others security, and still others glory’.26 
 
Although there are valid criticisms of rationality, the assumption of rationality can still 
be useful; as Krugman points out:  
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You might ask, why not represent people the way they really are? The answer is 
that abstraction, strategic simplification, is the only way we can impose some 
intellectual order on the complexity of economic life. And the assumption of 
rational behavior has been a particularly fruitful simplification.
27
 
 
Although referring to economics, the point is also valid for strategic studies; which 
suffers from the same complexity and requirement to simplify in order to understand the 
studied phenomena.  
 
Within strategic studies the adoption of a rational actor model is most obviously linked 
to realism where ‘states are seen as unitary actors who want to maximize their self-
interest under the constraints of the international system. This translates into a never 
ending struggle for survival, power and wealth among largely self-confined entities’.28  
Within this paradigm states are viewed as rational and calculating, seeking to maximise 
their utility, whether it survival, power or wealth. This has been translated extensively 
into game theoretic models demonstrating how conflict and cooperation may play out in 
a rational environment. A different perspective is that of constructivists who argue that 
States are social actors that follow international or domestic rules. Therefore, it is the 
structure of the system that determines the behaviour of the agents within it.
29
  
 
Individuals may calculate in a perfectly rational manner the best preference based on 
their understanding of the options that they believe to be open to them. Therefore, 
rationality could be viewed as dependent on the view of the structure of the system and 
their psychological cognitive biases. This links to Khaneman’s view that rationality is 
acting consistent manner with ones beliefs. An observer might not agree with an agent’s 
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goal or actions, but could at least see that they are acting consistent with their beliefs; 
therefore, rationally within their perception of the system. 
 
Jakobsen defined the assumption of reality as ‘the assumption that both coercer and 
opponent are capable of ordering their interests consistently, evaluating obtained 
information correctly, and choosing the most cost-effective policy from the existing set 
of options’.30 He also recognised that it may be viewed as a weakness in his theory and 
further argued that it should be ‘complemented by actor specific behavioural models of 
the adversary’.31 However, in later work his argument changes his view stating that: 
The widespread assumption that a good understanding of the adversary and 
accurate intelligence is necessary for coercive success must be abandoned. It is 
counterproductive since detailed information about the adversary’s way of 
thinking and motivations is unattainable in the real world in most cases. It is also 
wrong. It is possible to coerce opponents you do not understand.
32
 
  
Despite valid criticisms of the assumption of rationality, it is a legitimate assumption to 
underpin the development of theory; as long as those theories are empirically tested.  
 
Within this section I have examined positivism and the assumption of rationality. 
Furthermore I have argued that adopting, the same approach as Jakobsen, using a 
deductive model based on the assumption of unitary rational actor is a legitimate 
approach as long as it is tested empirically and subsequent refinement of the theory is 
made. This chapter will now examine the validity of using case studies to generate 
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empirical data and then will analyse further the assumptions within the ideal policy to 
assess whether they remain valid when applied to the context of nuclear proliferation. 
 
Empirical Issues
 
 
The primary focus of the thesis is to test the validity of Jakobsen’s ideal policy, I have 
adopted the same approach as Jakobsen; the use of case studies and structured focussed 
comparison. I agree with Jakobsen that this approach offers the best method for 
comparing the different cases to identify any patterns. Furthermore, the use of cases 
enables a deeper qualitative study to be conducted in order to understand the adopted 
coercive mechanisms. However, it is important to understand the strengths and 
weakness of case studies as a research strategy.   
 
George argues that case studies are often characterised as “small n” studies, in contrast 
to "large N” statistical studies. Moreover, that this distinction implies that “large N” 
methods are always preferable when sufficient data is available for study; even though 
case studies maybe better at answering the research questions.
33
 Coppedge adds to this 
view arguing that case studies and small-sample comparisons sometimes have been 
dismissed as ‘merely descriptive, anecdotal, historical, or journalistic, and therefore 
atheoretical’.34 However, he also argues that case studies are useful for generating facts 
and identifying the ‘connections between action and reaction plausible reconstruction of 
events and processes can be obtained’.35 
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Coppedge does point out two valid weaknesses with small sample cases; firstly that 
although propositions are integrated with theory, they are integrated more loosely. 
Therefore, facts can be used to support a range of theories and it is less clear which tests 
would confirm or disconfirm the theory. The impact of this is that without rigorous 
logic or mathematical tools to generate hypotheses, there is no clear way to derive what 
must be true if the theory is true. Furthermore, he argues that in contrast to formal 
theory, the theories of small-sample analysis are less clear about their assumptions; they 
rely more on the tacit assumptions of common sense, which leads to conditional and 
vaguely probabilistic predictions, which are hard to falsify.
36
 Moreover, George and 
Bennett point out that with a small sample size if a theory fails to fit the evidence in a 
case, it is not obvious whether the theory fails to explain the particular case or fails to 
explain a whole class of cases, or does not explain any cases at all.
37
 However, George 
does assert that the strength of case studies is that they are good for leading to the 
development of new theory as, unlike statistical research, the process of archival 
research and interviews can lead to new variables being identified.
38
 
Fundamentally, the method of focussed structured comparison has been chosen for this 
study as it is the same method adopted by Jakobsen; although it is noted that the small 
sample of this thesis means results cannot be statistically validated.   
 
Analytical Framework 
The research puzzles that I aim to answer are: 
1. Does Jakobsen’s ideal policy remain valid when applied to the context of state 
attainment of nuclear weapons?  
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2. What are the factors, conditions and variables unique to coercive diplomacy 
being employed against states seeking nuclear weapons that may need to be 
incorporated into the ideal policy?  
3. How can the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy be improved in order to 
prevent states attaining nuclear weapons? 
 
The behaviour being examined is how states use coercive diplomacy as a strategy to 
prevent other states attaining nuclear weapons. As discussed later in the chapter, there 
are fewer cases of coercive diplomacy aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation than 
cases of stopping acts of aggression. Therefore, results cannot be statistical validated. 
However, by looking in-depth at a few case studies valuable insights on the ideal policy 
and coercive diplomacy have been gained. As more cases arise, statistical methods may 
give greater confidence in the validity of empirical findings. This thesis is focussed on 
testing the utility of Jakobsen’s ideal policy in a different context than the one it was 
formulated and tested against; therefore, there is no requirement to test other theories of 
coercive diplomacy.  
 
The assessment questions that will form the basis of the structured focussed comparison 
have been drawn directly from the ideal policy and can be found at appendix B. All but 
questions 11 and 16 are taken straight from the ideal policy and will be critiqued in later 
chapters. However, the addition of assessment questions 11 and 16 needs to be justified. 
 
Assessment Question (AQ) 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present 
when states threaten and use force? 
Jakobsen’s hypothesises that the willingness to use force is dependent on the interaction 
among three variables: 
80 
 
1. The nature of the threatened interests. 
2. The prospects of military success. 
3. The level of domestic support.39 
 
He then coded interests as either vital, strategic, stability or moral/ideological. Vital 
interests were defined as the defence of the homeland; where the willingness to threaten 
and use force and suffer pain is assumed to be highest when an act of aggression 
threatens the homeland directly.
40
 As he was examining conflicts where a coercer 
responds to an act of aggression committed against a third party; Jakobsen discounted 
vital interests. Due to the threat that nuclear weapons pose to homelands, I will include 
the vital interest category for this variable. This has an effect on the patterns that 
Jakobsen hypothesised would lead to a willingness to threaten force. 
 
With 3 codes for each of the variables, Jakobsen identified 27 possible outcomes 
(3x3x3) of which three of them were argued to be ‘will-producing’ patterns.41 Taking 
vital interests into account this leads to 36 (4x3x3) possible outcomes, with sixteen 
being relevant as ‘will producing patterns’. Effectively, this adds a fourth ‘will to 
threaten’ pattern which is as follows:   
 
1. Interest-driven pattern:  high interest, medium/high prospects of military success 
and medium/high domestic support. 
2. Government-driven pattern: medium interest, high prospects of military success 
and medium/high domestic support. 
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3. Domestic pressure-driven pattern: low interest, high prospects of military 
success and high domestic support.
42
 
4. Vital Interest – Very high interest, High/medium/ low prospects of military 
success and high/medium/low domestic support. 
 
The vital interest pattern would indicate that a state, whose existence was threatened, 
would be willing to threaten to use force even if doing so would not achieve its 
objective (i.e. remain extant) and the threat had little domestic support. This 
demonstrates one of the problems with this element of Jakobsen’s theory for the case of 
nuclear proliferation. It would seem the logical thing to do in such a situation would be 
for the state to surrender. However, it could be argued that this scenario reflects where 
elites within a regime believe it is either their annihilation or the slim chance that their 
threat may stay an opponent. For example it may be that they threaten to use nuclear 
weapons on the opponent’s cities if they do not halt the advance of conventional forces. 
This threat could be made knowing that actually going through with this threat would 
still end up with their annihilation through a nuclear exchange. Such a scenario 
demonstrates where arguably coercive diplomacy and deterrence blur. 
 
AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to 
develop nuclear weapons?       
In addition to the framework Jakobsen makes six claims about the advantages of the 
ideal policy compared to existing theories. The first claim is that it can explain coercive 
diplomacy outcomes more accurately with fewer variables.
43
 Although he states 
‘explain’; an implied claim is that if both sides act rationally then the ideal policy will 
                                                          
42
 Ibid. pg.43. 
  
43
 Ibid. pg.5. 
82 
 
work; so it is a prediction of success. However, as mentioned previously the problems 
of individual constructions of the system and their perception of their position within it, 
psychological biases, cognitive limitations and asymmetric information will affect the 
ability of the state to calculate the most rational choice in a crisis. Therefore, the ideal 
policy is unlikely to be a reliable method for predicting outcomes. However, as will be 
seen in the cases studies, it is useful as an analytical framework to explain why states 
acted in a particular way.   
 
The second claim is that ‘it can explain coercive diplomacy outcomes just as accurately 
but with fewer conditions representing the operationalisation of Schelling’s five 
necessary conditions and George and Simons’ ‘particularly significant’.44 Furthermore 
that operationalisation enables policy-makers to decide whether they are present or not 
in a given crisis.
45
 To verify the first element of this claim it would be necessary to 
examine several case studies using a framework derived from Schelling’s work and 
George’s framework. Then the analysis would need to be compared in order to attempt 
to determine which framework yields the most accurate analysis. However, the 
difficulty with this is that as discussed earlier in the chapter it would be difficult to 
determine which analysis is closer to the truth to bench mark this assessment against.    
 
Furthermore, Jakobsen’s assertion of clarity for policy makers by clearly 
operationalising the variables, is over emphasised as there is still an element of 
subjectivity. For example what exactly constitutes a threat? Often the US makes 
statements such as ‘no options have been left off the table’, this is clearly an implied 
threat that force may be used, but does it meet the criteria for the ideal policy or not?  
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The third claim is that the ideal policy framework is testable. This will be evaluated in 
more depth later in the thesis. The fourth claim is that the focus on implemented policy 
avoids the mixture of contextual variables and success conditions that limit the 
explanatory power of George and Simons’ framework. Again without, testing George 
and Simons’ framework against the given cases and then comparing the results against 
the ideal policy this claim cannot be fully verified. However, the implemented policy in 
reality will clearly be dependent on the context of the situation. Therefore, whether the 
policy implemented looks like the ideal policy will depend on the context.  
 
The fifth claim is that keeping messages clear and simple reduces the scope for 
misperception and miscalculation.
46
 This would seem a logical claim. However, the 
simplicity of the message sent is dependent on the context and complexity of the crisis 
that it is being applied to and the interpretation of the opponent of the signal. For acts of 
aggression it is easy to see the opponent’s response to demands i.e. the withdraw or 
halting of an advance. However, in the case of nuclear proliferation it may not be 
possible to verify fully compliance. The increased uncertainty of such crises makes 
signalling more difficult and increases the chances of miscalculation and misperception.  
 
The final assertion is that ‘the framework requires little knowledge about the opponent’ 
and that ‘one can explain and predict outcomes of coercive diplomacy attempts against 
aggressors by focusing on the policy pursued by the coercer and black boxing the 
opponent’. Jakobsen further asserts that: 
To test this part of my argument I only need to determine whether the 
implementation of the ideal policy results in success and its absence in failure. 
There is no need to analyse the behaviour of the opponent in great detail. The 
only thing I need to decide in the case studies is whether the opponent 
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understands the game of coercion to ensure that both players are playing the 
same game.
47
  
 
Although it is recognised that ‘incorporating the behaviour of the coercer and opponent’ 
would lead to increased accuracy, the limit of information on the target forces 
assumptions and educated guesses on the opposition to be made.
48
 Whilst this approach 
is understandable in a vacuum of data on the opponent, it does limit the depth of 
analysis that can be done and the explanatory power of the policy. It also limits 
determination of whether the ideal policy worked because of the implementation of the 
policy or because of another reason. However, in order to determine whether it was 
truly the coercer’s choice to comply the opponent has to be examined and incorporated 
into the analysis as much as possible.   
 
Case Selection 
George emphasises that the primary criterion for case selection should be relevance to 
the research objective of the study, whether it includes theory development, theory 
testing, or heuristic purposes.
49
 Furthermore, the cases should also be selected to 
provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem. This requires 
that the universe or subclass of events be clearly defined so that appropriate cases can 
be selected.
50
 
 
Jakobsen used two criteria to decide whether a crisis constituted a case of coercive 
diplomacy: 
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1. The coercer must send a message to the aggressor(s) demanding that the use of force 
is stopped and/or consequences undone. 
2. A threat to punish non-compliance must accompany this demand.  This threat may 
or may not be accompanied by a carrot for compliance.
51
  
 
These criteria were formulated specifically for the scenario of coercive diplomacy with 
the aim of undo/stopping an act of aggression. As this thesis is examining coercive 
diplomacy employed to prevent nuclear proliferation the first criteria needs to be 
amended to the following: 
1. The coercer must send a message asking the target state to stop/or undo their nuclear 
programme. 
 
Furthermore, in order to reduce the variables to understand the resulting outcome for my 
study, cases must also fit some additional criteria: 
 
1. The selected case must have developed, or have been perceived by the USA to 
have developed, a nuclear programme since 1964.
52
     
 
2. The USA must be the primary coercer of the selected case. By maintaining the 
US as the primary coercer it reduces the variables, as different states will have 
different capabilities, strategic culture and political systems that may affect the 
cost calculus within it. 
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3. There needs to be evidence of a completed outcome i.e. compliance or rejection 
of the demand. As part of the puzzle that this study looks to solve is what leads 
to successful outcomes; any case that is still ongoing, such as Iran
53
, has been 
discounted. 
 
Table.1 in appendix C shows states that had or still have a nuclear programme and could 
be considered as cases. The following states were identified as meeting the criteria: 
1. North Korea (1993-2006) 
2. Libya (1992-2003)  
3. Iraq (1992-2003)  
4. South Korea (1970-2004) 
5. Taiwan (1960-1980) 
6. Pakistan (1976-1998) 
 
NK and Libya have been chosen as between 1993-2006 as both were the targets of US 
coercive diplomacy that had the goal of stopping them attain nuclear weapons. NK 
continued its programme and tested its first nuclear device in 2005; therefore, ultimately 
US policy can be seen as a failure. Libya surrendered its WMD programme in 2003; 
therefore, it appears to be a demonstration of successful US coercive diplomacy. 
As the coercive diplomacy in both cases occurred roughly at the same time, the specific 
military and diplomatic power of the US was the same in both cases; therefore, the 
difference on outcome must be dependent on other factors. By comparing and 
contrasting the case studies it is envisaged that the key factors that led to successful and 
unsuccessful outcomes can be determined. Furthermore, NK was specifically mentioned 
as members of the ‘axis of evil’, and Libya was mentioned in a speech titled ‘beyond 
the axis of evil’; this is relevant because Iraq, also identified as part of the ‘axis of evil’ 
was subsequently invaded by a US; which demonstrated its willingness to use force.  
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Iraq also had coercive diplomacy applied over the same period as NK and Libya. 
However, the outcome of this is unclear as eventually more than limited force was 
applied and it appears that Iraq did not have a WMD programme. Furthermore, as will 
be explained within the study, the invasion of Iraq is likely to be factor in why NK 
continued its nuclear programme and Libya decided to surrender its. Therefore, Iraq is a 
contributing factor to the outcomes in the two case studies.      
 
South Korea, Pakistan and Taiwan do meet the selection criteria but have been 
discounted for two reasons. Firstly, they were only subjected to withdrawal of US aid or 
support, rather than a more forceful threat. Secondly, it is felt by focusing on Libya and 
NK a more detailed study can be achieved that will delve more deeply into the differing 
outcomes to form more profound explanations of the two cases. 
 
There are several states such as South Africa
54
, Sweden, Kazakhstan55, Ukraine and 
Belarus who started nuclear programmes and then stopped; however, there is no 
evidence to suggest that coercive diplomacy was used to encourage these states to roll 
back their program. Furthermore, there have been states such as India who have 
developed and tested nuclear weapons; but again there is no evidence of a failed 
strategy of coercive diplomacy to prevent them becoming a nuclear power.  
 
Libyan and North Korean Nuclear Proliferation Case Studies 
 
This thesis is the only study that conducts a structured focussed comparison of NK and 
Libya using Jakobsen’s ideal policy as a framework. The detailed analysis of the cases 
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will occur in chapter 3 (Libya) and chapter 4 (NK); with the subsequent structured 
focussed comparison in chapter 5. However, in the next section I will review the key 
academic studies of the Libyan and NK nuclear crises. In both cases there is literature 
covering the narrative of the cases; however, I have focussed on the literature that has 
relevance to this thesis 
 
Libyan nuclear proliferation case studies 
There are two major competing theories within the literature over Gaddafi’s decision to 
surrender his nuclear weapons. One that argues Libya’s decision was partly due to the 
Bush administration’s tough non-proliferation policy and credible threat of force 
demonstrated by the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.56 A second theory is that it 
was due to decades of economic sanctions, recent economic incentives and diplomacy.57   
Robert Joseph; the key US negotiator in the 2003 discussions that led to Libya 
surrendering its WMD, in his book Countering WMD the Libyan Experience (2009) 
highlights several lessons that fall out of the ‘Libyan model’ identifying ‘essential to 
success’:  
1. Demonstrate Seriousness. 
2. Insist on a strategic decision. 
3. Employ all the tools (Diplomacy, Economic, Financial, Interdiction, 
Military) 
4. Create the perception and reality of a Win-Win outcome. 
5. Assurance of complete and continuing access for verification.58 
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In an earlier chapter Joseph also includes ‘avoid bargaining’; arguing that:  
 
Instead of negotiating X for Y, US and UK representatives insisted that Libya 
acknowledge and abandon its WMD and longer –range missiles. In doing so, 
they also made it clear that Libya would remove a major obstacle to improved 
relations and greater economic and political benefits for the Libyan people.59  
 
However, as I will argue in chapter 3 it is difficult to see how a deal was not done; this 
view is amplified in several other studies.60  
 
Another theme in the literature is that Bush’s administration did not set the objective of 
Libyan regime change.61 Whilst many of the studies cover the narrative and make 
recommendations for policy or single factor contributions62 towards coercive theory, 
there are only a two that identify a coercive framework from the Libyan case. Jentleson 
and Whytock argue that the Libyan case demonstrates that ‘credible coercion and deft 
diplomacy’ require three criteria ‘proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive 
credibility’.63 They also assert that ‘the extent of target state vulnerability as shaped by 
its domestic political and economic conditions, including the transmission belt or 
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circuit-breaker role of elites and other key political actors’.64 The key aspect of this 
strategy being the specific targeting of elites in order to influence their decision making.  
 
As discussed in chapter 1; Jakobsen puts forward a model, similar to that of the ideal 
policy, stating that Libya model demonstrated Coercion, Carrots and Confidence 
building measures (3Cs).65 Furthermore, he argues that ‘asking which policy instrument 
“won Libya”, as the vast majority of studies do, leads to flawed conclusions and policy 
recommendations as the necessary contributions made by other tools are ignored’.66 He 
also points out that Jentleson and Whytock’s coercive diplomacy framework downplays 
‘the role played by coercion’.67 Furthermore, Jakobsen argues that the Libya case 
‘highlights that analysts and policy-makers would do well to focus more on how 
different policy tools can be used in combination to achieve desired outcomes than on 
how individual tools can be employed with decisive effects. It also demonstrates that the 
Libya success will be hard to replicate’.68 
 
A common theme in the various studies is that the Libyan model will be hard to 
replicate.69 Bowen, points out that the ‘Libyan example attests, the prevailing political-
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strategic context is crucial to the efficacy of such measures. Replicating this in a non-
Libyan environment is likely to prove very difficult, if not impossible’.70  
 
North Korea nuclear proliferation 
There are two NK crises; one in 1994, that concludes with the signing of the Agreed 
Framework (AF), and a second in 2003 when the US cancels the AF because of NK 
secret Uranium based programme. Most of the literature tends to focus singularly on a 
specific crisis; and although many offer policy recommendations and single factor 
contributions to coercive theory, there are no coercive frameworks/models developed. 
The key arguments within the literature are whether the AF was successful; and the 
wisdom of the Bush administration’s decision to break the AF in 2003 due to NK 
cheating.    
 
The key source for any study of the first nuclear crisis is Going Critical by Wit, 
Poneman and Gallucci; who were the principal negotiators with NK that led to the AF. 
They point out several lessons; however, one of the significant points they make, is that 
you have ‘to integrate carrots and sticks into a strategy of coercive diplomacy’71  further 
adding that:   
If offered only carrots, the North Koreans will conclude that the other side is 
more desperate for a deal than they are and will likely continue on a path of 
defiance and increasing negotiating demands. Offering only sticks will tell the 
North Koreans that there is not benefit from complying with international 
demands, except avoidance of pain.72 
 
                                                          
70
 Op.cit. Bowen (2006), pg.82. 
 
71
  Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, Going Critical, the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, (Washington D.C., 
Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pg.398. 
 
72
  Ibid. pg.398. 
92 
 
This point is similar to the 3Cs concept that Jakobsen highlights; as essentially it is 
emphasising the importance of using more than one policy tool to achieve your 
objective. 
 
A common criticism, which will be discussed more in chapter 4, is that the AF rewarded 
NK for cheating and that they would continue to cheat. There are several who defend 
this arguing that incentives have to be given in order to get NK to comply.73  
 
Sigal argues that although the AF could be classed as a success it was a ‘tortuous path’ 
and that ‘after three years of failure after failure with coercive diplomacy, it finally tried 
cooperation and succeeded’.74 Jackson also points out that the first NK crisis reveals: 
Two additional conditions that can hinder a two-track policy from achieving its 
policy aims: shifting how the objectives of coercive signals and actions are 
prioritized throughout the course of a crisis, and relying on international 
institutions and foreign governments for the implementation of a two-track 
policy.75 
 
Jackson argues that ‘the fact that this crisis led to something other than open conflict 
suggests that the United States might plausibly claim at least a partial coercive success’.  
Newnham is even more adamant that ‘even in light of this seeming failure, the paper 
will show that the Agreed Framework approach was actually fairly effective, especially 
given the extreme difficulty of the case and the lack of reasonable alternative policies’.76 
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A controversial point that Wit, Gallucci and Poneman argue is that ‘negotiated 
arrangements can advance US interests even if the other party engages in cheating’.77 
This point clearly relates to the Bush administration’s decision to cancel the AF with 
NK in 2003, which was preventing NK plutonium development, over the issue of its 
Uranium programme. Similarly, Robert Litwak’s analysis of NK points out that the 
difficulty of military pre-emption. Furthermore, he argues that ‘in terminating the 
Agreed Framework, Washington left Pyongyang with no open avenue and with nothing 
to lose if it reactivated the Yongbyon facility. When NK began to reprocess the 8000 
spent fuel rods in early 2003, the Bush administration essentially acquiesced to the 
North’s further reprocessing of plutonium for additional nuclear weapons’.78 A further 
criticism of the Bush administration’s inability to develop a coherent strategy towards 
NK that utilised a mixes of credible threat and incentives is commented on by several 
scholars.79 
 
There are several books80 that explain the North Korean crises and policy choices for the 
US and allies; but do not necessarily identify any relevant points for international 
theory, or more specifically coercion theory. There are a few studies that argue that NK 
has been the most effective at coercion; securing it regime’s survival and rewards for its 
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threatening behaviour.81 Creekmore argues that the first NK crisis indicates that US 
leaders should talk directly with opponents, that governments should seek ‘consensus 
on how to deal with serious national security issues that could become major crises’82 
and that ‘closer cooperation between governments, nongovernmental organisations, and 
scholars could enhance policymaking and implementation’.83 
 
Yochi Funabashi argues that the Bush administration was mistaken delivering an 
ultimatum and should have ‘instead lured NK into diplomatic negotiations toward 
dismantling’ their nuclear weapons and programs.84 Furthermore, in Bush’s second term 
it failed ‘to uphold the joint statement of the fourth round of the six party talks in 
September 2005. The US ‘failed to back the diplomatic expression “to discuss the issue 
of light water reactors at a suitable time” with political will’.85 Becker although more 
hawkish also argues that what is required is ‘political will’ to disarm such states.86 
Drennan argues that both sides attempted coercion that failed, with the escalation 
leading to the possibility of war neither side wanted.87 
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Comparison of NK and Libya 
Although most of the studies focus either on NK or Libya; in the Libyan studies, it is 
not uncommon to have discussion relating to lessons that can be applied to NK. 
However, this is significantly different from the structured focused comparison between 
the cases that will occur in this thesis. Joseph raises lessons from the Libyan case that he 
argues can be adapted to cases, such as NK ‘in a way that maximizes the prospects for 
the regimes to make the strategic choice to abandon their WMD programs’.88 Similarly, 
Bowen studies the Libyan crisis, identifies similarities and draws some conclusions on 
how lessons might be applied towards NK.
89
 Rothman examines both Libya and NK in 
order to determine why states facing similar threats chose to cope with them differently; 
however, this still does not use an analytical framework to compare these cases in 
depth.
90
  
  
There is a vast amount of literature on both the Libyan and North Korean proliferation 
efforts; however, none of these studies, other than Jakobsen himself, have used the ideal 
policy as there framework to conduct a structured focussed comparison. Furthermore, 
this thesis has conducted interviews with a range of key policy makers involved directly 
with these cases. Whilst none of the findings of the cases within this thesis provide new 
material, this study does confirm some of the findings of previous studies and a fresh 
analysis on an important strategy for dealing with nuclear proliferation.    
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Conclusion  
A positivistic research approach has been adopted by this study primarily as it was the 
method adopted by Jakobsen. However, an advantage of a positivistic approach is that it 
ensures that theories are tested empirically, as far as possible, to observable reality. As 
opposed to theories that do not seek to test themselves against any form of reality; 
therefore, offering no guarantee to a practitioner that they can be applied, or offer 
insight, in the real world with any confidence. Furthermore, positivism actively 
acknowledges that theory development is a process of continual improvement, and that 
theories are to be continually critiqued, adjusted and built upon. This is particularly 
important as it justifies the assumption of rationality arguing that the essential element 
of the development of theory is whether it is proven correct when tested empirically. 
The assumption of rationality is a good starting point for the development of theory; 
however, if it is proven to be empirically incorrect then those assumptions should be 
amended or the theory discarded.  
  
Using Jakobsen’s ideal policy I have derived assessment questions that will be used to 
test the selected case studies. Furthermore, I have identified the key claims Jakobsen 
puts forward for the ideal policy superiority over theories. The validity of these claims 
will be determined in relation to the empirical evidence and analysed fully in the 
concluding chapter. NK and Libya was selected as the case studies. Both the case 
studies were subjected to coercive diplomacy from the US between 1993-2006 (Libya 
2003), with the objective of stopping each state attain a nuclear weapon. NK continued 
its programme and exploded its first nuclear bomb in 2006; therefore, ultimately the US 
policy can be seen as a failure. Libya appears to have given up its WMD programme in 
2003; therefore, appears to be a demonstration of successful US coercive diplomacy. As 
the coercion occurred roughly at the same time, the specific military and diplomatic 
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capability of the US is the same in both cases; therefore, the difference in results must 
be dependent on other factors. By comparing these and contrasting the case studies it is 
envisaged that the key factors that led to successful and unsuccessful outcomes can be 
determined.
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CHAPTER 3 – US COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 
TOWARDS LIBYA 1992-2006 
In December 2003 the Libyan government announced that it would give up its Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD). The announcement came after secret negotiations on 
WMD and other issues between Libya, the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
Bush administration heralded Gaddafi decision as clear example that there robust 
counter-proliferation policy backed by the credible use of force in Iraq was effective.
1 
However, many argued this agreement was a product of a diplomatic negotiations and 
economic sanctions that were put in place by the previous administrations.2 In fact three 
previous US administrations had kept the pressure on Libya, persuading the 
international community to adopt sanctions that forced Tripoli to recognize its 
responsibility for the Pan Am 103, stop its support for terrorism and end its pursuit of 
WMD.3 
 
This chapter will, using the assessment questions derived in chapter 2, to analyse the 
coercive diplomacy applied by the US from 1992 to 2006 towards Libya. I have split the 
case into two distinct episodes; Episode 1, the Clinton administration’s policy toward 
Libya followed by episode 2, the Bush administration’s policy toward Libya. The 
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separation of episodes is due to a clear change in the rhetoric and policy of the Bush 
administration after the attacks of 11
th
 September 2001 (9/11). 
 
It will argue that coercive diplomacy in the form of the ideal policy was not applied in 
either episode. The Clinton administration focussed on the issue of terrorism and did not 
make an explicit threat to use force over either terrorism or WMD. The Bush 
administration gave an implied threat to Gaddafi. However, they did not give a specific 
deadline for compliance. Furthermore, I argue that Gaddafi acted rationally in 
surrendering his weapons as he had clear reasons to believe that there was a threat of 
force, demonstrated by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, even if the Bush administration did 
not intend to actually attack Libya.     
 
EPISODE 1 – CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 1993-2000 
AQ 1 - What was the US policy objective and demand? 
The US policy objective was stated in the Iranian Libyan Sanctions Act (ILSA) as ‘full 
compliance by Libya with its obligations under Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the 
Security Council of the United Nations, including ending all support for acts of 
international terrorism and efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction’.4  
 
The key demands within UNSC resolutions 731, 748 and 883 were: 
1. That the Libyan Government immediately provide a full and effective response 
to those requests so as to contribute to the elimination of international terrorism.
5
 
2. And in regard to the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772: 
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a. Surrender for trial all those charged with the crime; and accept 
responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials; 
b. Disclose all it knows of this crime, including the names of all those 
responsible, and allow full access to all witnesses, documents and other 
material evidence, including all the remaining timers; 
c. Pay appropriate compensation.6 
 
Therefore, although the ILSA mentioned ending Libyan ‘efforts to develop or acquire 
weapons of mass destruction’ as a policy objective, its main focus, and the sole focus of 
UNSC resolutions was on the issue of terrorism. Furthermore, US WMD concerns were 
primarily over Libya’s attempts to develop chemical and biological weapons, not 
nuclear weapons.
7
 The Clinton administration articulated a position of ‘concern’ 
regarding Libyan efforts to develop WMD
8
; however, no public demand regarding 
specially Libya’s nuclear weapons program was made. 
 
The prioritising of terrorism over WMD as the key policy objective was maintained 
throughout the Clinton administration’s time in office. Martin Indyk, who as Assistant 
Secretary of State led on negotiations with the Libyans in November 1998, confirms this 
stating ‘the priority was compensation to victims, cooperation with the trial, get out of 
the terrorism business!’.9 The policy objective focus on terrorism was also highlighted 
by Ambassador Welch, head of the eastern desk in the state department during the 
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Clinton administration, who pointed out that US policy ‘at the time it was completely 
terrorist focused, we were aware that Gaddafi had some WMD programmes and we 
were interested in it as a country and interdicting those as we could but the international 
community was not involved in that at all to the same degree as they were on the 
terrorism issue’.10  
 
The Libyans did eventually appear to respond positively to US demands over terrorists 
issues; expelling the Abu Nidal terrorist organization in 1999, breaking ties with other 
radical Palestinian groups, closing down training camps, and extraditing suspected 
terrorists to Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen.
11
 Most significantly the Lockerbie case was 
settled with suspects being handed over in April 1999 for trial, in the Netherlands, by a 
Scottish court.
12
 Furthermore, by October 1999 Libya had offered to join the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), including a pledge to comply with inspection and 
verification provisions.  
 
In summary, the policy objective and clear demands of the Clinton administration were 
firmly focussed on Gaddafi giving up his support of terrorists, handing over terrorist 
suspects and paying reparations to the families of the Lockerbie victims. There was no 
clear demand that Gaddafi was to halt and disarm his nuclear programme, but there was 
mention of ‘concern’ over his WMD programmes, although this was viewed as a lower 
priority and related more to his pursuit of chemical and biological weapons. 
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Determination of the form of coercive diplomacy that was adopted 
The ideal policy framework suggests that the minimum success criteria would have 
required a threat to defeat Gaddafi’s objective of obtaining nuclear weapons, a deadline 
for compliance, an assurance that compliance would not lead to more demands and a 
carrot/incentive for compliance. 
 
However, as I will show the Clinton administration did not apply coercive diplomacy in 
the form of the ideal policy over the issue of nuclear weapons as the primary focus of 
US policy was to resolve issues regarding Libya’s support of terrorism. Despite this 
there is still utility in examining the coercive diplomacy applied towards Libya and 
assessing why the ideal policy was not implemented. Furthermore, elements of this 
episode impact on episode 2. 
  
AQ 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his 
objectives quickly with little cost? 
The only evidence of a direct threat of force towards Libya over WMD was in April 
1996 when the then Secretary of Defence William Perry responded to press questions 
on the Libyan development of a chemical weapons plant, pointing out that the US 
would not allow the plant to open and responding to a question on the ‘use of U.S. 
military force’ by stating that and that he ‘wouldn’t rule out or anything in’.13 However, 
he later backtracked on this statement clarifying that 
 
Preventative action to keep the plant from coming on line is something that can 
be done first through diplomacy....We have a good period of time in which we 
can apply that diplomacy, including coercive diplomacy. If that fails, then we 
can consider military actions.
14
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Allegedly as a consequence of Perry’s threat, Libya halted construction on the plant 
presumably to avoid a potential US attack.
15
 Therefore, Gaddafi apparently took this 
threat seriously, even if it was unintentional. 
 
One implication from Perry’s statement that ‘diplomacy, including coercive diplomacy’ 
could be applied before the consideration of a military option is that Perry did not view 
what he termed ‘coercive diplomacy’ as a policy requiring the threat of force. Coercive 
diplomacy in the form of the ideal policy requires a credible threat of force; therefore, it 
this was to be applied it would require the consideration and communication of credible 
military options from the outset. Perry’s statement perhaps could be explained as an off 
the cuff remark. However, as it was an attempt to clarify the message made in his initial 
comment it is highly likely that it was carefully considered.   
 
Many within the administration did not view force as an appropriate tool to use against 
Libya. Ambassador Indyk stated ‘our leverage during the negotiations in 1999 had 
nothing to do with the threat of force, because at that point the national interest did not 
justify the threat of force for those objectives’.16 Furthermore Ambassador Welch 
commented that the use of force was ‘not an option that would work out to our benefit.  
The risk was higher than the benefit, especially if you weighed it against other 
alternatives’.17 The alternative that was chosen was the maintenance of UN and US 
unilateral sanctions that isolated Gaddafi and put pressure on his regime.    
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Although there was not an overt threat of force from the US, there was always an 
implied threat that force could be used to back a US political objective. The US during 
the Regan administration had considered Libya, because of its small size and 
advantageous geographic location on the Mediterranean, particularly susceptible to US 
military and economic pressure.
18
 This view seemed to be proven correct in April 1986, 
when the US conducted bombing raids on Benghazi and Tripoli, which appeared to 
coerce Gaddafi into ending his overt support for terrorism. Furthermore, US fighter jets 
shot down two Libyan aircraft over the Gulf of Surt in January 1989 proving their 
vulnerability to US power projection from aircraft carriers.
19
  
 
Another factor that gave credibility to US capability and willingness to use force was 
the ousting of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991. The US deployed over 500,000 
troops, 1000 battle tanks and aircraft, and 6 Carrier battle groups. The US led coalition 
commenced military operations on the 16
th
 January 1991 and by the 28
th
 of February it 
had achieved the limited objective of removing Iraq forces from Kuwait.
20
 The 
willingness of the US to conduct an expeditionary operation of this magnitude and the 
overwhelming military victory they attained, over what was at the time the 4
th
 largest 
army, must have been noted by Gaddafi with concern. The Gulf war along with the 
previous military actions against Libya demonstrated that the US not only possessed the 
military capability, but it had the will to use force when it assessed it was in its interest 
to do so. 
 
The strongest US unilateral action against Libya was detailed within the ILSA. This act 
declared that the President would enforce sanctions on a person if they ‘contributed to 
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Libya's ability to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or destabilizing 
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons or enhanced Libya's military or 
paramilitary capabilities’.21 However, this measure clearly was not a threat to use force. 
 
In summary, the approach that was adopted by the Clinton administration was to 
increase the international political and economic isolation of Gaddafi and his regime.  
The pressure was added by the enactment of the ILSA in 1996, that required the 
President to impose US sanctions on foreign firms investing $40 million or more in the 
Iranian or Libyan oil and natural gas industries
22
 as well as companies exporting items 
to Libya that enhance its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and advanced 
conventional weapons programs.
23
 There was no direct threat communicated that force 
would be applied in a manner that conforms to the ideal policy. 
 
AQ 3 - Was a deadline for compliance offered? 
The clearest deadline given to Libya was within UNSC resolution 883 that was adopted 
on 11 November 1993. The resolution stated that ‘in order to secure compliance by the 
Libyan Government with the decisions of the Council, to take the following measures, 
which shall come into force at 00.01 EST on 1 December 1993’. The resolution further 
stated that it would not come into force if the Secretary General in effect informed the 
UNSC that Libya had conformed to UN demands. Therefore, the Libyans were publicly 
made aware on 11 November 1993 that if they conformed fully by the UNSC deadline 
of the 1 December 1993 sanctions would not be implemented.   
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Earlier UNSC resolutions were more open, including statements such as ‘we expect 
Libya to comply promptly and in full’24 but with no fixed deadline. Therefore, the 
approach that seems to have been adopted initially is what Alexander George would 
have termed as the 'gradual turning of the screw'; where the coercing power neither 
creates a ‘sense of urgency’ nor does it signal the nature of threatened punishment. 
Instead, its demands are accompanied by a threat that punishment will be gradually 
increased if compliance does not occur.
25
 This in turn changed to an ultimatum, as 
UNSC 883 gave a clear indication of exactly when specific sanctions would be enacted 
if Libya did not meet clear demands.  
 
The ILSA contained no formal deadline. However, Gaddafi would have been aware of 
the policy being developed and discussed publicly by Congress; therefore, effectively 
there was a tacit ultimatum, as it is likely that if Gaddafi had conformed fully with the 
demands of the UNSC resolutions it would have most likely stopped Libya being 
included within the ILSA.   
 
In summary, although there was no deadline issued threatening the use of force relating 
to Gaddafi’s nuclear programme, there was a deadline given for when the measures 
within UNSC 883 would be applied; therefore, this element conforms partially to the 
ideal policy. 
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AQ 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands? 
Key to the ideal policy is that an adversary is assured that if he complies, further 
demands will not be placed upon him. Gaddafi reportedly was sceptical about the US 
and UK’s assurance that the Lockerbie suspects would not be used to implicate Libya as 
being fully responsible for the terrorist atrocity and that the UK/US real objective was 
regime change. In a letter to Gaddafi in February 1999, UN Secretary General Annan 
provided an assurance that the trial would not be used ‘to undermine’ the Libyan 
government. The trial was limited to the two mid-level officials, leading to charges of 
appeasement from US hardliners who believed that the Libyan regime should be 
accountable for Lockerbie.
26
 Even after Libya had met key demands, such as handing 
over key suspects, the US did not push to change its policies instantly. As a statement 
from Secretary Neumann highlights: 
We will oppose lifting U.N. sanctions against Libya until we are satisfied that 
Libya has met all the relevant U.N. Security Council requirements. The 
provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act regarding investment in Libya’s 
petroleum sector will continue to be considered until, as the statute prescribes, 
the President has determined and certified to Congress that the U.N. Security 
Council resolution requirements have been met. Also until that time, we expect 
to maintain core unilateral economic sanctions prohibiting U.S.-Libyan 
business.
27
 
 
 
This statement made on the 4
th
 May 2000 demonstrated that even though Gaddafi had 
handed over suspects to Scottish police on the 5 April 1999, the US still maintained 
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pressure over demands for reparations to the families of the Lockerbie victims and its 
‘concern’ over WMD.  
 
Libya was given an assurance within UNSC resolution 883 that if it complied the 
measures would be suspended immediately.
28
 Furthermore, the ILSA detailed how the 
President would lift sanctions if compliance was forthcoming.
29
 However, neither 
UNSC resolutions nor ILSA gave a clear assurance that if Libya complied, no further 
demands would be made. 
 
In summary, the assurance given to Libya was that handing over Lockerbie suspects 
would not be utilised as a way of seeking regime change. However, even after suspects 
had been handed over the US maintained sanctions based on outstanding demands that 
needed to be resolved, which included the issue of WMD. Assurances were given, but 
not assurances that further demands would not be made; therefore, this element only 
partially conforms to the ideal policy. 
 
AQ 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance? 
The key carrot that was being offered to Gaddafi was the lifting of international 
sanctions and reintegration into the international community, and in particular an 
improved relationship with the US. Removing sanctions would enable Gaddafi to attract 
the investment required to improve Libya’s ageing infrastructure and gain access to 
markets to sell oil. The oil revenues would enable him to secure his position within 
Libya. Furthermore, the lifting of the travel ban would allow him to increase his 
influence abroad aiding in Gaddafi’s personal ambition to be a regional leader. This 
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ambition is evident from a conversation recalled by Martin Indyk with the Libyan head 
of intelligence, Moussa Koussa who told him that Gaddafi: 
Can’t stand the fact that people he was in the trenches with Nelson Mandela, 
Robert Mugabe, they are not only out of jail, but they are now leaders of their 
countries heroes round the world and he can’t even host them in Libya, he wants 
to remove the stigma of being under sanctions.
30
 
 
Another incentive was an improved relationship with the US, which in turn could lead 
to full re-integration into the International Community (IC). Integration back into the IC 
would enable Libya to obtain investment to develop its oil resources and in turn much 
needed revenue. With money Gaddafi could then deal with internal problems and also 
obtain more influence in Africa. The US demonstrated that it was serious about the 
possibility of an improved relationship with Libya by its willingness to enter secret 
negotiations with the Libyan regime in 1998. Entering into negotiations demonstrated 
its willingness to seek a solution and resolve the issues between the two states. If the US 
was not interested in reaching such an accommodation it did not have to enter such 
negotiations and could have maintained sanctions and its diplomatic stance of isolating 
Libya until all its demands were met. 
 
There was a clear incentive of having UN and US sanctions lifted that in turn would 
have improved Libya’s economic situation and bolstered Gaddafi position. Furthermore, 
the secret talks held between the US and Libya demonstrated that there was a possibility 
of an improved relationship with the US. Therefore, there was clearly an incentive on 
offer that conforms to the ideal policy.  
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Evaluation of the implementation of the ideal policy and coercive diplomacy applied 
Coercive diplomacy in the form of the ideal policy was not applied towards Libya 
specifically for the policy goal of preventing it from developing nuclear weapons.  
There was no clear demand that Libya halt its nuclear weapons programme and there 
was no direct threat to use force. There was a deadline given, but this related to when 
sanctions would come into force primarily over the issue of terrorism. Furthermore, the 
only assurances given were related to the way the Lockerbie suspects would be dealt 
with, not specifically that future demands would not follow. The clearest element of 
US’ policy that conformed to the ideal policy was that there was a clear incentive on 
offer to Gaddafi that if he complied with UN and US demands, sanctions would be 
lifted, and an improved relationship with the US would be a possibility. 
 
The actual strategy of coercive diplomacy applied was firmly focused on the key policy 
objective of resolving historic terrorist issues and relied primarily on the threat of, and 
actual application of, sanctions. Although it could be strongly argued that any demand 
the US gave to Libya contained an implied a threat of force, as there was no specific 
demand given to Libya regarding what would happen if it did not cease developing 
WMDs there was effectively no coercive diplomacy applied for this objective. The only 
threat that was made, was later retracted, and was more concerned with chemical and 
biological weapons, than specifically nuclear weapons.  
 
AQ 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war? 
The Clinton administration only made demands about Gaddafi ceasing his pursuit of 
WMDs, not specifically nuclear weapons.
31
 Veiled non-specific threats of this nature 
                                                          
31
 Bill Clinton, President Clinton’s first comprehensive  strategy document, A National Security Strategy 
of Engagement and Enlargement, in The Clinton foreign policy reader: presidential speeches with 
commentary, in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayevich, Boris Zlotnikov eds (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 
2000), pg.29. 
111 
 
clearly did not deter Gaddafi who continued to develop a nuclear weapons capability 
throughout the 90s. However, there is evidence to suggest that Gaddafi would have been 
willing to comply. Although Secretary Perry’s threat was retracted, it is claimed that 
work stopped on Rabata factory, an indication that they took the statement seriously.  
Furthermore, Gaddafi did eventually decide that it was better to comply with the 
demands over the Lockerbie suspects. However, his compliance with these demands 
was not primarily due to fear of war, but more a desire to remove sanctions that were 
crippling the Libyan economy.   
 
Over terrorism there was a clear case made by the US and UK, accepted by the 
international community, that Gaddafi was responsible for several terrorist attacks. If a 
clear case could have been developed that Gaddafi had a nuclear weapons programme, 
it is highly likely that it would have caused international outrage and a continuation, if 
not increase, of international sanctions. Driven with the desire to escape such sanctions, 
it is highly likely that Gaddafi would have calculated that it would be preferable to 
surrender these weapons if it removed sanctions.   
 
One argument that is often put forward is that Gaddafi did not have a serious nuclear 
programme.
32
 One possible implication of this assertion is that Gaddafi viewed this 
programme as a bargaining chip and was never fully serious about developing the 
capability. Therefore, in effect if Libya’s nuclear weapons programme was detected it 
would put him in a more preferable negotiating position. There is evidence to support 
this claim as during the Clinton administration’s negotiations, it was the Libyan’s who 
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raised the offer of ending its WMD programs.
33
 Gaddafi was willing to sacrifice his 
WMD programme in order to achieve other political objectives.    
 
As there was no direct threat that Gaddafi should halt his nuclear weapons programme 
or face a war it would initially appear that the opponent did not have to make a decision 
on whether it was better to comply or risk going to war. However, as Gaddafi did offer 
WMD as a possible concession during secret negotiations in 1998, it is highly likely that 
he would have complied rather than go to war. 
 
AQ 7 – Did the opponent act rationally, miscalculate or suffer from 
misperception? 
In order to determine whether Gaddafi acted rationally it is necessary to assess what was 
his political objective. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gaddafi was increasingly 
internationally and regionally isolated. Arab nations, driven by a need to integrate fully 
into the world economy, came to terms with Israel and accepted the need for a US 
security umbrella. Moreover, Gaddafi’s activist foreign policy that involved interfering 
in other African states isolated him further from his neighbours. Therefore, Gaddafi 
throughout the 1990s increasingly became side-lined whilst peers such as Nelson 
Mandela and Yasir Arafat were engaged with Western democracies.
34
 The impact of 
this was that Gaddafi calculated that his regimes survival and personal ambition was 
better served by improving relations with the US in order to re-integrate into the 
International Community (IC).   
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As stated previously there is anecdotal evidence that Gaddafi’s goal to re-integrate into 
the international community was partly based on his desire to take on the mantle of a 
regional leader. Therefore, assuming that Gaddafi’ goal was international re-integration 
and increasing his influence within the region, ceasing his support of terrorists and even 
handing over suspects of the Lockerbie bombing was rational, as neither of these were 
aiding him in achieving this objective.  
 
Whether it was rational for Gaddafi’s to seek to attain nuclear weapons during the 
Clinton administration depends very much on what you assess to be his political 
objective. If it was to remain in power and deter external states from interfering with 
Libyan internal affairs, his pursuit on the face of it appears rational. Libya is a large 
country, with a small population, that had proven to be vulnerable to US attacks.  
Moreover, the demonstration of the US overwhelming capability to defeat Iraq’s army 
in 1991 clearly indicated that his conventional forces would not be able to deter a 
determined US action. Therefore, it was logical for Gaddafi to conclude that developing 
a nuclear weapon as the only way of effectively deterring the US. 
 
However, if his nuclear programme was detected, Gaddafi must have realised that it 
would lead to at the very least continuation of Libya’s international isolation and 
sanctions. Furthermore, it would possible lead to a more aggressive posture from the 
international community and US. Therefore, if his goal was re-integration it could 
appear not to be a rational choice. Another possibility is that Gaddafi also saw nuclear 
weapons as an item of prestige that would further enhance his standing within the region 
and his desire to become a Pan-Arab, and latterly African leader.   
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It is most likely that Gaddafi saw nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip that he could 
use to deal with the US and IC. If he was caught before developing a full nuclear 
capability he most likely believed that he could extract concessions out of the 
international community for giving up his weapons before any further sanctions or 
threats of force were directed at him. The concessions he could seek would be larger the 
closer he got to a credible nuclear weapon system. If he actually attained a nuclear 
weapon, it would in provide an element of deterrence from the US and perhaps enable 
him to coerce neighbours.   
 
Gaddafi must have noted that in 1994 the DPRK and US signed the AF, a road map that 
gave the NK concessions in the form of oil and two Light Water Reactors (LWR), in 
return for them dismantling their plutonium based nuclear weapons program. 
Furthermore, the US prior to 2003 had not conducted a military strike against a state 
specifically in order to disrupt their nuclear weapons programme. Although, in 1981 
Israel had conducted such a strike against an Iraq
35
 nuclear reactor on the grounds of 
pre-emption; therefore, there was the risk of a similar pre-emptive strike being 
conducted against Libya. However, Gaddafi most likely calculated that even if his 
WMD program was detected he would have time to use its existence to open 
negotiations with the US. 
 
Gaddafi actions in this episode would appear to be rational. He started to comply with 
the US and UN demands over issues of terrorism which clearly brought him closer to 
re-integration into the international community. Furthermore, as the US did not have 
clear evidence of his nuclear programme and there was no direct threat made, Gaddafi’s 
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pursuit of nuclear weapons program would appear to be rational as it gave him the 
opportunity to either obtain a deterrent and mark of prestige, or possible increase any 
future bargain position with the US. 
 
AQ 8 - Does credible implementation of the ideal policy lead to compliance? 
The ideal policy was not applied in this episode. 
 
AQ 9 - Does failure to implement the ideal policy lead to non-compliance? 
There was no form of coercive diplomacy implemented primarily for the purpose of 
Libya surrendering its nuclear weapons programme. The coercive diplomacy applied 
relied on the use of sanctions, implemented towards Libya over issues of terrorism and 
to an extent its pursuit of biological and chemical weapons. Even the coercive 
diplomacy over issues of terrorism did not take the form of the ideal policy as there was 
no threat of force, however, it did have some success as Gaddafi handed over key 
terrorist suspects and agreed to sign the CWC.    
   
It could be asserted that the logic of the ideal policy holds, as the ideal policy was not 
applied and Gaddafi continued with his nuclear weapons programme. However, this 
would not be a valid assertion, as there could be various reasons for non-compliance. I 
would argue that as there was no real strategy of coercive diplomacy applied 
specifically over the issue of nuclear weapons, Gaddafi did not actually have any 
specific demand to comply with. Therefore, it was failure to detect, interdict and form a 
strategy to deal with his nuclear programme that allowed Libya to continue its nuclear 
programme.  
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AQ 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be 
carried out? 
As there was no compliance regarding nuclear weapons or a direct threat to use force it 
is not possible to assess this question fully. 
 
EPISODE 1 WILL TO THREATEN AND USE FORCE 
Jakobsen asserts that the willingness to use force can be explained by three ‘will 
producing; patterns which are Interest-driven pattern, Government-driven pattern and 
Domestic pressure-driven pattern.
36
 Furthermore, following Jacobsen’s’ logic I argue 
that because of the unique threat of states attaining nuclear weapons, there must be an 
additional pattern that is a ‘vital interest’ driven pattern. The pattern is dependent on the 
coding, of low to high, of three variables; the nature of threatened interests, prospects of 
military success and domestic support. This section will examine each of the variables 
in turn, assessing the extent they were present and determining whether they explain 
why the US was not willing to threaten the use force over Libya’ nuclear programme. 
 
The nature of the threatened interests. 
The Clinton administration articulated within the ILSA that:  
The failure of the Government of Libya to comply with Resolutions 731, 748, 
and 883 of the Security Council of the United Nations, its support of 
international terrorism, and its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction 
constitute a threat to international peace and security that endangers the national 
security and foreign policy interests of the United States and those countries 
with which it shares common strategic and foreign policy objectives.
37
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Therefore, Libya’s pursuit of WMD was seen as ‘endangering’ national security and 
foreign policy interests of the US. However, the interests actually being threatened by 
Libya’s pursuit of nuclear weapons were not stated. 
The greatest threat to the US would have been Libya developing a nuclear weapons 
system with the capability to strike the US. Gaddafi had stated that Libya, and other 
Arab nations, should develop such a capability in order to deter US attacks.
38
 If Gaddafi 
was only developing a nuclear weapons capability in order to deter US acts of 
aggression, it would not be an existential threat to the US. Therefore, it would not be a 
vital US interest. However, clearly there would always be a fear expressed by some 
within the US that Gaddafi would not act rationally and would launch an unprovoked 
attack.  
 
Clinton in his National Strategy for engagement and enlargement stated ‘in those 
specific areas where our vital or survival interests-those of broad, overriding importance 
to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity-are at stake, our use of force 
will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral’.39 This statement emphasised that the use 
of force was viewed as a viable tool when vital or survival interests were at stake.  
Therefore, a simple deduction would be that as Clinton never issued a threat, the issue 
of Libyan nuclear programme was not seen by the Clinton administration as a vital 
threat and did not require the use or threat of force.   
 
The threat to US interests was more likely that development of a Libyan nuclear 
weapons capability would complicate the balance of power in the region and the US 
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ability to influence events. This view is put forward by Litwak who states ‘The US 
concern was that Gaddafi would use what he characterised as a “deterring force” as an 
offensive coercive instrument to intimidate neighbours and to provide cover for the 
objectionable foreign policy behaviour’.40 Development of even a limited range nuclear 
weapons capability could have directly threatened Israel, who in turn, may have decided 
to take pre-emptive action that would destabilise the region. Gaddafi had openly been 
anti-Israeli; opening military camps inside Libya to train Arabs to fight the Israelis and 
funding armed groups within Palestinian territories.
41
 Furthermore, Israel had taken pre-
emptive strikes on a suspected Iraq WMD sites in 1981. 
 
Even a limited nuclear weapon system would have been enough to add to the cost-
benefit calculation of conducting any form of military action against Libya.  
Furthermore, there would always be a concern that Gaddafi could supply such weapons 
to terrorists or proliferate to other rogue states or non-state actors. The risk of 
proliferating nuclear weapons would increase the threat to the US that the weapons 
would fall into the hands of enemies willing to use them.   
 
Ambassador Indyk pointed out the concern over proliferation stating that ‘a country like 
Libya getting nuclear weapons, it’s a threat to our vital interests to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, it would have been treated as a threat to our vital 
national interests’.42 If Libya was allowed to develop a nuclear weapon capability it 
would have damaged the credibility of the NPT, possible encouraging other countries to 
act similarly and causing a rapid increase in nuclear proliferation. Therefore, it was in 
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the US interest to prevent such nuclear proliferation as the more states with nuclear 
weapons the more risk was posed to the US.   
Due to the ability to deter the US from acting against Libya, and the risk of proliferation 
That Libya’s development of a nuclear weapon would have signalled it is assessed that 
it would have affected US strategic interests
43
 if Gaddafi had been successful. 
Therefore, by Jakobsen’s hierarchy this issue is coded ‘high’.   
 
The prospects of military success. 
Throughout the 90s Libya’s military capability declined whilst the US demonstrated 
convincingly in the Gulf war of 1991 its superiority in conventional forces. As pointed 
out by Dr El-Kikhia ‘its military is antiquated. It still uses Soviet weapons of 1970’s 
vintage, and those weapons have demonstrated their ability in the Gulf War.  Even far 
more sophisticated weapons could not stand up to America’s might or European 
might’.44 The US also firmly indicated that it was capable of taking out WMD plants 
within Libya, with Frank Bacon, US press spokesperson stating about the Libyan 
Tarhunah Chemical plant ‘should military options be necessary, we can accomplish this 
with conventional means.’45 Therefore, the balance of power was clearly in the US 
favour.  
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It was also highly unlikely that any major power would have supported Gaddafi if a 
clear demand had been made that he halt his WMD programmes or face military action.  
Libya was already politically and economically isolated due to issues over terrorism, 
and the international outrage would have been focussed on Libya’s disregard for the 
NPT. Furthermore, no state would have wanted to oppose the US without strong 
national interests for doing so.   
 
The 1986 bombings proved that Libya was vulnerable to US attacks. Geographically 
Libya was an easier target for the US than Iraq. The majority of the population lives 
within the littoral and its coast line goes on for 1170 km
46
 making it particular 
susceptible to airstrikes from European or a US Carrier Group. Furthermore, a Carrier 
Group was continually deployed to the Mediterranean along with a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) throughout the 90s.
 47
  
 
However, the high probability of being able to conduct an attack successfully, is 
different from conducting an attack successfully that achieves the aim of destroying 
Libya’s nuclear programme. It is unclear whether the US had detailed knowledge of 
locations essential to his nuclear programme. Without detailed intelligence it is unlikely 
that limited air strikes alone could confidently destroy Libya’s programme. The US did 
have the capability to conduct special operations, or even a limited amphibious 
operation through the use of the MEU. However, this would have raised the stakes 
significantly by placing ground troops in direct contact and raising the chances of US 
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casualties. However, due to the vastly capability difference of the opposing forces, if the 
US had felt it was in its interest to do so it would have had a ‘high’ chance of a military 
operation succeeding. 
 
The level of domestic support 
US politicians clearly saw the issue of reparations for victims of Lockerbie as a priority, 
most likely because this issue could have an instant effect on votes. This is highlighted 
by Ambassador Welch who points out ‘my dealing with Congress on the matter is that 
all they really cared about at the end of the day was getting satisfaction for the 
American claimants from Libya. If that could be afforded, they were willing to hit the 
pause button on other issues’.48   
 
Furthermore, when asked about whether there would have been domestic support for a 
hard line and threat of force he pointed out that ‘people would have been supportive, but 
what does taking a hard line mean’, there are limits to it, public enthusiasm can spike 
early and decline rapidly’.49 This comment points to one of the common issues faced by 
gaining domestic support, in that it can depend heavily on the mood of the time.  
 
If a case had been put forward to threaten the use of force against Libya over its nuclear 
weapons programme it is highly likely that it would have been relatively simple to gain 
the backing of the people for some level of intervention. A media agenda that raised the 
alarm of the prospect of Libya, a rogue state, led by the irrational Gaddafi, would have 
undoubtedly concerned many US citizens. However, whether support would have been 
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for air strikes or a more prolonged ground operation, with the likelihood of causalities is 
not possible to assess. 
If Gaddafi’s nuclear programme had been placed in front of the US congress and people 
it is not difficult to believe that a case for threatening military operations could be made. 
Particularly, as Gaddafi was viewed as a brutal dictator by the US. However, due to the 
various options it is likely that there would have been a debate regarding what form any 
military threat should take. Therefore, this element is assessed as ‘medium’. 
 
AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten 
and use force? 
There was no direct threat to use force so this question cannot be assessed. 
 
AQ 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to 
threaten and use force? 
The national interest for threatening force was assessed as high, the chance of military 
success as high and the chance of attaining domestic support as medium, a pattern that 
conforms to an interest driven pattern. Therefore, Jakobsen’s framework predicts that 
the US should have threatened to use force. 
 
The most obvious explanation for why the Clinton administration did not threaten to use 
force and apply the ideal policy is that they did not know about Gaddafi’s nuclear 
programme. The possibility aligns with a 1999 congress report that stated that ‘Libya 
continues to develop its nascent and still rudimentary nuclear research and development 
program but still requires significant foreign assistance to advance to a nuclear weapons 
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option’.50 Although in 2001 a subsequent report indicated that ‘Libya and other 
countries reportedly used their secret services to try to obtain technical information on 
the development of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons’ and that 
‘Libya’s continuing interest in nuclear weapons and ongoing nuclear infrastructure 
upgrades raise concerns’.51 However, it is not until 2003 that the unclassified reports 
indicate Gaddafi’s intent to develop a nuclear weapon. A report evaluating the US 
intelligence communities’ performance in assessment over Libya, states that: 
Prior to December 2003, the strength of clandestine reporting on Libya’s 
procurement activity provided the Intelligence Community with a fairly accurate 
view of what nuclear-related equipment and material Libya possessed. 
Intelligence suggesting that Libya was receiving nuclear equipment via the A.Q. 
Khan network, and reporting from the 1980s indicating that Libya had acquired 
yellowcake from Niger in 1978 that were later validated by inspections. 
Intelligence that Libya had received uranium hexaﬂuoride feed material for its 
gas centrifuge program was also conﬁrmed.52   
 
The report went on to point out that the ‘CIA and DIA had assessed that Libya could 
produce enough weapons grade uranium for a nuclear warhead as early as 2007’53 and 
that: ‘By 2000, information was uncovered that revealed shipments of centrifuge 
technology from the Khan network were destined for Libya’.54 The interesting aspect of 
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this report
55
 is that it indicates that the intelligence community most likely knew that 
Gaddafi was seeking nuclear weapons before 2000 as he had gained possession of both 
yellow cake and uranium hexaﬂuoride feed material for a gas centrifuge program. Most 
concerning is that they believed he was further along with his programme, assessing in 
1999 that he could develop a nuclear weapon by 2015, an assessment that changed in 
2001 to development of a nuclear warhead by 2007.
56
 
 
Gaddafi had also made several statements that indicated he was pursuing nuclear 
weapons. In the mid 1990s recalling the US attacks on Tripoli, he stated: 
If we had possessed a deterrent—missiles that could reach New York— we 
would have hit it at the same moment. Consequently, we should build this force 
so that they and others will no longer think about an attack. Whether regarding 
Libya or the Arab homeland, in the coming twenty years this revolution should 
achieve a unified Arab nation.... This should be one homeland, the whole of it, 
possessing missiles and even nuclear bombs. Regarding reciprocal treatment, the 
world has a nuclear bomb, we should have a nuclear bomb.
57
  
 
This statement was a clear indication that Gaddafi deemed pursuit of nuclear weapons a 
valid policy objective, even though Libya had signed the NPT. 
 
Taking the assessments stated within US reports and Gaddafi’s rhetoric towards 
developing a nuclear weapon it is highly likely that at some level within the US 
administration individuals with policy making responsibilities were aware by 1999 that 
Gaddafi appeared to be seeking nuclear weapon with the possibility of obtaining a 
device by 2015. Therefore, why was there not a decision to make a case, backed by the 
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threat of force, that he halt and disarm his nuclear programme?  The most likely 
explanation is that the Clinton administration did not view the nuclear issue as an 
immediate threat and were more concerned with the more immediate electoral damage 
that could be done by not dealing with the highly motive issue of reparations for the 
Lockerbie victims’ families. Raising the issue of nuclear weapons backed by the threat 
of force would have complicated obtaining compensation. Whereas obtaining 
compensation first, then dealing with the less immediate, but important issue of 
Gaddafi’s emerging nuclear programme would have been a more logical strategy.   
Ambassador Welch also implies that Libya was not viewed a threat stating ‘short of 
Libya actually using any of these devices there was no threat of going to war.  My 
personal view is the threat of Libya would not have risen to the level where it would 
have been that much of a concern. I find it implausible they would have used them’.58 
These statements emphasise the administrations perception that a Libyan nuclear 
programme was not an immediate threat. Fundamentally future administrations had up 
to 2015 to deal with Libya nuclear weapons programme; progress on the issue of 
reparations for victims could gain, or lose, politicians votes at the next election.    
 
AQ 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from 
leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important 
interests are threatened? 
There was no direct threat to use force so it is not possible to assess whether coalitional 
consensus concerning threat of force required leadership or shared perception of various 
states that important interests are threatened. However, an assessment of coalitional 
consensus required to threaten and implement sanctions can be assessed. UN sanctions 
required US leadership to formulate and implement. Furthermore, the enactment of 
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sanctions was aided significantly by the US, UK and France sharing the policy objective 
that Libyan terrorist issues should be resolved. This united front by three permanent 
members of the UNSC clearly influenced states to back their claims and led to UN 
sanctions. Therefore, the instigation of sanctions against Libya over the issue of 
terrorism required US leadership and relied on shared interests with the UK and France. 
 
As soon as the Libya handed over the Lockerbie suspects; the UN, against US wishes, 
suspended its sanctions. The US wished to maintain the pressure on Gaddafi until full 
compensation for the families of Lockerbie victims had been achieved and issues 
regarding Libya’s pursuit of WMD had been resolved. However, the leadership of the 
only remaining superpower was not sufficient to influence the UN to maintain these 
sanctions. Once the issue of terrorism seemed to have been resolved many states within 
Europe believed it was in their interest to form economic ties with Libya against the 
wishes of the US.   
 
Furthermore, Libya only agreed to hand over suspects after the US agreed to 
compromise on where the trial of the suspects should be held. The US compromise was 
based on its view that the UN sanctions were beginning to unravel with international 
leaders such as Mandela defying the travel ban and publicly stating in Libya ‘we are 
actively encouraging our business people to develop trade relations with countries such 
as yours’.59 The plight of the UN sanctions was later reflected upon by Ambassador 
Ronald Neumann, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East Affair who stated:  
U.N. sanctions, in place since 1992, were having an impact on Libya, but the 
symbolic dimensions, the ban on air travel and mandate to reduce Libyan 
diplomatic presence, were seen as increasingly futile. International support for 
new pressure on Libya was declining. Sanctions fatigue was setting in. Others in 
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the region and our own allies believed it important for all concerned to try to 
bring the matter to a close, but Libya was coming no closer to surrendering the 
suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing.
60
  
 
 
Ambassador Indyk also indicated this view stating ‘African leaders did not respect the 
sanctions, Arab leaders started to visit there as well, by the time we opened 
negotiations, the dirty little secret was that sanctions were failing and that is the primary 
reason we decided to begin negotiations’.61 
 
The ILSA implemented US sanctions on foreign companies, which caused significant 
issues with several European states.
62
 Reportedly one official commented, ‘it’s one 
thing to lead by example. But to try to impose a secondary boycott on others who won’t 
go along is totally counterproductive and harms other interests’.63 There was also 
disagreement within the US administration whether imposing such sanctions was wise.  
But the act was clearly going to pass congress; therefore, the administration tried to 
limit the scope of the legislation to foreign investment in the energy sector, and to 
maintain diplomatic flexibility through a provision granting the President authority to 
waive the ILSA sanctions.
64
  
 
Although initially there was coalitional consensus regarding the full implementation of 
sanctions, this started to wane once individual states saw it against their interests not to 
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enforce them. This was despite US leadership and potential US sanctions for 
contravention of the ILSA.    
AQ 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when 
none of the above conditions are met? 
There was no threat of force discussed over the issue of terrorism or WMD that required 
a coalitional consensus; the chosen approach was the use of sanctions. 
 
AQ 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise 
support for policies involving threats and use of force? 
There was no threat of force so it is not possible to extrapolate from this episode how 
international organisations impact on policies involving threats and use of force.  
However, whether international organisations aided the implementation of sanctions can 
be examined.   
 
Gaddafi was informed in May 1993 that the US was seeking, through the UNSC, a full 
embargo on Libyan oil sales that would prevent Libya’s export of 1.36 million barrels a 
day of crude, the lifeline of its economy.
65
 The pressure mounted as in November 1993, 
the UNSC passed resolution 883, reiterating the demands of UNSC resolutions 731 and 
748; that Libya cooperate by handing the suspects over to US and UK. The implication 
of UNSC resolution 883 was that states were called upon to freeze all Libyan foreign 
financial holdings, a ban on the transfer of production technology critical to the Libyan 
energy sector and other prohibitions that significantly impacted upon its economy.
66
  
However a total embargo on Libyan oil and gas exports was avoided as it was believed 
that such a measure would have triggered opposition from Russia and China, as well as 
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from European allies (notably Italy and Germany) dependent on Libya as an energy 
supplier.
67
  
 
Litwak points out that the UN sanctions in November 1993 proved to be the ‘high-water 
mark of international efforts to compel the Gaddafi regime’s compliance with Security 
Council resolutions requiring the Libyan government to turn over the Lockerbie 
suspects for trial’. After these sanctions the US and UK governments struggled to 
maintain collective pressure on Libya in the face of dissipating international support for 
multilateral sanctions.
68
 However, having an international organisation that could apply 
sanctions, even if the effectiveness waned over time, did aid the US with compelling 
Libya.   
 
AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to 
develop nuclear weapons?        
There was no threat issued explicitly to Libya concerning nuclear weapons. Therefore, it 
is not possible to ascertain what impact this would have had on his nuclear programme.  
 
EPISODE 2 – BUSH ADMINISTRATION 2000 - 2006 
AQ 1 - What was the policy objective and demand? 
9/11 had an enormous impact on the US’ nuclear proliferation policy. Bush viewed 9/11 
as an act that demonstrated the vulnerability of the US and its enemies’ determination.  
Furthermore, he feared the next terrorist attack and gave a clear implied threat to all 
nations stating:  
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with 
us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that 
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continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States 
as a hostile regime.
69
 
 
This was not just rhetoric in the wake of an unforeseen crisis; policy was being changed 
as pointed out by Litwak: 
The 9/11 attacks did not change the structure of international relations, but did 
lead to a redefinition of threat. The Bush administration argued that 
unpredictable "rogue" states, like Iraq, and undeterrable terrorist groups created 
a dangerous nexus of proliferation and terrorism. It argued that the threat posed 
by the "rogues" derived from the very character of their regimes -- hence the 
post-9/11 emphasis on regime change over containment -- and rejected 
diplomatic engagement with the "rogues" as rewarding bad behaviour.
70
 
 
With the immediate objective of finding an effective way of responding to 9/11 the 
administration started discussing whether force should be used more broadly against 
targets that did not have a direct link to supporting Al-Qaida. Donald Rumsfeld, then 
Secretary of State for Defence articulated in a memo that ‘we need to consider other 
nations, including Sudan, Libya, Iraq, and Iran, where terrorists had found safe haven 
over the years and where they might seek refuge if we were to attack al-Qaida’s hub in 
Afghanistan’.71 Furthermore, in his memoir he reflected that  9/11 was a ‘rare 
opportunity to persuade Libya’ to choose a different path72, stating ‘I believed that if we 
put sufficient pressure on Afghanistan and Iraq, other countries might recognise that 
their interests in self-preservation meant that they too needed to end their support for 
terrorism and their WMD programs’.73 
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In his 2002 State of the Union message, Bush labelled NK, Iran and Iraq and ‘states like 
these’ as constituting an ‘Axis of Evil’.74 Libya a state who had supported terrorism and 
was seeking WMD must have believed that they were within the ‘states like these’ 
category. An interpretation further consolidated further when Secretary Powell whilst 
defending the use of the term ‘Axis of Evil’ to a senate committee stated that the three 
identified countries were ‘probably not the only ones we could have put into the club’.75 
Furthermore, Libya was clearly identified by John Bolton, former Undersecretary of 
State for Arms Control, who singled out Syria, Libya, and Cuba in a speech entitled 
‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’ stating ‘America is determined to prevent the next wave of 
terror. States that sponsor terror and pursue WMD must stop. States that renounce terror 
and abandon WMD can become part of our effort. But those that do not can expect to 
become our targets’.76  
 
The President also laid out a policy of pre-emptive action against states supporting 
terrorism and seeking nuclear weapons stating ‘we must be prepared to stop rogue states 
and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass 
destruction against the United States and our allies and friends”.77 He further added that:    
The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to 
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the 
greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking 
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the 
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time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by 
our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.
78
 
 
The significance of this statement was that pre-emption no longer relied purely on the 
immediacy of the threat, but the potential impact. Therefore, indicating that the US 
would be willing to act against WMD threats even if the attack did not appear imminent. 
Although, the NSS also stated that force would not be used ‘in all cases to pre-empt 
emerging threats’.79   
 
The US clearly articulated a policy objective that states that supported terrorism and 
sought nuclear weapons halt their activities or face the possibility of pre-emptive 
military action. Libya identified as a state ‘beyond the Axis of Evil’, who had a history 
of supporting terrorists and seeking WMD clearly fell into the category of a potential 
‘target’ of a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, Gaddafi must have viewed the demand that 
states should halt their pursuit of nuclear weapons being implicitly directed at him.    
 
AQ 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his 
objectives quickly with little cost? 
A threat was articulated by elements of the Bush administration towards Libya. 
John Bolton’s ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’ speech named Libya and pointed out that 
‘States that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our effort. But those 
that do not can expect to become our targets’.80 This was clearly a threat to Libya from 
a senior official in the Bush administration. However, it was a threat that was not 
repeated directly by the President himself. The closest Bush came to identifying Libya 
specifically as a possible target was his original ‘Axis of Evil’ speech where he referred 
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to NK, Iran, Iraq and ‘States like these’. 
   
Whilst the President’s statements were not a specific threat directed to Libya, they did 
clearly articulate a threat to states like Libya who were developing WMD and had a 
history of supporting terrorism. This threat was given credibility when the Bush 
doctrine of pre-emption was used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq under the premise 
that Saddam had WMD and that there was a ‘risk that the current Iraqi regime will 
either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its 
Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so’.81 The 
importance of the invasion of Iraq was highlighted by Richard Perle, a former Bush Snr 
and Reagan policy official, who stated ‘our diplomacy then could be simplified to two 
words: “You're next.” The point was not “we are going to invade you next”. It was we 
are going to turn to you next’.82  
 
Certainly several UK and US officials at the time believed that Gaddafi thought he was 
next. Jack Straw, then UK Foreign Secretary commented ‘those of us involved in all of 
this were not in any doubt that Gaddafi was worried that he might be next, and certainly 
the tolerance in the International Community for a rogue states attaining nuclear 
weapons was declining’.83 A similar view was that of a senior member of the first Bush 
administration, who commented that Gaddafi’s view was ‘these guys invaded Iraq, who 
at the time Gaddafi thought had a nuclear weapon, it did not do him any good, and 
                                                          
81
 Authorization for use of military force against Iraq resolution of 2002, Public Law 107-243,107th 
Congress, Joint Resolution, To Authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq., NOTE: 
Oct. 16, 2002 - [H.J. Res. 114].  
 
82
 Richard Pearle, cited in Amity Shales, ‘Comment: Bush's doctrine starts to yield results’, Financial 
Times, 22 December 2003. 
 
83
 Author’s interview with The Right Honourable Jack Straw, by telephone, 14 June 2013. 
134 
 
argue that it caused the invasion, so he saw what was coming’84 and by Robert Joseph, 
who was the lead US negotiator in the 2003 Libyan negotiations, who stated that:  
There is no question that Gaddafi’s principal motivation was his belief that 
Libya would be next on the target list, no question. There were other motivations 
in play as well, but the primary one was the perception that we were going to use 
force against Libya if it did not abandon its WMD programs.
85
 
However, there are opponents of this view that indicate that the Iraq war actually 
weakened the US position, as stated by Professor Jentleson argues that:  
By the time the deal is struck in December 2003, it is pretty clear that the United 
States is not doing that well in Iraq – the initial mission accomplished is over, so 
you could imagine that Gaddafi in a perfectly rational way saying “I am less 
worried about you coming after me militarily, now that I have seen the reaction 
of the international community and how you are tied down in Iraq.
86
 
 
Many argue that Iraq was not a required element to bring about Gaddafi’s decision and 
the predominant factor was the desire to reintegrate into the international system and 
improve his economic situation.
87 
However, even individuals more critical of the 
connection
88
 between the Iraq war and Gaddafi admit that it is hard to argue against the 
timing as put forward by a proponent of the Iraq factor Ambassador Joseph: 
On the 13
th
 of December Saddam was pulled out of his spider hole.  No doubt 
this had a direct impact on Gaddafi’s thinking.  Did we intentionally pull him 
out on the 13
th
 to effect decisions on the 16
th
? No, but all the stars were in 
alignment at that point, he didn’t want to be the guy in the spider hole.89 
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Was there a real intention to target Libya next? There is evidence to suggest parts of the 
administration were considering the threat of force towards Libya, as a memo from 
Secretary Rumsfeld written in April 2003
90
 states ‘we need more coercive diplomacy 
with respect to Syria and Libya, and we need it fast. If they mess up Iraq, it will delay 
bringing our troops home’.91 The fact that this was written by the Secretary of Defence 
and not the Secretary of State, clearly indicates that the threat or actual use of force was 
implied in the term ‘coercive diplomacy’. Furthermore, the concern that ‘if Iraq did not 
go well’ it would bring troops home indicates that the credible demonstration of force in 
Iraq was viewed as a necessary element of any coercive diplomacy to be used against 
Libya.  
 
However, the lead negotiator Ambassador Joseph implies that any threat perceived by 
Gaddafi was neither immediate nor directly focussed on Libya but was certainly 
capitalised on, stating: 
We certainly didn’t discourage Gaddafi from thinking in those terms. We didn’t 
need to discourage or encourage him. The Libyans came to us through British 
intelligence in March 2003 when we were flying thousands of forces into the 
region to enforce multiple UNSCRs on what was assessed to be WMD in Iraq. 
That didn’t escape them and gave them a motivation; they started to hedge their 
bets at that point.
92
 
 
Although a definitive analysis of whether Gaddafi felt threatened by the US is not 
possible without access to documents and close personnel that are currently 
unattainable; there is enough secondary evidence to strongly indicate that Gaddafi felt 
threatened. Firstly, it is claimed that Gaddafi told Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi that 
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his WMD capitulation was due to Iraq stating ‘I will do whatever the Americans want, 
because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid.’93 Secondly, it was reported that 
a leaked Pentagon review claimed Libya’s inclusion as a country for which the US 
should be prepared when ‘setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities’.94 This 
could easily have been picked up by Gaddafi as a sign of US future intent. Furthermore, 
it was reported that a Bush administration strategy paper leaked in December 2002, 
which called for the pre-emptive use of military and covert force to prevent an enemy 
state from launching WMD. This directive specifically named Iran, Syria, NK and 
Libya as the main states against which the strategy was aimed.
95
  Furthermore, the 
Director of the CIA, George Tenet, had talked about concerns with Libyan WMD, 
including nuclear programs, in his annual unclassified testimony to congress; knowing 
that this message would get back to the Libyan leadership.
96
 
 
It is also claimed by Abdel Rahman Shalgham that President Bouteflika of Algiers 
relayed a message from Bush to the Libyans that they either give up on WMD or he 
would destroy the weapons and everything else besides.
97
 However, perhaps the 
strongest evidence that Gaddafi did feel threatened of the US comes in 2008, when 
referring to the invasion of Iraq and Hussein’s execution, he stated: 
An entire Arab leadership was executed by hanging, yet we sit on the side-lines 
why? Any one of you might be next, yes. America fought alongside Saddam 
Hussein against Khomeini.  He was their friend; Cheney was a friend of Saddam 
Hussein. Rumsfeld the secretary of defence at the time of invasion was a close 
                                                          
93
 Robin Gedye, “UN Should Fight for Rights, says Berlusconi,” Daily Telegraph (London), 9 April 
2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml? Xml-/news/2003/09/04/wun04.xml, quoted in Robert 
S Litwak, Regime Change, US Strategy through the Prism of 9/11, pg.193.  
 
94
 Roula Khalaf and Robert Cottrell, Syria, Libya broaden the ‘axis of evil’, Financial Times, 11 March 
2002. 
 
95
 Oxford Analytical, ‘Libya: Chances of rapprochement with US recede Tuesday’, 21 January 2003. 
 
96
 Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013. 
 
97
 Abdel Rahman Shalgham, quoted in Alison Pargeter, Libya The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi, pg.185.  
Claim is referenced as being from an interview with Abdel Rahman Shalgham Libya’s former foreign 
affairs secretary.  
137 
 
friend of Saddam Hussein. Ultimately they sold him out and hung him. You are 
friends of America; let’s say that “we” are, not “you” but one of these days, 
America may hang us.
98
 
 
Clearly if Gaddafi feared the US in 2008, he is highly likely to have felt threatened by 
the US in the aftermath of a successful invasion of Iraq, when US-Libya relations were 
significantly poorer. Furthermore, people who dealt directly with them during the 
negotiations were convinced that the Libyans believed they were next, as pointed out by 
Ambassador Joseph ‘we would not have had the outcome we did, if it had not been 
prominent in their own mind that they were going to get whacked’.99 Gaddafi’s fear of a 
US invasion could also be construed from a speech he gave in October 2003 where he 
described how Women needed to be trained in the kind of insurgent tactics that were 
being used at that time against the US in Iraq.
100
  
 
Another element of Bush’s strategy that was clearly coercive in its effect was the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched in May 2003. Bob Joseph who was also 
the key architect behind the PSI points out that Libya’s final compliance was a 
combination of ‘what we did in Iraq and the smoking gun when we seized the BBC 
China’. Furthermore, he argues that ‘the Libyans knew we had the evidence and 
believed we could play it out as justification for a strike on Libya’.101 A senior member 
of the Bush administration added to this view pointing out that the PSIs ‘real 
importance was not stopping the transfer, it was that the transfer was going through 
proved his complicity, and after the demonstration in Iraq he had two choices give it up 
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or go through what Saddam Hussein went through and he was not prepared to do 
that’.102 
 
Although there was not a direct threat from the President of the US, the rhetoric of 
elements of the Bush administration, combined with credible demonstration of the Bush 
doctrine of pre-emptive force in Iraq clearly were perceived as a threat to Gaddafi and 
an indicator that he could be next. This was particularly amplified when the interdiction 
of the BBC China provided clear proof that he had a nuclear weapons programme.  
Therefore, the threat to use force to deny Gaddafi attaining a nuclear capability 
conforming to the ideal policy is deemed to be present for this episode.  
 
AQ 3 - Was a deadline for compliance given? 
There was no specific time given to Libya to halt its nuclear weapons programme by or 
face military strikes. However, pressure was maintained on Libya through US unilateral 
sanctions in the form of the ILSA and the open demands and threats already discussed.  
The approach that was adopted conforms closely to what George termed as the 'gradual 
turning of the screw', where the coercing power neither creates a sense of urgency nor 
does it signal the nature of threatened punishment. Instead, its demands are 
accompanied by a threat that punishment will be gradually increased if compliance does 
not occur.
103
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However, once Libya initiated talks with the UK and US over the issue of WMD, the 
programme of talks between the parties, in effect became a deadline which the Libyan’s 
had to comply by. As pointed out by Condoleezza Rice:  
As we were getting close to agreement, though, the Libyans started to balk at 
certain demands for transparency in the destruction of their WMD. It looked as 
if the whole effort was unravelling as Tripoli started to deny the existence of 
programs to which it had already admitted. Then we got a break: a ship from 
Malaysia carrying a suspicious cargo bound for Libya was stopped by German 
and Italian authorities and diverted for inspection. On board were five large 
shipping containers labelled “used machine parts” later determined to have been 
carrying thousands of centrifuge components-including some emanating from 
the A.Q Kahn network. Exposed in the midst of negotiations, the Libyans 
retreated from their hard-line stance and an agreement was back within reach.
104
 
 
The interception of equipment came at a key part of the secret negotiations being held 
between the UK, US and Libya. The interception demonstrated to Tripoli that the UK 
and US knew, and had evidence, about Libya’s clandestine nuclear supply network and 
bounded Gaddafi’s room for manoeuvre during the negotiations; whilst increasing 
pressure for him to reveal and dismantle fully his programme.
105
 If the Libyans did not 
agree at this scheduled meeting to the next step of announcing their nuclear weapons 
programme and plan to disarm, it is highly likely that the US and UK would have 
brought the issue to the UNSC. Therefore, in effect the meeting became the set deadline 
that Libya needed to make the decision to comply by or face increasing pressure. 
However, as there was no specific time stated from the outset that Libya had to 
surrender its nuclear programme or face military strikes, this element does not conform 
to the ideal policy. 
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AQ 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands? 
Gaddafi was concerned that if he admitted publicly to having a nuclear weapons 
programme that the US would use it as a reason to conduct strikes against Libya.
106
  
Abdel Rahman Shalgham, Gaddafi’s former foreign minister confirms this fear of a 
trick stating that Gaddafi commented ‘they will laugh at us. I will speak and they won’t 
speak after me. This is a trick and a conspiracy’.107 It is also alleged that President 
Mubarak of Egypt, prior to the agreement warned Gaddafi ‘that if you give the 
Americans one thing they will keep on coming back asking for another’.108  
 
This fear of a trick was only overcome by a phone call between Prime Minster Blair and 
Gaddafi, where he was assured that if he came clean that he could re-join the 
international community.
109
 Furthermore, Blair later visited Libya, giving further 
assurance to Gaddafi that there was no hidden agenda against Libya.
110
 Litwak goes a 
step further assessing that not only was Gaddafi given an assurance that the US 
objective was ‘policy change’ and not ‘regime change’, but that he was given a ‘tacit 
assurance of regime survival’.111    
 
Whether an assurance that future demands would not be made is an area for debate.  
There were several instances where the Libyans certainly felt that promises had not 
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been met
112
 and that demands continued to come from the US relating to reparations for 
previous terrorist attacks. This is pointed out by Ambassador Welch who stated:   
They thought there would never be an end to things.  There was one particularly 
dramatic moment in the terrorism claims negotiations where the claims courts in 
the United States started to impose astronomical judgements against Gaddafi and 
his officials.  They said how are we ever going to stop all this, you have no 
solution to it, you say we have to pay the Panam victims, the la belle victims, 
and all these other cases there is never going to be an end to it.
113
 
 
The US clearly did continue to pressure Libya post 2003, especially on terrorism and 
issues of human rights.
114
 US subsequent demands demonstrate a fundamental difficulty 
with assurances within a strategy of coercive diplomacy. If coercive diplomacy is seen 
as an option that works it becomes tempting to use the strategy again to achieve your 
next political objective. US military strikes in 1986 were viewed as having influenced 
Gaddafi to pull back from supporting international terrorism; therefore, it was thought 
that ‘Gaddafi might be responsive to pressure’ regarding his policies on pursuing WMD 
and supporting terrorism.
115
 
 
There was a clear assurance given to Gaddafi that if he complied the US and UK would 
not seek regime change. However, there was not a clear indication that further demands, 
regarding normal diplomatic issues such as human rights would not be made.  
Therefore, this element partially conforms to the ideal policy. Whether this assurance 
was actually kept is not of significant importance for this episode, but clearly could 
have an impact on future uses of coercive diplomacy. 
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AQ 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance? 
The primary incentive for Libya to surrender its nuclear weapons was the removal of 
UN and US sanctions, which would remove the barrier to investment in its 
underexploited oil assets.
116
 The American and British governments communicated to 
the Libyans that UN sanctions would be permanently removed if they fulfilled UNSC 
resolutions related to Lockerbie, but that US sanctions would then only be lifted if the 
WMD issue were addressed.
117
 Furthermore, Dr Mark Fitzpatrick, IISS analyst and 
member of the State Department at the time pointed out ‘once Britain opened up these 
communications with Gaddafi, and the US joined them, incentives became more 
important than sanctions, there was not talk of additional sanctions, all the talk was just 
lifting sanctions’.118 
 
However, an area of contention is what deal beyond the quid pro quo to achieve WMD 
disarmament was made. This notion of a deal emphasised by Professor Jentleson who 
states:  
There is a definite deal, Tony Blair announces the deal in December 2003, he 
talks about what the next steps will be, first of all to implement the deal are part 
of a bargain, what access British, American and internationals would have to 
take away materials and technology, secondly the whole process that led to 
normalisation of relations for a period was defiantly part of a deal, one can say 
the official position of the United States is we will do this deal and then talk 
about it, but that is just public cover.
119
 
 
Even Condoleezza Rice points out that there is a deal stating ‘when the Libyans gave up 
their weapons of mass destruction in 2003, there was a clear diplomatic quid pro quo, in 
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exchange, we’d help them to return to good standing in the international community’.120 
Moreover, The Foreign Secretary of the time Jack Straw also points out that:  
There was an understanding between us that if you renounced nuclear weapons 
and do it the way that we wanted them to do it, and they did do it in the way we 
wanted in the way that they technically handled the issue after their 
announcement, rounding stuff up and shipping it away, if they did, the UK and 
US would as were sponsor the re-integration into the international community 
and that would mean the United States normalising its relationship with Libya, 
which had been very seriously strained for some time.
121
 
 
However, he did subsequently point out that the notion of an ‘elaborate bargain’ was not 
his ‘recollection of events’ and that ‘there was certainly an understanding that we would 
work with them and talk through the different aspects of Britain and Americas 
relationship’.122 Another Bush official Paula DeSutter also claimed:  
We made no promises to Libya, we just said as you do this, our relations will get 
better, so for us we wanted them to be glad that they had done it. We wanted 
public statements saying hey, we give up our WMD programmes and it was a 
really good thing. We wanted Libya to be a good example.
123
 
 
However, the clearest articulation of there being no bargain is from Ambassador Joseph 
who led on the negotiations who stated:  
From the outset US and UK participants took the position that the very process 
of bargaining would undercut prospects for a clear and clean outcome; 
bargaining would slow down the process and likely cause confusion.....Instead 
of negotiating X for Y, US and UK representatives insisted that Libya 
acknowledge and abandon its WMD and longer range missile programs. In 
doing so, they made clear that Libya would remove a major obstacle to 
improved relations and greater economic and political benefits.
124
 
 
The confusion over this issue may be the definition of a deal or a bargain. This is 
highlighted by as Ambassador Welch, who commented: 
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If you look inside the American government for some offer of a deal you will 
not find it.  That said, because of the nature of the conversations between the top 
levels of the Libyan leadership and those involved in the WMD side, I can’t 
exclude that the Libyans walked away thinking there was a promise of 
something. Arabs tend to do that. Bob Joseph would have a very contractual 
view of this, the Bedouin will have a different view, and the two people most 
intimately involved aren’t talking.  Diplomacy at those levels is a fine art.125 
 
In my view the acknowledgement that if one party does something and there is 
recognition that the other party will respond in a specific manner is a deal/bargain. 
Therefore, the US/UK position that Libya announce and disarms its nuclear programme, 
then it would consider an ‘obstacle’ to the opponents political objective (closer 
diplomatic and economic ties) removed, is clearly a bargain/deal to move to the next 
stage if Libya complies. Furthermore, Blair’s assurance that Libya’s announcing its 
nuclear capability would not be used as an excuse to launch attacks is also a deal. 
However, neither of these are a clear promise or formal deal to give Libya everything 
that it wanted after that moment in time.   
 
In response to Libya renunciation of WMD, the US did lift sanctions, expand 
commercial and diplomatic ties with Libya. However, in November 2004, Gaddafi 
voiced his disappointment that Libya had not been properly recompensed. This, he 
noted, provided little incentive for countries like Iran and NK to dismantle their nuclear 
programs. In particular Gaddafi argued he needed more security guarantees from the 
United States, Europe, and Japan, as well as ‘civilian-use technology in return for 
abandoning military technology’.126 In January 2005 Gaddafi argued that Libya should 
receive a program ‘like the Marshall Plan, to show the world that those who wish to 
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abandon the nuclear weapon program will be helped. They promised, but we haven’t 
seen anything yet’.127  
 
However, there was clearly an incentive offered to the Libyans that if they complied 
there would be the possibility of further discussions that could lead to the removal of 
sanctions and re-integration into the international community. Therefore, this element 
does conform to the ideal policy. 
 
Evaluation of the implementation of the ideal policy and the strategy of coercive 
diplomacy employed 
The strategy adopted by the US almost, but does not strictly, conform to the ideal 
policy. There was a credible threat to use force, there was clear incentives given in the 
form of reintegration into the international community and the removal of sanctions.  
However, the assurance only partially conforms to the ideal policy as it was assuring 
Gaddafi that there would be no military strikes, not specifically that there would not be 
further demands. Furthermore, there was no specific deadline given of when force might 
be used if compliance was not forthcoming. However, Gaddafi did comply with the 
demand and surrendered all of his WMD programmes. However, although the ideal 
policy was not implemented fully this episode of coercive diplomacy was a success. 
 
AQ 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war? 
Gaddafi clearly believed that surrendering his WMD programmes was preferable to 
going to war. At the time of surrendering his programme weapons he had valid reasons 
to believe that he could be next on the US target list. Furthermore, he must have been in 
no doubt that if a war with the USA was to occur, it was one that he could not win. 
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Although the offer of integration into the international community may have been 
sufficient to entice Gaddafi to surrender his weapons, the threat of force clearly 
increased the motivation to comply.    
 
AQ 7 – Did the opponent act rationally and not miscalculate or suffer from 
misperception? 
Gaddafi acted rationally in surrendering his nuclear weapons in 2003. The only 
misperception he could be accused of suffering from was an over estimation of the US 
willingness to use force at that time, as discussions with policy makers would indicate 
that the US was not actually considering an attack on Libya. However, it is difficult to 
assess whether this would have still been the case after the interdiction of the BBC 
China provided evidence of Gaddafi’s nuclear programme. 
 
One argument put forward for Gaddafi surrendering his nuclear weapons is that he did 
not have a programme to surrender. This is pointed out by Bowen who argues that:  
WMD Intelligence Commission noted in March 2005 ‘The lack of sufficient 
progress in developing a nuclear weapon is one of the factors that may have 
prompted Gaddafi to abandon and disclose Libya’s nuclear program’.  
Furthermore, trading in the nuclear card for such a major return could have been 
seen as a face-saving ‘get out’ measure when comparatively so little had been 
achieved.
128
   
 
The state of his programme at the time was reported as still in its ‘embryonic stage’.  It 
had succeeded only in providing some training to a number of students and technicians, 
and the establishment of a nuclear research reactor, which operates under IAEA 
safeguards at Tajura, southeast of Tripoli.
129
 This is further backed by the then IAEA 
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director general, Mohamed El Baradei, who stated that the facilities he visited indicated 
a program that was ‘in the initial stages of development’ without any ‘industrial scale 
facility to produce highly enriched uranium’.130 Furthermore, Ambassador Mahley, who 
led on dismantling the Libyan WMD programme, commented:  
On the nuclear programme we got there before he even started enrichment, sure 
they had a lot of yellow cake around, but we are talking a decade before you can 
put that stuff together at the scale, even if they got a shipment of centrifuges and 
enough nuclear material, then tried to refine it from a device into a weapon, this 
is grandson of Gaddafi we are talking about.
131
 
 
 
However, others argue firmly that this was not the case and that he really did give up 
something stating ‘it was a turnkey programme; AQ Khan was going to supply it all’.132  
Bob Joseph the lead negotiator also firmly argues that: 
He did have a serious nuclear weapons programme. Libya had spent lots of 
money on this, they were getting the assistance they needed from the AQ Khan 
network. Were they on the very verge of enriching uranium and building a 
weapon; no they weren’t!133   
 
With no immediate obtainment of nuclear weapons Gaddafi’s surrendering of his 
nuclear programme was rational. He either continued to develop a nuclear weapon, 
which in light of US policies enacted after 9/11 was at increased risk of detection, and if 
detected would have been at a high risk of being destroyed militarily. Negotiating and 
surrendering this programme seemed to be a path to achieving his goals of re-
integration into the international community and developing a stable economy.     
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AQ 8 - Does credible implementation of the ideal policy lead to compliance?  
The ideal policy was not implemented in this episode.  
 
AQ 9 - Does failure to implement the ideal policy lead to non-compliance? 
For this episode failure to implement the ideal policy did not lead to non-compliance, as 
Gaddafi still surrendered his WMD programmes. However, the reason for Gaddafi’s 
compliance is related to key elements of the ideal policy. Firstly, Gaddafi clearly felt 
that there was a threat that force, as demonstrated credible by the invasion of Iraq, may 
be used. Secondly, there was clear incentive of improved relations with the US and the 
removal of sanctions, which in turn were seen as a way of improving the financial and 
security situation within Libya. Therefore, although the ideal policy was not 
implemented, as there was no deadline or assurance that future demands would not be 
made, there were elements of the ideal policy that clearly persuaded Gaddafi to 
surrender his WMD programmes. 
 
AQ 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be 
carried out? 
Gaddafi clearly felt threatened that he could be next on the US target list; even in 2008 
he stated that ‘one of these days, America may hang us’134 a clear indication that he felt 
threatened. It is not possible to assess what balance fear and incentives was required to 
bring Gaddafi finally to the decision to comply. 
 
EPISODE 2 - WILL TO THREATEN AND USE FORCE 
This section will now examine whether this episode conforms to Jakobsen’s predicted 
patterns for when states are willing to threaten to use force. This will be done by 
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examining the three variables; nature of threatened interests, prospects of military 
success and domestic support. 
 
 
The nature of the threatened interests. 
Libya fit the mould of a state that in post 9/11 thinking was a threat to the interests of 
the US. It had a history of supporting terrorism and from 2001 Gaddafi’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons had ‘raised concerns’ within the US Intelligence community.135 The 
President and senior administration officials repeatedly expressed the concern that 
terrorists could get nuclear weapons from a state that supported terrorism and use this 
capability to conduct an attack on the US. 
   
Furthermore, as discussed in episode 1, Libya obtaining a nuclear weapon would have 
been against the strategic interest of the US. Primarily, it would have damaged the NPT, 
possible increasing proliferation. Secondly, it would have enabled Gaddafi to deter the 
US, possibly emboldening his willingness to act against US interests within the region. 
Therefore, Gaddafi’s pursuit of nuclear weapons would still be impacting on a US 
strategic interest
136
 and is coded as high. 
 
The prospects of military success. 
The US military capability in 2001 was vastly more powerful than the Libyan military.  
This was clearly demonstrated by the invasion of Iraq in 2003 where the US, along with 
allies, quickly defeated Saddam’s forces. Gaddafi’s forces were even less capable in 
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terms of equipment and numbers than Iraq’s military. However, after the initial invasion 
of 2003, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dragged on, the US military was feeling 
‘severely stretched’.137 However, if the will was there the US would have been able to 
muster the required forces for any kind of operation against Libya.  
 
The prospect of hostile great-power intervention to back Libya against the US would 
have been highly unlikely. Although there were protests by several states over the 
invasion of Iraq, there was no state willing to back Iraq militarily. Therefore, it is 
difficult to view any state that would have at the time opposed the US if it had decided 
to take the most extreme military operation and invade Libya. Libya’s antiquated 
military, and its geographical positioning, would have been highly vulnerable to US 
coercion through military means. However, the US would still have to overcome the 
difficulties, of locating all the nuclear sites and destroying protected bunkers. The only 
way to do this with certainty would have been to conduct extensive military operations 
possible including a full scale invasion. In purely military terms this would have been 
an option, but it would have and required a significant reason to justify undertaking 
such an option as it would have increased the risk of having US casualties. 
 
From 2001-2003 the US clearly had the capability and assets to conduct a range of 
military operations, from strikes to full invasion, within Libya. As proven by the more 
complicated US invasion of Iraq, any war with Libya would have been most likely 
quickly won at little cost. Therefore, in terms of Jakobsen’s patterns this element is 
assessed as being high.  
 
The level of domestic support 
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As with the previous episode, if a case had been put forward, that strikes on Libya were 
required in order to prevent Gaddafi possessing nuclear weapons it is highly likely that 
it would have attained domestic support. In fact due to the attacks of 9/11, it is highly 
likely that such a proposition would have overwhelmingly received domestic support.  
However, exact type of operation, and associated likelihood of casualties, would have 
been a topic of heated debate.
138
 Therefore, this element is coded as medium. 
 
Summary of Willingness to use force 
Libya’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was of high interest to US, there was a high chance 
of military success, and there would have been medium level of domestic support, this 
conforms to Jackobsen’s interest-driven pattern. Furthermore, Jakobsen’s pattern 
indicate that even if nature of interest was assessed as low that it would most likely 
conform to a Government-driven pattern. However, there is an underlying assumption 
that the government would need to frame the debate in order to gain domestic support to 
undertake a military action towards Libya. Therefore, any threatened action would need 
to be ‘driven’ by the government. 
 
AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten 
and use force? 
There is a strong implied threat in this episode and 2 patterns (interest and government) 
indicate that the US should have been willing to apply a more direct threat. This will be 
examined within the next question. 
 
AQ 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to 
threaten and use force? 
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According to Jakobsen’s hypothesised patterns the US should have been willing to 
make a more direct threat towards Libya regarding its nuclear weapons programme.  
Therefore why, like in the case of Iraq, did Libya not warrant a direct threat of force?  
One explanation is pointed out by a senior member of the Bush administration: 
We knew roughly what the status of his programme was, and we knew how 
many cascades, we knew a lot about it, if you are asking would we have 
threatened? It is unclear, mostly the general feeling in the United States is don’t 
take anything off the table, but don’t put yourself in a cul-de-sac, enemies are 
always trying to put you in a cul-de-sac, but don’t put yourself in one by 
declaring something and then not being willing to do it, you or may not be 
willing to do it depending on the circumstances that exist.
139
 
 
The fact the US was not willing to directly threaten at that stage would imply Gaddafi 
was not seen as an immediate threat, perhaps because he was not viewed as possessing a 
viable weapon. Domestic support also impacted on the ability of the United States to 
deal with Libya, as Ambassador Mahley articulates: 
Nobody in the administration wanted to appear to be now trying to lean over 
backwards to please Libyans, because one of the things in the United States 
about domestic politics, is the Lockerbie victims association, and the Libyans 
were several million behind in making compensation payments, and those 
people were not satisfied with the compensation that they had gotten, so when 
the United States was not demanding, to the precursor to anything else that all be 
settled up, that became a sensitive domestic political issue in the United 
States.
140  
 
The combination of lack of immediacy over nuclear weapons and pressure from the 
families of victims to still resolve outstanding claims, kept the nuclear issue one to be 
resolved at a later date. Therefore, until more concrete evidence was presented to 
politicians, or the public, issuing a direct threat of force was not seen as logical way 
forward. In addition almost immediately after 9/11 the Bush administration was focused 
on Iraq, and it is likely that it did not wish to put itself into a ‘cul-de-sac’ and risk 
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broadening the ‘war on terror’ beyond its means by threatening Libya, then being forced 
to go through with an action. 
 
AQ 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from 
leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important 
interests are threatened? 
There was only a strong implied threat from the US, who in the aftermath of 9/11 firmly 
warned states that both supported terrorists and sought nuclear weapons could be 
potential targets. Although the UK did not issue similarly strong implied threats, as it 
supported the US in invading Iraq over the issue of WMD, demonstrating its 
willingness to follow the US.  
 
It was the UK who was initially approached by Libya regarding surrendering of its 
WMD. The UK/US had several shared interests in preventing Gaddafi obtain WMD.  
Firstly, both states had historic issues over Libya’s behaviour, in particular regarding its 
previous support of terrorism. Therefore, both were concerned that a WMD armed 
Gaddafi would be a destabilising influence within the region. Secondly, as both the UK 
and US were signatories of the NPT, permanent members of the UNSC and recognised 
nuclear powers there was not only an obligation, but it was in their interest, to prevent 
proliferation of WMD. Libya’s attainment of WMD could have led to a weakening of 
the proliferation regime and destabilise international security.   
 
AQ 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when 
none of the above conditions are met? 
A consensus on whether to threaten force did not emerge because Libya had approached 
the UK to surrender its weapons before its pursuit of WMD had become an international 
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issue. It is highly likely that if Libya had not come forward when it did a more robust 
approach, including seeking international action against Libya, would have been taken 
by the US when the interdiction of BBC China supplied indisputable evidence of 
Gaddafi’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. At this point it is more likely that a consensus on 
action, including possible strikes, would have been discussed. 
 
AQ 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise 
support for policies involving threats and use of force? 
As there was no direct threat it is not possible to assess whether international 
organisations make threats to use force easier. 
 
AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to 
develop nuclear weapons?  
The implied threat toward states such as Libya seems to have decreased Gaddafi 
motivation to attain nuclear weapons as he initiated the negotiations that led to the 
surrendering of their WMDs. However, even whilst US, UK and Libyan negotiations 
were under way, Libya was continuing with its nuclear weapons programme, as 
demonstrated by the interdiction of parts on the BBC China that were destined for 
Libya. This would indicate that Gaddafi was hedging his bets, looking to surrender the 
weapons only if the deal was right.      
 
CONCLUSION 
A more detailed comparison of all the episodes will take place in chapter 5; however, 
Table 3.1 summarises the key findings of this chapter.   
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Coercive diplomacy in the form of the ideal policy was not applied under the Clinton 
administration as there was no clear demand given to Gaddafi that he stop his 
development of nuclear weapons. The policy objective and clear demands of the Clinton 
administration were firmly focussed on Gaddafi giving up his support of terrorists, 
handing over terrorist suspects and paying reparations to the families of the Lockerbie 
victims. There was no clear demand that Gaddafi was to halt and disarm his nuclear 
programme, but there was mention of ‘concern’ over his WMD programmes, although 
this was viewed as a lower priority and related more to his pursuit of chemical and 
biological weapons. 
 
There was no direct threat to use force, or deadline given with regard to the issue of 
WMD. However, Gaddafi did comply with the primary demand that Libya hand over 
terrorist suspects this was met and cease support of terrorism. The approach that was 
adopted by the Clinton administration was to increase the international political and 
economic isolation of Gaddafi and his regime. The pressure was delivered through the 
ILSA and UN sanctions. There was no direct threat communicated that force would be 
applied in a manner that conforms to the ideal policy.  Furthermore, although there was 
no deadline issued threatening the use of force relating to Gaddafi’s nuclear programme, 
there was a deadline given for when the measures within UNSC 883 would be applied; 
therefore, this element conforms partially to the ideal policy. 
  Threat 
to use 
force 
Deadline 
given 
Assurance 
given 
Incentives 
offered 
Ideal 
Policy 
Predicted 
outcome 
of CD 
Actual 
outcome 
of CD 
Will to 
threaten 
and use 
of force? 
Impact of org. 
Libya 
Ep.1  
No Partial Partial Yes No Failure Partial 
Success 
Yes Sanctions 
only 
Libya 
Ep.2  
Yes No - 
implied 
Partial Yes No Failure Success Yes No impact 
Table 3.1 
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The assurance given to Libya, by the Clinton administration, was that handing over 
Lockerbie suspects would not be utilised as a way of seeking regime change. However, 
even after suspects had been handed over the US maintained sanctions based on 
outstanding demands that needed to be resolved, which included the issue of WMD. 
Assurances were given, but not assurances that further demands would not be made; 
therefore, this element only partially conforms to the ideal policy. 
 
There was a clear incentive offered of having UN and US sanctions lifted that in turn 
would have improved Libya’s economic situation and bolstered Gaddafi position. 
Furthermore, the secret talks held between the US and Libya demonstrated that there 
was a possibility of an improved relationship with the US. Therefore, there was clearly 
an incentive on offer that conforms to the ideal policy.  
 
Gaddafi’s decision to comply with the US and UN demands, over issues of terrorism 
which clearly brought him closer to re-integration into the international community, was 
rational. Furthermore, as the US did not have clear evidence of his nuclear programme 
and there was no direct threat made, Gaddafi’s pursuit of nuclear weapons program was 
also rational as it gave him the opportunity to either obtain a deterrent and a mark of 
prestige, or possible increase any future bargain position with the US. 
 
There was initially coalitional consensus regarding the full implementation of sanctions, 
this started to wane once individual states saw it against their interests not to enforce 
them. This was despite US leadership and potential US sanctions for contravention of 
the ILSA.    
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A significant finding within this episode is that although there was no threat to use force 
over Gaddafi’s WMDs, Jakobsen’s framework predicts that the US should have been 
willing to threaten force. Dealing with Libya’s WMD programme was of strategic 
interest to the US, the US was capable of conducting a successful military campaign if 
required, and it would not have been difficult to make a case to its domestic audience 
about the danger posed by a Libyan nuclear weapons capability. The combination of 
these variables conform to an interest driven pattern that Jakobsen asserts would lead to 
a willingness to threaten force.   
 
The most likely reason that force was not threatened, was even though by 1999 the US 
was aware of Gaddafi’s nuclear programme, it is clear that policy makers did not view it 
as an immediate threat and must have assumed that it was one that future 
administrations could deal with; the priority of the Clinton administration was achieving 
reparations for families of the Lockerbie bombing.  Raising the nuclear issue with Libya 
at that time may have complicated and impacted upon the chances of receiving 
reparations. 
 
Under the Bush administration the US clearly articulated a policy objective that states 
that supported terrorism and sought nuclear weapons halt their activities or face the 
possibility of pre-emptive military action. Libya identified as a state ‘beyond the Axis of 
evil’, who had a history of supporting terrorists and seeking WMD clearly fell into the 
category of a potential ‘target’ of a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, Gaddafi must have 
viewed the demand that states should halt their pursuit of nuclear weapons being 
implicitly directed at him.    
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Although there was not a direct threat of force issued by Bush, the rhetoric from 
elements of his administration, combined with credible demonstration of force in Iraq 
clearly were perceived by Gaddafi as a threat. This was particularly amplified when the 
interdiction of the BBC China provided clear proof that he had a nuclear weapons 
programme. Therefore, the threat to use force to deny Gaddafi attaining a nuclear 
capability conformed to the ideal policy.  
 
A key element of this episode was the interception of equipment under the PSI at a 
crucial moment in the secret negotiations between the UK, US and Libya. The 
interception gave that the UK and US the evidence that Gaddafi knew could be used to 
make a convincing case against him; therefore, it increased the pressure for him to 
reveal and dismantle fully his programme. This interception in effect made the next 
meeting of the parties a deadline that Libya needed to make the decision to comply by 
or face increasing pressure. However, as there was no specific time stated from the 
outset that Libya had to surrender its nuclear programme or face military strikes, this 
element does not conform to the ideal policy. 
 
There is a debate as to whether there was a deal done. Bob Joseph, who was the US lead 
negotiator, argued that there was no bargaining.  I agree with most scholars that there 
must have been an assurance, if only an implicit one, given to Gaddafi that if he 
complied the US and UK they would not seek regime change and he would be re-
integrated back into the international community; the latter being a clear incentive that 
conforms to the ideal policy. However, there is no evidence that further demands were 
removed from the table, regarding normal diplomatic issues such as human rights would 
not be made. Therefore, this element partially conforms to the ideal policy. This element 
also highlights one of the issues with coercive diplomacy; which is if the strategy works 
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it is difficult for regimes not to be tempted to use if over other issues. It should be noted 
that, with the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011, whether the assurance of regime change 
was actually kept is not of significant importance for this episode, but clearly could 
have an impact on future uses of US coercive diplomacy.  
 
With no immediate obtainment of nuclear weapons, Gaddafi’s surrendering of his 
nuclear programme was rational. He either continued to develop a nuclear weapon, 
which in light of US policies enacted after 9/11 was at increased risk of detection, and if 
detected would have been at a high risk of being destroyed militarily. Negotiating and 
surrendering this programme seemed to be a path to achieving his goals of re-
integration into the international community and developing a stable economy.   
   
Another significant finding is that like episode 1, although there was no direct threat 
made to threaten the use force over Gaddafi nuclear weapons programme, Jakobsen’s 
framework predicts there should have been. As in episode 1 dealing with Libya’s 
nuclear programme was clearly of strategic interest to the US; the US would almost 
certainly been able to conduct a successful military campaign if required and it would 
not have been difficult to make a case to gain domestic support. These factors conform 
to an interest driven pattern or even with less domestic support it would conform to a 
government driven pattern, both of which Jakobsen asserts would lead to a willingness 
to threaten force.   
 
As in episode 1, it is highly likely that the reason force was not threatened was that 
Gaddafi’s attainment of a nuclear weapons did not appear an immediate threat to US 
interests. Therefore, the more immediate politically damaging issue of Lockerbie and 
reparations to the families took priority. Furthermore, after 9/11 the US engaged in 
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conflicts in Afghanistan in 2001 and then Iraq in 2003. It is likely that US strategists did 
not want to engage in further conflicts unless necessary. Therefore, Libya could wait 
until a more opportune moment.   
 
A significant finding is that in both episodes, although there was no direct threat to use 
force over Gaddafi nuclear weapons programme, Jakobsen’s framework predicts there 
should have been. In both episodes Gaddafi nuclear programme was of strategic interest 
to the US; the US would almost certainly been able to conduct a successful military 
campaign if required and it would not have been difficult to make a case about the 
danger that a Libyan bomb posed to gain domestic support. These variables lead to 
patterns that Jakobsen asserts would lead to a willingness to threaten force.   
 
In both episodes it is asserted that the reason force was not threatened was that 
Gaddafi’s attainment of a nuclear weapons did not appear an immediate threat to US 
interests, therefore, the more immediate and politically damaging issue of Lockerbie 
and reparations to the families took priority. The next chapter will now examine US 
policy towards North Korea.    
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CHAPTER 4 – US COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 
TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF KOREA 1992-2006 
On the 9 October 2006, in defiance of the international community, NK conducted a 
nuclear test.
1
 This test was widely condemned by the international community and five 
days later the UNSC passed resolution 1718, condemning the test, imposing sanctions, 
and calling for NK to return immediately to multilateral talks on the issue.
2
 The 
exploding of this bomb was not only a worrying failure of the NPT, but it was also a 
failure of the US strategy of coercive diplomacy which had sought to prevent the DPRK 
from obtaining a nuclear weapon capability.  
 
The Clinton administration’s objective from the outset was to prevent the DPRK 
obtaining a nuclear weapon. This was done through a series of escalating demands; that 
ranged from holding talks with ROK over the denuclearisation agreement to finally 
freezing and dismantling their plutonium production programme. With both sides driven 
in a rational pursuit of their own objectives the crisis came to ahead in 1994 with 
President Clinton considering to either conduct pre-emptive strikes on NK or reinforce 
SK with up to 100000 troops, a move which the North would most likely have viewed 
as a prelude to war. In the midst of this crisis the former US President Jimmy Carter 
made an unofficial trip to Pyongyang and spoke directly with Kim Jong Il. This 
intervention enabled the tension to be reduced and further negotiations to be conducted 
between the opposing sides. In return for the North meeting its demand and 
freezing/dismantling its plutonium programme, it was offered diplomatic and financial 
                                                          
1
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6032597.stm, accessed 28 August 2015.  
 
2
 http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm, accessed 29 August 2015.   
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inducements for compliance. This approach initially worked with NK being drawn into 
an Agreed Framework (AF) with the US in 1994, which appeared to result in a freeze in 
its nuclear programme.   
 
However, in October 2002 NK broke the safeguards that prevented verification that its 
enrichment of uranium had been suspended and in 2003 it withdrew from the NPT. The 
resumption of NK programme led to a re-ignition of the crisis, which again was 
believed to have been resolved in the ‘September 2005’ agreement. Both agreements 
gave substantial inducements and concessions in turn for compliance, however, both 
times NK appeared to take the rewards whilst covertly continuing with its nuclear 
weapons program, unperturbed by threats. 
 
Although the Clinton administration applied coercive diplomacy, that led, to the AF and 
the dismantlement and containment of the North’s plutonium programme; the strategy 
was not implemented in the form of the ideal policy. The Bush administration’s policy 
in contrast was erratic based initially on continuing the AF, but eager to find a way out, 
believing that more stick was required. Ending the AF in 2002 Bush’s policy was 
initially based on a hard rhetoric and multilateral negotiations with NK in the form of 
the six party talks. Eventually within Bush’s second term the strategy sought to emulate 
the AF leading to a Joint Statement in 2005. However by this time NK was already 
close to attaining a nuclear weapon and the US involved in a domestically unpopular 
Counter Insurgency Operation (COIN) in Iraq; so NK proceeded to develop a weapon 
which it tested in October 2006.  
 
This chapter will use the assessment questions derived in chapter 2 to analyse the 
coercive diplomacy applied by the US from 1993 to 2006 towards NK. I have split the 
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case into two distinct episodes; Episode 1, the Clinton administration’s policy toward 
NK followed by episode 2, the Bush administration’s policy toward NK. Again the 
separation of episodes is due to a clear change in the rhetoric and policy of the Bush 
administration. 
 
EPISODE 1 – CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 1993-2000 
Clinton’s administration had three distinct approaches towards NK; initially it tried 
deterrence and containment, followed by coercive diplomacy leading to the AF, then an 
attempt to reach a grand settlement through the Perry review. Within this episode I will 
examine the demands leading to the AF; I will not examine the Perry approach as it was 
diplomatic strategy based on maintaining the AF, limiting the DPRK’s missile 
programme and settling issues left from the Korean War through the incentive of 
reducing sanctions and offering the possibility of bilateral talks.
3
 
 
AQ 1 - What was the US policy objective and demand? 
Clinton’s objective was ‘to make sure that NK did not get nuclear weapons’.4 Trying to 
achieve this led to a series of escalating demands; that one analyst described as the 
Clinton administration ‘fumbling through a series of policies towards the DPRK’ and 
starting off with a ‘posture, rather than a policy’.5 However, this accusation is over 
critical; the Clinton administration clearly maintained the goal of preventing nuclear 
proliferation but found its strategy, and demands, to achieve this objective had to 
change in response to NK’s actions.   
                                                          
3
 William Perry, Statement of the Hon William Perry, NK Policy Advisor, U.S. Department of State, U.S. 
Policy toward NK I: Perry Review, Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of 
Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress First Session, 13 October 1999, (Serial No.106–74,  U.S. 
Government Printing Office Washington:2000), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
106hhrg62724/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg62724.pdf, accessed 10 January 2016, pg.31. 
 
4
 Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci, by telephone, 12 February 2013. 
 
5
 Author’s interview with Dr Nicholas Eberstadt, by telephone, 3 April 2013. 
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Under George Bush Snr’s administration NK signed on the 20 January 19926 the ROK-
DPRK Joint declaration on denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. NK also agreed to 
IAEA safeguard measures on 30 Jan 1992.
7
 Therefore, the DPRK agreed to be subject 
to inspections by the IAEA under the safeguards agreement and ROK representatives 
under the Joint declaration. 
  
The denuclearisation declaration prevented both Koreas from rights enjoyed under the 
NPT; such as the right to enrich uranium and separate plutonium as directed by IAEA 
safeguards. Many also believed it was triumph for US diplomacy that had been the key 
in encouraging the Koreas to an agreement over denuclearisation.
8
 However, even 
before the Bush administration had left office problems were emerging. During IAEA 
inspections, in July 1992, inconsistencies were found between NK’s declared reactor 
history and what tests revealed. After a further 4 inspections, the IAEA requested access 
to 2 suspect sites. These requests were backed by the US who continually demanded 
that NK permit special inspections. However, on the 20 February 1993 the DPRK 
rejected the IAEA request for special inspections.
 
 
On the 22
 
February 1993 after an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA board of 
governors, at which the US presented evidence of the DPRK’s nuclear programme9, the 
board adopted a resolution on the 25
th
 calling on NK to comply with its IAEA 
                                                          
6
 ROK-DPRK Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Republic of Korea – 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (entered into force 19 February 1992), 
http://caledavis.com/Sources/1992/JointDeclaration.pdf, accessed 19 May 2014. 
 
7
 International Atomic Energy Agency, Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application 
of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
INFCIRC/403 (30 January 1992),  http://caledavis.com/Sources/1992/SafeguardsAgreement.pdf, 
accessed 19 May 2014. 
 
8
 Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, Robert Gallucci, Going Critical, The first North Korean Nuclear Crisis,  
pg.10. 
 
9
 Ibid. pg.20. 
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safeguards obligations within one month.
10  
In response NK announced its intention to 
withdraw from the NPT stating reasons such as the US-ROK resumption of exercise 
‘Team Spirit’ and an unjust IAEA resolution demanding NK to open military sites that 
had ‘no relevance at all to the nuclear activities’.11 
 
The announcement of NK intention to withdraw from the NPT prompted Washington to 
demand that Pyongyang meet its non-proliferation obligations by returning to the NPT 
and comply with its IAEA obligations, and implement the denuclearisation 
declaration.
12
  This was further backed by a joint letter from the US, Russia and the UK 
that urged ‘the DPRK to retract its announcement and to comply fully with its Treaty 
commitments and its safeguards obligations, which remain in force’.13 On the 1 April 
the IAEA board found the DPRK non-compliant with its obligations under its 
Safeguards Agreement resulting in the issue being referred to the UNSC.
14
 The referral 
led to UNSC resolution 825 being issued on 11 May 1993 that called upon the DPRK to 
‘reconsider’ its withdrawal from the NPT and further called upon the ‘DPRK to honour 
its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and comply with its safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA’.15 
                                                          
10
 Ibid. pg.21 
 
11
 Pak Gil Yon, Letter dated 12 March 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN 
Doc S/25405 (12 March 1993) annex 1 http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/DPRKWithdrawal.pdf, 
accessed 19 May 2014. 
 
12
 Op.cit. Wit,Poneman&Gallucci, pg.40. 
 
13
 Yuliy Vorontsov, Edward Walker, and David Hannay, Letter dated 1 April 1993 from the 
Representatives of the Russian Federation, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/25515 (2 
April 1993) annex 1. http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/Letter.pdf,  accessed 20 Jan 2014. 
 
14
 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Compliance with Arms Limitation and 
Disarmament Agreements, UN Doc A/48/133 and S/25556 (12 April 1993). 
http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/DPRKComplianceLetter.pdf, accessed 20 May 2014. 
 
15
 SC Res 825, UN SCOR, 3212nd mtg, UN Doc S/Res/825 (11 May 1993) 
http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/Res825.pdf, accessed 20 May 2014. 
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The DPRK seemed to avert a crisis by agreeing to ‘suspend as long as it considers 
necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons’.16 This shifted the US focus back on to the immediate demand that 
NK should honour its obligations under the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreement.  
Headway towards NK complying with this demand appeared to be made throughout 
1993, with meetings between NK and the IAEA eventually leading to inspections of all 
but the reprocessing site. However, IAEA inspections found NK in further 
noncompliance with its safeguard agreement, referring the issue to the UNSC again 
which prompted a presidential statement ‘calling upon the DPRK to allow the 
IAEA inspectors to complete the inspection activities agreed between the IAEA and 
DPRK’.17 
 
The crisis further escalated on the 19 April when Pyongyang declared to the US that it 
‘intended to unload the fuel rods containing bomb-making material from its reactor’.18  
The US had clearly stated to NK in negotiations throughout 1993 that ‘refuelling 
without proper supervision by the IAEA was a red line for the United States’.19 The 
IAEA reported that defueling was increasing in pace and the issue was referred to the 
UNSC, prompting the statement on 26 May 1993 that strongly urged ‘the DPRK only to 
proceed with the discharge operations at the five megawatt reactor in a manner which 
                                                          
16
 US Department of State, ‘Joint Statement Following U.S.-NK Meeting’ (14 June 1993) 4(24) US 
Department of State Dispatch. http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/JointStatement.pdf, accessed 20 May 
2014. 
 
17
 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1994/13, 23 March 1994, Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/1994/13 
accessed 21 May 2014. 
 
18
 Op.cit. Wit,Poneman&Gallucci, pg.169. 
 
19
 Ibid.pg.171. 
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preserves the technical possibility of fuel measurements, in accordance with the IAEA’s 
requirements’.20 
 
Unperturbed NK continued defueling and responded to the IAEA announcement that 
safeguard had failed and the threat of UN sanctions by withdrawing from the IAEA and 
preparing to move fuel rods to the reprocessing site. At this point the US contemplated 
surging troops into SK in order to defend against any NK attack provoked by UN 
sanctions. The US also considered a pre-emptive strike on Yongbyon to destroy the 
DPRK nuclear facilities. It was also being mooted within the US administration that the 
policy should be broadened to include regime change.
21
   
 
Although regime change did not become a policy objective there was a decision to 
escalate the demands, as stated by one of the AF negotiators Joel Wit: 
In 1994 the objectives of the negotiations got bigger, so we added to this IAEA 
focus, a dismantle focus. This not only allows special inspections, but they had 
to dismantle their nuclear facilities; that went beyond the NPT as countries are 
allowed to have such facilities as long as there are proper safeguards.
22
 
 
Therefore, at the beginning of the talks that would lead to the AF the US had 5 
demands: 
1. NK had to freeze its plutonium production program. 
2. Spent fuel had to be shipped out of NK. 
3. NK had to dismantle all frozen facilities. 
4. NK had to acknowledge its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and implement nuclear safeguards, including special inspection. 
                                                          
20
 Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/1994/28,  26 May 1994, Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PRST/1994/28  
accessed 21 May 2014. 
 
21
 Op.cit. Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.204. 
 
22
 Author’s interview with Mr Joel Wit, in person, 6 March 2013. 
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5. Implement the Denuclearisation Declaration.23 
 
In summary the political objective throughout the Clinton administration was to prevent 
the DPRK obtaining a nuclear weapon.  This was done through a series of escalating 
demands; that are as follows: 
 
Demand 1 (from 14 March 1992). Hold talks with ROK over denuclearisation 
agreement leading to inspections.  
Demand 2 (from November 1992). Comply with the IAEA special inspections and 
safeguard agreement and comply with demand 1. 
Demand 3 (from 12 March 1993). Stay within the NPT. 
Demand 4 (from 4 March 1994) . Do not move fuel rods to re-processing installation 
without supervision of the IAEA; conform with demands 1&2. 
Demand 5 (From 19 July 1994). Freeze and dismantle plutonium production 
programme, ship spent fuel out of NK, comply with NPT and ROK-DPRK 
denuclearisation agreements. 
  
AQ 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his 
objectives quickly with little cost? 
Due to unresolved issues of the Korean War, there was always the threat of military 
force being used by either side in a crisis. During the Korean War the US had threatened 
to use nuclear weapons against Korean and Chinese targets.
24
 In 1976 the US and ROK 
conducted a joint military exercise ‘Team Spirit’ with the objective of deterring NK 
aggression. The exercise involved up to 200,000 US and ROK service personnel in a 
                                                          
23
 Op.cit. Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.298. 
24
 Ibid.pg.1 
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demonstration of land, air and maritime capabilities.
25
 Although staged as a defensive 
measure, the North argued that the exercise was a threatening action. In 1991 the 
exercise was slimmed down, and in 1992 after a debate on the utility of the exercise it 
was cancelled.
26
 During a point of stalemate in the negotiations between the ROK and 
DPRK over the inspection regime, SK pushed for the resumption of Team Spirit 
exercise
27
 indicating that they saw the exercise as a way of putting pressure on the 
DPRK. 
 
The US threat was credible as the Gulf War of 1991 demonstrated. NK had closely 
studied Desert Storm and the political consequences of the war, concluding that 
although Saddam Hussein remained in power, Iraq had lost its independence; due to the 
actions of the international community.
28
 Therefore, NK was wary of any proposed 
surge of troops similar to that of Desert Shield. 
 
The US administration had continually emphasised in bilateral talks with the NK that 
progress on DPRK-ROK talks as part of the denuclearisation agreement, was always an 
element required of any final agreement. However, there was no evidence of a specific 
threat to use force over this demand. There was also no direct threat to use force over 
NK failure to comply with IAEA special inspections although sanctions through the UN 
was repeatedly threatened.   
 
                                                          
25
 Global Security.org, Team Spirit, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/team-spirit.htm, accessed 
21 May 2014. 
 
26
 Op.cit. Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.11. 
 
27
 Ibid. pg.14. 
 
28
 Ibid.pg.35. 
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The US and ROK did re-instigate Team Spirit, partly over the DPRK’s lack of progress 
in complying with IAEA demands and reaching agreement on inspections under the 
denuclearisation agreement. NK clearly indicated they perceived Team Spirit as a threat 
stating that resumption of the exercise was ‘a nuclear war rehearsal, threatening the 
DPRK’. The IAEA also on several occasions threatened to declare the continuity of 
safeguards broken with the intention of persuading NK to comply with special 
inspections. This threat often complicated the US approach, as the DPRK asserted that 
resolving IAEA inspections was dependent on the outcome of US-NK discussions.
29
  
Therefore, the DPRK response to what it deemed as threats was to escalate the situation 
further by stating that it would withdraw from the NPT ‘until the United States nuclear 
threats and the unjust conduct of the IAEA against the DPRK will be recognised to have 
been removed’.30 These demands would finally be resolved as part of the AF.  
 
The Clinton administration’s response to NK announcement that it would leave the NPT 
was diplomatic. The strategy was to build multilateral consensus
31
 that led to UNSC 
resolution 825; which merely called upon the ‘DPRK to reconsider the announcement’, 
‘reaffirm its commitment to the treaty’, ‘honour its obligations under the non-
proliferation treaty’ and ‘comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA’.32  
Therefore, there was no direct threat over this demand. 
 
                                                          
29
 Ibid pg.80 
 
30
 Pak Gil Yon, Letter dated 12 March 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN 
Doc S/25405 (12 March 1993) annex 1 http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/DPRKWithdrawal.pdf 
accessed 19 May 2014. 
 
31
 Op.cit. Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.45. 
 
32
 SC Res 825, UN SCOR, 3212nd mtg, UN Doc S/Res/825 (11 May 1993).  
http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/Res825.pdf , accessed 25 May 2014. 
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At talks held between the US and NK on 2 June 1993, the DPRK held the position that 
they were going to withdraw from the NPT. In response the US made it clear that such 
an action would lead ‘the international community ‘to take its own steps’ which was a 
thinly veiled threat of sanctions.
33
 NK emphasised that sanctions would be a 
‘declaration of war’ that could lead to them building nuclear weapons and extracting 
plutonium from its spent fuel rods. The lead negotiator, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, 
threatened that ‘no sitting president of the US would allow NK to acquire nuclear 
weapons.’34 However, it was not until the DPRK was given security assurances that it 
decided ‘to suspend as long as it considers necessary the effectuation of its withdrawal 
from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’.35 Therefore, NK met the 
US demand not to withdraw from the NPT, not based on the threat of force, but on the 
possibility of further talks. 
 
NK was clearly threatened with an implied use of force if they started to re-process fuel 
rods from their reactor. Gallucci stated ‘I warned the North Koreans about reprocessing 
and about how serious that would be; I told the NK negotiator that I personally did not 
believe that the President of the United States would tolerate a nuclear weapons 
programme in NK’.36 Since 1993 the fear within the US was that reprocessing the 
plutonium rods would provide enough material to make a nuclear weapon. Therefore, a 
                                                          
33
 Op.cit. Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.55. 
 
34
 Ibid. 
 
35
  US Department of State, ‘Joint Statement Following U.S.-NK Meeting’ (14 June 1993) 4(24) US 
Department of State Dispatch. http://caledavis.com/Sources/1993/JointStatement.pdf,  accessed 25 May 
2014. 
 
36
 Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci Phone, by telephone, 12 February 2013. 
172 
 
discussion emerged within the US administration regarding whether pre-emptive strikes 
might be needed.
37
  
 
On 29 December 1993 after talks between the US and DPRK, both sides agreed to a 
‘Super Tuesday’ package where on the same day there would be IAEA inspections at 
seven sites, DPRK-ROK talks would be scheduled and special envoys exchanged, ROK 
would announce the cancellation of Team Spirit and US- NK would arrange another 
meeting between their chief negotiators.
38
 However, on 26 January 1994 it was reported 
that the US was intending to send Patriot missiles to SK. News articles also claimed that 
the US was going to send new helicopters and deploy an aircraft carrier to the region. 
There was also speculation on a possible US war plan and the possibility of sending an 
additional 1000 troops to Korea for Team Spirit.
39
 Furthermore, two members of the US 
senate publicly provided support for the president to ‘use any means necessary and 
appropriate, including the use of diplomacy, economic sanctions, a blockade, and 
military force’ to prevent NK obtaining a nuclear weapon.40 
 
The deployment of forces to the region would possible be perceived by NK as a threat, 
mirroring Desert Storm.
41
 Laney, the Ambassador to the ROK at the time, pointed out 
that that the plan to deploy forces to SK: 
On the one hand we were trying to mollify the North with talks, while on the 
other building up for a possible preventative strike.  The North had no reason not 
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 Op.cit. Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.103. 
 
38
 Ibid. pg.116. 
 
39
 Ibid. pg.123. 
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 Benjamin Gilman, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation in Korea Resolution’, 103D Congress 1ST Session, H. J. 
RES. 292 in the House of Representatives, Government Printing Office, Mr. Gilman (for himself, Mr. 
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to think we were preparing to strike Yongbyon as it had been much discussed in 
the press, particularly by right-wing pundits who had claimed "we can take it out 
surgically and it is all over.
42
 
 
Another threatening action by the US occurred after NK announced its intention to 
discharge its reactor.
43
 The US had made it clear that this was a red line and pressed the 
UN to impose sanctions on NK. In order to defend against any military response to 
sanctions, which NK had called an act of war, the US put in place its plan to augment 
forces in the region. As pointed out by Ambassador Gallucci: 
We escalated some conventional moves that we had planned to undertake 
anyway and we did it in a way that was quite transparent, so that the North 
Koreans could see them, we were going to switch out our Cobra helicopters for 
Apache, we started doing that, we placed counter battery radar so you could fire 
for effect with first rounds against North Koreans entrenched artillery pieces 
along the DMZ, and we started shipping in Bradley fighting vehicles. So we 
were doing things that we would have eventually done anyway, but in an 
escalatory way quite transparently to signal that we were doing a little flexing.
44
 
 
However, essential to the question of coercive diplomacy, is whether this was a build of 
forces in order to directly threaten NK with a pre-emptive strike or whether it was a 
build of forces in order to be prepared to deal with NK possible military response to UN 
sanctions. Gallucci clearly indicates that there was a credible threat that the US would 
have conducted a pre-emptive strike if NK had moved the fuel rods: 
If the North Koreans had taken that step of moving the material from the pond to 
the reprocessing facility, and we would have eventually known about the 
separation of plutonium from intelligence sources, I think the President would 
have acted to destroy the nuclear facility at Yongbyon and probably the 
suppression strikes that would have been necessary for the safe execution of that 
surgical strike.
45
 
 
However, Joel Witt another of the key negotiators states: 
It was more defensive than offensive, everyone knew what the first steps of the 
Op Plan were, how you want to interpret the Op Plan depends on where you sit, 
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if you are the NK seeing the US moving along the Op Plan you think holy cow; 
Op plan danger. So we thought they were defensive, in fact patriot missiles are 
defensive but can have offensive implications, you defend sites where you may 
stream in troops, that’s a problem if you are NK.46 
 
Although the US was primarily making military deployments to improve its defensive 
posture within SK, the North must have felt threatened and perceived a possibility of a 
pre-emptive strike. If 100,000 troops had been deployed rapidly to the region, this 
would have raised their fears further, reminding them of the recent Gulf war.   
 
With war looming at the moment that Clinton was set to make the decision on 
deployment of troops and pre-emptive strike and intervention by President Carter led to 
a de-escalation. As pointed out by Joel Wit: 
We were not going to back down from our position and it appeared to us they 
were not going to stop doing what they were doing, we had some signals that 
there might be a way out, but when Carter parachuted in it crystallised the 
escape route for them, we knew even if he hadn’t shown up we had a plan to 
have a last meeting come to Jesus meeting with NK before launching the pre-
emptive strike; we never got to the Rudolf Hess option
47
. 
 
The Carter intervention de-escalated the situation but there remained the underlying 
threat that the crisis could return to the brink of war. The US had demonstrated that it 
was not willing to back down even if it risked war. Therefore, a return to the crisis, and 
the implicit threat of force was ever present throughout the negotiations that led to the 
AF. Therefore, this element is coded as conforming to the ideal policy. 
 
AQ 3 - Was a deadline for compliance offered? 
Demand 1 (from 14 March 1992).  Hold talks with ROK over denuclearisation 
agreement leading to inspections. 
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There was no deadline, backed by the threat of force, for the demand that NK hold talks 
with the ROK over inspections. Deadlines were set for NK regarding IAEA inspections. 
The IAEA Board of Governors on 25 February set a deadline of 1 month for NK to 
accept special inspections or have the issue referred to the UNSC.
48
 However, the threat 
seems to have been an element in NK decision to withdraw from the NPT.  
Regarding the demand that NK stay within the NPT, the deadline adopted was what 
George would have termed the ‘try and see’, as no specific timing was given but a 
warning that actions would take place if they were to go through with the threat and 
leave the NPT. A ‘Try and see approach’ was also applied to the demand that NK did 
not move and reprocess fuel rods. NK had been told on several occasions that the US 
would not allow them to obtain nuclear weapons. However, NK publicly announced the 
defueling of their nuclear reactor, and must have known that the US would see this as a 
step towards them attaining nuclear material for a bomb. Therefore, the trip wire was set 
for NK to break if they went ahead and moved the fuel rods. Once the crisis had been 
averted there was only an implicit deadline that an agreement needed to be reached by 
the end of the bilateral talks between the US and UK held in Geneva between 5-12 
August 1994. However, as no hard deadlines, only an implied one was given, for 
compliance or face military strikes, the timetable for AF talks is not sufficient to code 
this element as conforming to the ideal policy.  
 
AQ 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands? 
The US had informally assured NK that it had no nuclear weapons on the peninsula.  
Furthermore, the Joint statement assured the DPRK that the US would not threaten the 
use of force, including nuclear weapons; it would be impartial in the application of full 
scope safe-guards, they would mutually respect each other's sovereignty, respect non-
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interference in each other's internal affairs and support the peaceful reunification of 
Korea.
49
 Although the AF clearly contained an assurance that no further demands would 
be made regarding regime change; it did not specifically state that future demands 
would not be made. However, this is deemed to be sufficient to be coded as partially 
conforming to the ideal policy. 
 
AQ 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance? 
US bilateral talks were the incentive for NK to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT 
and restart IAEA and ROK inspections. The Joint Statement stated that further dialogue 
relied on NK accepting IAEA inspections to ensure the continuity of safeguards.
50
 In 
particular the carrot of high level talks up to US Secretary of State level appeared to 
have motivated the DPRK. However, as will be discussed the ability of the US to 
deliver this carrot, whilst keeping allies and domestic audiences content was often 
problematic. 
 
Another incentive that was offered to induce NK was the cancelling of Team Spirit. The 
ROK announcement on January 1992 of the suspension of Team Spirit was a significant 
factor in the DPRK signing up to both the IAEA safeguards and talks with the South.  
However, the resumption of Team Spirit in 1993 was taken as a threat by NK who 
protested that ROK and US had gone back on their word. The cancelling of future 
Teams Spirit therefore was always viewed by NK as an incentive.  
 
The DPRK was given no specific incentive to entice them not to unload fuel rods under 
the supervision of the IAEA. The US was clear that such an action could lead to UN 
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sanctions and possible a pre-emptive strike. Once tensions had been reduced by the 
Carter intervention NK was offered several incentives to induce them to freeze and 
dismantle their graphite program. They were offered LWR nuclear reactors, a carrot that 
would eventually cost Japan and SK in the region of $5bn. The US agreed to provide 
500,000 tons annually of heavy oil for heating and electricity production.  However, the 
big carrot was the offer to move towards ‘normalisation of political and economic 
relations’. As stated by a Robert Carlin, who was an intelligence officer with the State 
Department at the time: 
The key was not the Light Water Reactors, or freezing the graphite program in 
exchange for the LWR, the key was that they were now engaged long term with 
the Americans, and had a prospect for continuous slow steady normalisation of 
relations.
51
 
 
 
The offer of incentives for NK compliance was the fundamental element that led to the 
AF. Therefore, this element conforms to the ideal policy. 
 
Evaluation of the implementation of the ideal policy and coercive diplomacy applied 
The strategy of coercive diplomacy that was applied throughout this episode was 
complicated by several escalating demands in response to NK actions, and several 
actors (DPRK, ROK, US, IAEA, UN and Japan), but at the centre throughout was the 
US. It was the threat of US military action similar to that of the Gulf War that concerned 
NK and compelled them to enter talks leading to the AF. It was the assurances 
contained within the AF that mapped out what the reciprocal the US action would be if 
they met key demands. It was the incentives of a LWR and heavy oil that the US 
promised NK that induced them. However, although there were implied deadlines and 
NK was aware that the bilateral talks, after the Carter intervention, may be there last 
opportunity to deal directly with the US. At no point was there a hard deadline backed 
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with the threat of force; therefore, the form of coercive diplomacy adopted did not 
conform to the ideal policy. The initial attempts of coercive diplomacy did not conform 
to the ideal policy primarily as there was not a credible threat made that force could be 
used if compliance was not forthcoming. The demand that NK was not to move fuel 
rods did not conform to the ideal policy as there was no clear incentive being offered for 
compliance. The AF resulted from coercive diplomacy, but as there was no hard 
deadline it was not in the form of the ideal policy. However, it was successful as NK did 
dismantle its plutonium based programme. As will be discussed in Episode 2, it was 
only after the US reneged on the AF that NK restarted its plutonium based programme 
and obtained a nuclear weapons. 
 
AQ 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war? 
Continued non-compliance with demands over inspections and the withdrawal from the 
NPT would most likely have eventually escalated, with UN sanctions being authorised, 
that in turn would have required similar consideration of surging US troops; possible 
leading to war. However, the specific urgency of the demand that NK did not move fuel 
rods brought the crisis to the brink; as this was going to lead to UN sanctions, US troop 
reinforcements and the possibility of a US pre-emptive strike.  
 
NK did not want to go war but most likely could see no way of complying without the 
regime losing face. Therefore, it was willing to go to war, even if it was likely to lose.  
Having studied the Gulf War, NK perhaps believed that the US would only conduct a 
pre-emptive strike or limited campaign. Pyongyang then could sell such an action to 
their domestic audience as an example of ‘Western aggression’ and claim victory if the 
US did not commit to a full invasion and regime change. There was precedence for this 
as Saddam after the Gulf war used a similar line. 
179 
 
  
The alternative for NK, complying without gaining anything in return (i.e. oil and 
LWR), would have appeared weak not only in the eyes of the IC, but also to 
subordinates within the regime; in turn this would have risked a coup or domestic 
instability. The Carter intervention clearly offered NK away of complying and saving 
face, as pointed out by Gallucci ‘it gave Kim Jung Il a face saving way to come back to 
the negotiating table and make some concessions that he might not have otherwise 
made’.52 
 
AQ 7 – Did the opponent act rationally, miscalculate or suffer from 
misperception? 
An assessment of whether NK acted rationally is dependent on their objective. If NK 
objective was to increase its security, and particularly that of the regime, then it did act 
rationally. By seeking nuclear weapons, they forced the US to the negotiation table and 
were able to extract concessions and assurances unlikely to be obtained through normal 
diplomacy. This may have involved NK taking the crisis to the brink of war, but as 
stated previously even if the US did conduct a pre-emptive strike, Pyongyang may have 
calculated that this could be used to their advantage. 
 
If they obtained a nuclear weapon they would be able to deter the US as pointed out by 
Gallucci:   
I think they watched and learned that if the United States is allowed to project its 
force it is extremely, perhaps uniquely, powerful opponent, capable of projecting 
with incredible lethality and precision that no other country on earth could deal 
with. They may have learned that having that having nuclear weapons is a 
deterrent to the overwhelming force of the United States.
53
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Another advantage that negotiation backed by a nuclear weapons programme gave them 
was the ability to gain concessions and much needed aid whilst still saving face. As 
pointed out by Ambassador Laney: 
Their threats based on their nuclear program were initially based on pride, then 
on fear of being outclassed altogether by the US and the South.  Also it involved 
extortion as a way of getting aid without being humiliated by receiving charity. 
While that certainly does not excuse their behavior it makes it intelligible. They 
really want and desperately need aid but they also want to be respected. They are 
willing to be the bad boy on the block to get attention if they can't get it any 
other way.
54
   
 
If NK objective was to obtain a nuclear weapon in order to coerce its neighbours then 
surrendering its programme was not rational, as they were giving up the only method of 
deterring the US and any hope of coercing neighbouring states without the threat of a 
US reprisal. It could be argued that they maintained this objective, but just pretended to 
surrender their plutonium programme, with the intention of cheating. However, as 
pointed out by the negotiators of the time: 
They spend 10s of billions of dollars over three decades starting in the early 
1960s to build these programmes. The point is if you were a rational decision 
maker would you totally trash a programme that you have spent billions of 
dollars on over 30 years that was about to produce 100 nuclear weapons  
material for a programme that you didn’t even know was going to work?55 
 
 
It could also be argued that seeking nuclear weapons was not rational as it maintained 
NK position as rogue nation outside of the IC and made it a target for the US. This 
claim would be valid if it was from the people of NK perspective, but not for the ruling 
elite. International isolation aided the regime, limiting external influences and enabling 
it to maintain a tight grip on the populace. There was also no guarantee that coming 
back into the international fold would significantly aid NK. The US may have continued 
a policy of containment with the aim of forcing the regime to collapse.   
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NK did make tactical and operational miscalculations though. The DPRK 
underestimated the technical abilities of the IAEA that led to the ‘inconsistencies’ being 
identified. If NK knew what the IAEA was capable of it may have delayed inspections 
further or considered remaining out of the NPT. Furthermore, the negotiators of the time 
argue that the collapse of the Super Tuesday agreement was ‘the first instance of a 
major NK miscalculation during the crisis. Subsequently, Pyongyang would repeatedly 
overplay its tactical hand without seeming to calculate seriously, much less understand, 
how its negotiating partner react’.56 NK also later indicated that it regretted the ‘Sea of 
fire’ comment which had put it on the defensive and killed the deal.   
 
Even the random behaviour of ignoring deadlines can be viewed as rational through the 
prism of the regime, as NK expert Chuck Downs explains ‘from their perspective this is 
their opportunity to weed out weaklings who aren’t perfectly supportive of the leader’.57  
 
Assuming that NK key objective was regime survival its actions can be viewed as 
rational. Obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent required or a 
bargaining chip to trade for the resources and money it required to exist. Even if it 
miscalculated US resolve and the crisis escalated into conflict it clearly had good reason 
to believe that it would be a limited conflict that the regime could weather and then use 
to its advantage internally.  
 
AQ 8 - Does credible implementation of the ideal policy lead to compliance? 
The ideal policy was not applied in this exchange. However, coercive diplomacy was 
applied that led to the AF. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next episode it is 
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only when the US ended the AF, that NK sought a plutonium based nuclear weapon. As 
pointed out by Ambassador Gallucci: 
Without the AF there would have been 100kg of plutonium produced, lots of 
nuclear weapons produced, and the North would have become a bigger and 
greater threat a lot sooner than it has over a period of a few years than it has over 
20 years.
58
 
However, there are critics of this view; Joseph points out: 
One can argue that the AF was a tactical success in that it temporarily closed the 
reprocessing facility and shut down the reactor. But at the strategic level it was a 
failure. It strengthened the most brutal regime in the world by giving it 
legitimacy and aid. And as for denuclearization, the North could always resume 
operations at Yongbyon whenever it decided to do so. Moreover, it was already 
embarked on an HEU program. So it was violating the agreement from the 
beginning
59
 
 
 
Although coercive diplomacy was key in leading to the AF, it was not the grand strategy 
required to bring NK further into the IC and sort out the underlying issues that initiated 
the crisis. This is not a failure necessary of coercive diplomacy but of US ability to form 
a longer term policy towards NK. 
 
AQ 9 - Does failure to implement the ideal policy lead to non-compliance? 
For this particular episode the ideal policy was not implemented; but there was 
eventually a successfully outcome. 
 
AQ 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be 
carried out? 
President Carter gave NK a way out that allowed them to save face and avert a military 
confrontation. This would imply that they were fearful that further pressure could be 
applied to them including military strikes, but needed the offer of incentives that would 
allow them to save face, gain a reward and enable them to negotiate. 
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EPISODE 1 - WILL TO THREATEN AND USE FORCE 
Jakobsen asserts that the willingness to use force can be explained by three ‘will 
producing; patterns which are Interest-driven pattern, Government-driven pattern and 
Domestic pressure-driven pattern.
60
 Furthermore, following Jacobsen’s logic I argue 
that because of the unique threat posed by nuclear weapons, there is an additional 
pattern ‘Vital interest’ driven pattern. This section will examine each of the variables in 
turn, assessing the extent they were present and determining whether they explain why 
the US was considering the use of force over NK’s nuclear programme. 
 
The nature of the threatened interests. 
The threat of NK attaining a nuclear weapon was reportedly described to Congress by 
the Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey as ‘the most urgent threat to United 
States national security in East Asia’ and ‘that possession by NK of such a device would 
threaten United States allies in all of Asia as well as United States forces in the 
region’.61 But why did the US perceive a nuclear armed DPRK as a threat? Firstly, a 
nuclear armed North would impact on the calculation of any conflict and affect the 
strategic balance of power on the peninsula.
62
 Another concern was that if, like other 
communist regimes, the North’s regime rapidly collapsed it could escalate into a nuclear 
conflict.
63
   
 
                                                          
60
 Jakobsen, Western use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, A Challenge for Theory and 
Practice, pg.43.  
 
61
 Benjamin Gilman, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation in Korea Resolution’, 103D Congress 1ST Session, H. J. 
RES. 292 in the House of Representatives, Government Printing Office, Mr. Gilman (for himself, Mr. 
Murtha, Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Hyde) introduced the joint resolution; which was referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 15 November 1993, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
103hjres292ih/pdf/BILLS-103hjres292ih.pdf, accessed 12 March 2013, pg.2. 
 
62
 Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci, by telephone, 12 February 2013. 
 
63
 Author’s interview with source B, in person, 5 March 2013. 
184 
 
There was also a proliferation risk that if NK collapsed the weapons would be lost or 
that they might sell fissile material, equipment or a nuclear weapon to other states or 
terrorists.
64
 NK has few resources and methods of generating wealth; nuclear 
technology was one possible revenue stream. Any proliferation before the NPT review 
in 1995 could have had wider global impact and would have undermined US counter-
proliferation policy.
65
 There was a concern that in response to a NK nuke, SK and Japan 
would develop a nuclear deterrent.
66
 The US had assured both these states that it would 
provide a ‘nuclear umbrella’, retaliating with a nuclear strike on an aggressor that 
attacked them with nuclear weapons, but if SK and Japan started to doubt this promise 
in the face of a direct threat of NK they may have decided to develop start their own 
programme. 
 
Another concern was that a nuclear armed DPRK at some stage would be able to 
conduct a direct strike on the US. This was not a threat in the 90s as they did not have 
the delivery system to deliver such a weapon. However, if NK developed the ability to 
strike the US directly it could undermine the ‘nuclear umbrella’ as it would increase 
doubts that the US would be willing to take punishment on behalf of other states. This 
doubt alone could embolden NK to act more aggressively in the region.  
Overall due to the clear threat to US allies and interests within the region, this element 
is coded high.  
 
The prospects of military success. 
There are three scenarios that need to be assessed in order to answer this element.  
Firstly, what was the prospect of successful pre-emptive strike aimed at destroying NK 
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nuclear programme? Secondly, what was the prospect of implementing a blockade to 
make sanctions effective? Thirdly, what was the prospect of successfully winning a full 
scale war that could result from the North’s response to the implementation of sanctions 
or pre-emptive strike?       
 
The US military’s assessment of a pre-emptive strike was that it could destroy the 
facilities at Yongbyon but ‘could not guarantee the destruction of plutonium the North 
was thought already to have, especially since it could be easily moved’.67 The Pentagon 
had studied a range option for attacking Yongbyon ranging from cruise missile attacks 
to commando raids. However, with over 300 anti-aircraft guns, six surface to air missile 
bases under construction and hilly terrain any option would be risky.
68
 There was also 
the possibility that an attack on the nuclear facility would release radiation. 
Furthermore, it would destroy any chance of calculating how much fissile material they 
had already re-processed.  The timing of such an attack would be difficult as pointed out 
by Gallucci, Pone and Wit: 
Any attack would require timely intelligence, accurate targeting, tight command 
and control, and exact timing.  An attack would have to be launched no sooner 
than when the North Koreans began to move the spent fuel to the reprocessing 
plant, but it would have to be executed before they moved the separated nuclear 
material elsewhere. That in turn, required enough information to apprise 
American decision makers of these activates in time to allow the military option 
to be executed successfully.
69
 
 
 
Enforcing a blockade to support UN sanctions would require a ‘staggering number of 
ships’ to implement successfully.70 It would also require China to abstain from vetoing 
an UNSC action and then police its own border with the DPRK. Furthermore, even if a 
                                                          
67
 Op.cit. Wit, Poneman&Gallucci, pg.107. 
68
 Ibid. pg.103. 
69
 Ibid. pg.103. 
70
 Ibid. pg.107 
186 
 
successful blockade was implemented it was highly likely to punish ordinary citizens 
than the regime.  
There was also a significant risk that a pre-emptive strike or implementation of a 
blockade would provoke NK into launching a pre-emptive strike on SK. Even the 
defensive measures of moving patriot missile systems and surging 100,000 troops into 
the country could easily have provoked a NK offensive.  
 
NK had a military force of 1,127,000 and a reserve of 6,000,000
71
 compared to the US 
forces within SK of 35,000
72
 and ROK forces numbering 633,000 active with a reserve 
of 4,500,000.
73
 Furthermore, the DPRK boasted around 3700 MBT and 730 combat 
aircraft
74
 to the US’s 84 Combat aircraft and ROK 1800 MBT and 497 combat 
aircraft.
75
 In terms of naval assets the US and ROK clearly had higher end capability 
including an aircraft carrier fleet based in Japan. However, the NK had 25 submarines
76
 
that clearly posed a threat to any deployed fleet. The US was capable of reinforcing the 
regional forces rapidly; as demonstrated by the surge of 545,000 men into Iraq in 1992.   
 
The superiority of US and ROK equipment, doctrine and training would have most 
likely led to a victory over NK. The Iraq war had already provided an example of how 
US forces were a generation ahead of an army equipped with old Soviet technology. 
Therefore, the US assessment at the time was that the NK ‘had a numerical advantage in 
manpower and in major weapons, tanks, artillery, and rocket launchers. The vastly 
                                                          
71
 IISS, The Military Balance, (1993), pg. 161. 
 
72
 Ibid. pg. 20. 
 
73
 Ibid. 
 
74
 Ibid. 
 
75
 Ibid. 
 
76
 Ibid. 
187 
 
superior training and readiness as well as air superiority of the allied forces offset that 
advantage’.77 The US believed that it would prevail in any military confrontation 
although it was assessed that it could take four months of very high intensity conflict, 
US reinforcements of at least 545,000 men
78
 and US and ROK troop casualties of 
around 300,000-750,000.
79
 
 
The most significant problem for any US or ROK strategy was the counter coercion that 
NK could apply. As pointed out by a senior member of the first Bush administration: 
We got probably 200,000 US citizens in Seoul, Japan has got about 70 or 80,000 
and it wouldn’t really matter if a nuclear device went off in Seoul or if they 
released one volley of their forward deployed artillery, it would be unbelievable 
devastation.  Now what would matter is, and no one would ever say this, the 
President at the time would have to make a decision on what to do, but between 
11-12000 forward deployed Howitzers, there were only 2 bridges across the Han 
river, he {NK} has got us somewhat over a barrel that is why successive 
administrations have had to handle this very carefully.
80
 
 
NK knew that it had this stranglehold on SK pointing out: 
We are … prepared politically and militarily … We have a great Party. We have 
strength derived from solidarity among the leader, the Party, and the people. We 
have [a] strong independent national economy. And we have powerful military 
forces. Based on these strengths, we can say for sure that we will be able to deal 
with any offensive or ‘pressure’ coming from our enemies.81 
 
Internationally NK would have very little support if a conflict was to occur. The only 
state that would consider aiding the North militarily was China who had entered the 
Korean War on their side. Therefore, if a US full scale invasion was mounted and 
approached its borders history could possible repeat itself. However, the NK-Chinese 
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relationship was not as warm as many believed.
82
 The coldness of this relationship was 
further signified in 1992 when China recognised and established diplomatic 
relationships with the ROK, a move that infuriated NK.
83
 Therefore, a pre-emptive 
strike, away from the Chinese border, on the DPRK’s nuclear facilities may have been 
acceptable to the Chinese.  
 
Due to the costs involved and the low prospect of achieving the objective quickly and at 
low cost the prospects of military success are coded low. 
 
The level of domestic support 
Polls in 1994 had 51% of Americans in favour of military action to destroy NK’s 
nuclear programme with 48% indicating it was worth the risk of a war.
84
 Republican 
figures from the previous administrations were particularly active in calling for such an 
attack.
85
 Moreover, the Republican held Congress had signalled to the President that any 
means could be used ‘including the use of diplomacy, economic sanctions, a blockade, 
and military force, to prevent’ NK attaining a nuclear weapons.86 The debate within the 
US was clearly mixed on whether to use force. This mixed debate means that this 
element is coded medium. 
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AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten 
and use force? 
The pattern for this episode has been assessed as high for interest, low for prospects of 
military success and medium regarding domestic support. This does not conform to any 
of the patterns described by Jakobsen that would lead to force being threatened; 
fundamentally because the prospects of military success of winning a quick war at low 
cost were evaluated as low. The only pattern where the logic of the ideal policy would 
imply the threat to use force, even if the prospect of success is low, is where the vital 
interests (i.e. state survival) are threatened. However, Clinton was actively considering a 
pre-emptive strike, or at the minimum UNSC resolution imposing sanctions that would 
have required a surge of a 100,000 troops.   
  
There are several explanations for why Jakobsen’s patterns and US willingness to 
threaten force do not align. Firstly, Jakobsen’s logic could be wrong and states may in 
fact be willing to go into a costly war over an issue that does not affect vital interest, 
would are controversial domestically, and possible would not succeed. It could be the 
US saw the credibility of its counter-proliferation policy as essential to its long term 
survival; but this would lead to the US threatening the use of force over other 
proliferation issues.  
 
Another possibility is that the US was gambling that the deployment of US troops 
would not lead NK to escalate to a point of engaging in a war that it could not win.  
Clearly if the surge did cause an escalation it would have been a US miscalculation. It 
may be that the US felt that it had no option; as if it did not seek a UNSC resolution, 
surge troops to deter NK, it would be viewed as a ‘paper tiger’ and would have lost 
credibility globally. Therefore, it was caught in an escalatory cycle with NK. 
190 
 
Comparison with other episodes will provide a clearer indicator of which explanation is 
more likely.       
 
AQ 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to 
threaten and use force? 
Discussed in question 11. 
 
AQ 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from 
leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important 
interests are threatened? 
 
Japan, ROK and the US shared the interest in preventing NK attaining nuclear weapons. 
The ROK and Japan, in had a vital interest, as unlike the US, a nuclear armed DPRK 
posed an almost immediate threat to those states. However, the ROK often opposed a 
US aggressive stance with the North, as they had the most to lose from any 
confrontation; as pointed out by Carlin ‘the South Koreans don’t want to see their 
beautiful country destroyed in the interest of US non-proliferation goals; big problem’.87  
 
Gallucci clearly points out issues with allies: 
The most difficult ally engagement was with our allies in Seoul Kim (SK 
President) was a pretty serious critic of engagement with the North and there 
was no deal that could be made without the South, so we were in a constant 
consultative mode and spent a lot of time with South Korean leaders, in 
particular the foreign minister, but it was very hard time with the political stance 
of SK president, so I think most difficult. Japanese were supportive throughout, 
as were the Russians from a distance...... There was a fair amount of ally 
management; the key to the deal was ensuring that we were on the same wave 
length as our allies in the South.
88
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Therefore, although there were shared interests that drove all parties to engage 
diplomatically, there was not a clear coalitional consensus to use force.    
 
AQ 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when 
none of the above conditions are met? 
As there was not a coalitional consensus concerning to threaten the use of force over 
NK nuclear programme this question cannot be answered. 
 
AQ 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise 
support for policies involving threats and use of force? 
The threat of UN sanctions for non-compliance was an element in the US strategy to 
persuade NK. However, the reliance on the IAEA complicated the strategy as it was not 
under US control. The IAEA threatened to refer issues to the UNSC at a moment when 
the US did not want to increase pressure. Joel Witt also comments ‘the IAEA was 
difficult, not because they were led by whacky people, they are kind of rigid 
international organisation with set procedures rules of behaviours and they did not get 
along with the North Koreans’.89 
 
To some seeking legitimacy through the UN seemed to unnecessarily complicate the 
crisis; as stated by Carlin ‘we made it pretty clear to the North Koreans that once we 
had got done with this UN thing we would sit down and have bi-lateral talks with 
them’.90  
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AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to 
develop nuclear weapons?      
There is no evidence to link threats to a change in the pace of NK programme.  
However, the continual NK rhetoric about the mistakes that Saddam made would 
suggest they were concerned that a similar fate awaited them. Therefore, it is logical to 
assume that they increased the pace of their nuclear programme to gain a bigger 
bargaining chip to achieve a better security arrangement with the US or obtain a 
deterrent. The only evidence of a possible connection is that when first threatened with 
sanctions they threatened to leave the NPT, and when the pressure had mounted further, 
the DPRK started to unload spent fuel rods. Both of these actions were on the path that 
would eventually enable them to attain a nuclear weapon. 
 
EPISODE 2 – BUSH ADMINISTRATION 2001 – 2006 
AQ 1 - What was the US policy objective and demand? The US objective throughout 
the Bush administration was to stop the DPRK nuclear programme.
91
 How this 
objective was to be achieved was an area of conflict within the administration that 
affected the policy adopted between the first and second Bush administrations.  
 
Two opposing camps emerged within the administration; one led by Thomas Hubbard, 
who recognised the flaws of the AF, but wished to keep it. The opposing faction led by 
Robert Joseph, senior director for non-proliferation and counter proliferation believed 
the AF to be useless and that NK should be isolated and coerced.
92
 This conflict soon 
became apparent as described by a senior member of the first Bush administration: 
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Kim [South Korean President} came to Washington in May 2001, and Secretary 
of Powell was briefing the press before and said basically that he was going to 
follow the Clinton programme and this caused great consternation, Cheney 
himself went nuts and Powell had to go out to press to say that I was a little bit 
too far ahead of my Skis, so we are going to pull back a bit and re-evaluate.
93
 
 
Bush’s view on the AF was:  
The previous administration had offered concessions to North Korean dictator 
Kim Jong-Il in return for a pledge to abandon his nuclear weapons program.  
The policy had not worked, and I told the team we were going to change it.  
From then on, NK would have to change its behaviour before America made 
concessions.
94
 
 
However, at the point described the policy had led to the dismantlement and 
containment of the plutonium based programme, although there was suspicion that NK 
had a secret HEU programme. The first indication that Bush was adopting the position 
of the hardliners was after 9/11. In the state of the Union speech after the attacks the 
President stated that one of his administration goals was to:  
Prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and 
allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty 
quiet since September the 11th, but we know their true nature. NK is a regime 
arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
95
  
 
In the same speech he pointed out that ‘states like these and their terrorist allies 
constitute an axis of evil’.96 Despite this rhetoric the administration did attempt to 
engage with NK developing what it called ‘a bold approach to improve relations with 
NK’ based on an ‘offer of economic and political steps to improve the lives of the North 
Korean people’.97 This approach was led by James Kelly who met with the DPRK 
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between 3-5 October 2002. During these meetings NK appeared to admit to having a 
HEU programme.
98
 
 
Although there is a debate over whether NK admitted to having an HEU programme,
99
 
once it was accepted in Washington that they did, even those who argued to maintain 
the AF realised that it was over; as Hubbard stated ‘this administration continued the 
fundamental policy elements of the approach of the last administration in the sense that 
we continued to support the Agreed Framework until it was clear the North Koreans had 
violated it’.100 A senior member of the first Bush administration confirmed this stating 
‘when they announced it; it had some effect of bringing the thing crashing down around 
our ears as people who were opposed to negotiating tried to find a way out of the short 
of military action and temporally got the upper hand’.101 
 
In a press statement October 2002 the US argued that it had been willing to engage with 
NK, but could not due to its HEU programme and called on the ‘NK to comply with its 
commitments under the Non-proliferation Treaty and to eliminate its nuclear weapons 
program in a verifiable manner’.102 On 14 November 2002, KEDO effectively ended the 
AF by suspending the delivery of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK, announcing that ‘future 
shipments will depend on North Koreas concrete and credible actions to dismantle 
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completely its highly-enriched uranium program’.103 In response on 12 December 2002, 
the DPRK announced that it would immediately resume operation of its nuclear 
facilities and construction of nuclear facilities that had been frozen. The DPRK then 
went on to break the safeguards agreement and expel IAEA inspectors
104 
and appeared 
to restart the plutonium based programme that had been bottled up by the AF. 
 
 
On 11 January 2003 NK resumed its withdrawal from the NPT initiated in 1993 arguing 
that it was a self-defence measure due to ‘the ever-intensifying United States hostile 
policy and pressure on the DPRK’.105 The IAEA initially called upon the DPRK to re-
establish the safeguard measures
106
 before eventually on 12 February referring the issue 
to the UN Security Council.
107
 The US approach to this crisis was to seek a multilateral 
approach through ‘six-party talks’.108 Again the administration was conflicted over 
whether to negotiate or add more pressure.  
 
At the first round of talks the US representative Jim Kelly stated the ‘immediate purpose 
is to ensure that the North Korean nuclear program is eliminated in a complete, 
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verifiable and irreversible manner’.109 Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement 
(CVID) became the focus of US policy within Bush the first administration.
110
 
However, there were often disagreements over its utility.
111
 The rigidness of a policy 
tied to CVID limited the room for manoeuvre of the first administration, as Ambassador 
DeTrani points out ‘the first administration was very consistent on the highly enriched 
Uranium programme - Comprehensive, Verifiable, Irreversible, dismantlement.  There 
was much more flexibility in the second administration’.112 The former British 
Ambassador to NK, David Slinn also points out NK’s resistance to CVID commenting:  
The North Korean system is hostile to the idea of transparency. It 
has repeatedly shown itself reluctant to accept any intrusive verification by 
external organisations. The Bush administration recognized that the 
gulf between what Washington would demand and what Pyongyang would be 
prepared to accept was so wide it was not worth trying for an agreement. The 
North Koreans would probably have not been prepared to go further than 
declarations, the US would, perhaps understandably given 
past experience of dealing with Pyongyang, have insisted on intrusive 
verification.
113
 
 
 
With no movement on NK, Bush’s policy within the second administration effectively 
U turned and sought to emulate the AF
114
; as pointed out by Dr Eberstadt ‘the US was 
caught by surprise, was reactive, and of course the government made a 180 degree turn 
in its last 2 years trying to fashion a successful appeasement policy for the DPRK’.115 
The vehicle for the policy continued to be the six party talks maintaining an aim of 
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‘verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’.116 There was also a change of 
negotiators with Christopher Hill, who had previous experience in negotiating in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, being appointed.  
 
The US also applied additional pressure through financial sanctions. On the 15 
September the US Department of the Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia as a 
‘primary money laundering concern’ under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act.  
Stating that ‘Banco Delta Asia has been a willing pawn for the North Korean 
government to engage in corrupt financial activities’.117 The importance of this act is 
explained by former member of the Bush administration, Rademaker: 
The policy of sanctioning Banco Delta Asia hit a raw nerve. Technically what 
happened was that North Korea’s money in the bank was not frozen by the 
United States. There was North Korean controlled money in Macao, and by 
sanctioning that bank, the money became too hot and they could not transfer it, 
so basically the money became frozen. My impression was that lives were on the 
line in NK. I actually think people would have died if the money had not gotten 
unstuck, so it was powerful tool.
118
 
 
Four days after the announcement, on the 19 September 2005 NK signed the Joint 
Statement that committed them to ‘abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards’119 in exchange for economic assistance, 
energy assurances and ultimately normalisation of relations and discussions over the 
provision of a light water reactor.
120
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However, the agreement soon collapsed as NK did not move on dismantling its facilities 
and became increasingly aggressive in their demand that the US return the funds frozen 
or they would withdraw from the six party talks
121
 as described by Rademaker: 
I knew the North Koreans would become hysterical--I didn’t know how 
hysterical--and it would seriously undermine the diplomacy he {Chris Hill} was 
trying to undertake. If he understood that when he signed off on it, it was not 
evident. For the next year and half it became the central issue in Hill’s 
negotiations, and in the end returning the money was the key to making 
headway. No other bank would transfer the money, so it was transferred to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, as they were the only ones who 
could be sure they would not be sanctioned for handling North Korean money. I 
don’t think we appreciated that the use of this legal authority would freeze the 
money in Banco Delta Asia. This authority had certainly never used in context 
of proliferation. We thought it was about forcing the bank to cut its ties with 
NK, not putting the bank out of business. But in effect it froze the money, 
because other banks thought if they took the money they would be sanctioned 
too.  In the end, there was no middle man willing to handle the money.
122
 
 
The DPRK did have the funds eventually released on 19 March 2007
123
, having them 
returned via the federal reserve with what Ambassador DeTrani states was the intent of 
‘signalling to the world that it was ok for the world’s banks to do business with them, 
even though the US banking system was not doing business with them.’124 However, 
many view this as a critical mistake by the US as pointed out by Chuck Downs: 
It was really a terribly critical point in our long negotiations with NK, where we 
had finally found something non-hostile, non-military--not a person would have 
died on either side--yet we had them.  We had curtailed their access to ill-gotten 
money around the world, and our negotiator did not see any benefit to this 
situation other than to give their leverage back to them.
125
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NK further increased the tension in July 2006 test firing missiles over Japan, this 
resulted in the UNSCR 1695 that demanded ‘that the DPRK suspend all activities 
related to its ballistic missile programme, and in this context re-establish its pre-existing 
commitments to a moratorium on missile launching’.126 The resolution also strongly 
urged ‘the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition’127 
something they were unwilling to do until their money had been returned.  
NK in response to the UNSC resolution argued that it was the:  
The vicious hostile policy of the United States towards the DPRK and the 
irresponsibility of the UN Security Council have created an extremely dangerous 
situation on the Korean Peninsula where the sovereignty of the Korean nation 
and the security of the state have been seriously infringed……. The U.S. 
extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel the DPRK to 
conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering nuclear deterrent, as a 
corresponding measure for defence.
 128
 
 
Furthermore the NK warned the UN that it was about to conduct a nuclear test. In 
response the UNSC urged ‘the DPRK not to undertake such a test and to refrain from 
any action that might aggravate tension’.129 However, on the 9 October 2006 NK 
conducted a test, thus ending in failure US attempts to prevent it attaining a nuclear 
weapon.  
 
The US political objective throughout was that the DPRK did not attain a nuclear 
weapon. However, as will be examined in more depth the strategy adopted varied 
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between the first and second administrations. The actual demands made of NK by the 
US are as follows: 
 
1. Abolish comprehensibly and permanently all nuclear development activities 
(made by Jim Kelly on 23 April 2003) 
2. Present concrete means for verification of compliance with that request. (made by 
Jim Kelly on 23 April 2003).
130
 
3. Conform to Joint Statement (2005). 
4. Return to six party talks (2006). 
5. Do not conduct nuclear test. 
 
Determination of the form of coercive diplomacy that was adopted 
AQ 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his 
objectives quickly with little cost? 
 
As covered in previous episode the US had a history of threatening NK with both 
conventional and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, under the Clinton administration the 
states had come to the brink of military conflict. Therefore, NK always had to assume 
that there was always the possibility that the US would use force to back a demand.  
After 9/11 the President identified NK as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ and then went on to 
state ‘I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America 
will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most 
destructive weapons’.131 Furthermore, US Vice President Dick Cheney reportedly said 
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of NK, ‘We don’t negotiate with evil.  We defeat it’.132 Moreover, the President told the 
Chinese President that ‘if we could not solve the problem diplomatically, I would have 
to consider a military strike against NK’.133 
 
President Bush did strike a more peaceful note occasionally stating that the US had ‘no 
intention of invading NK…….my comments about evil was toward a regime, toward a 
government, not toward the North Korean people’.134 However, there was clearly still a 
threat to the regime itself implied within this statement.  Moreover, it was not long 
before aggressive statements were made such as: 
We will not tolerate nuclear weapons in NK. We will not give into blackmail. 
We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
elimination of NK's nuclear weapons program.
135
  
 
It was not just the rhetoric; the US poured the same kind of statements at fellow member 
of the ‘axis of evil’ Iraq, which it then invaded. Allegedly the invasion prompted Kim 
Jong-Il to move to a military base for 90 days fearing that NK was next.
136
 The invasion 
demonstrated that the US was willing to act upon the notion of pre-emptive self-defence 
and highlighted its superior war fighting capability as pointed out by a US retired senior 
military officer: 
In the case of Iraq it was certainly this notion of pre-emptive self defence – we 
have talked it about a lot then we acted. So I think a lot of people thought we 
could be next.  I don’t know if I can recall any specific reactions, but I can 
remember reading some of the Intel at the time, especially around the middle 
east where a great deal of notice was given. So I am sure that got noticed in 
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places like NK, especially when see the kind of warfare it was, in terms of 
combat operations it was pretty remarkable frankly.
137
 
 
However, a direct threat to use military force to back any of the US demands was not 
made.  
 
During the initial stages of the second administration, the policy was the six party talks 
and the implied threats decreased. This did change prior to NK’s nuclear test with 
Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor, stating on 15 May 2005 that ‘if that 
{nuclear test} is really launched, the United States must take action.’138 This was 
backed by the US government announcing that it had transferred fifteen Stealth bombers 
to South Korea.
139
 During a press conference when pressed about the response to an 
imminent NK nuclear test the President stated: 
If NK were to conduct a test, it's just a constant reminder for people in the 
neighbourhood, in particular, that NK poses a threat. And we expect our friends 
and those sitting around the table with us to act in such a manner as to help rid 
the world of the threat.
140
 
 
Implied threats were also made through the UNSC stating that 
A nuclear test, if carried out by the DPRK, would represent a clear threat to 
international peace and security and that should the DPRK ignore calls of the 
international community, the Security Council will act consistent with its 
responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations.
141
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However, after NK announced its first nuclear test the President clearly emphasised that 
diplomacy, not military action, was the primary approach stating ‘we'll continue 
working to make sure that we give diplomacy a full opportunity to succeed’142 and that 
it was ‘very important for us to solve these problems diplomatically’.143   
 
The Bush administration made clear threats towards NK within the first administration 
and prior to the nuclear test. President Bush told China that he may have to consider 
military action, a threat he must have known would reach NK ears. Furthermore, the 
invasion of Iraq, another member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ along with the rhetoric must have 
given the DPRK regime the feeling of being threatened.  However, for most of the 
second administration the rhetoric died down. Therefore it is taken that this element 
does partially conform to the ideal policy.  
  
AQ 3 - Was a deadline for compliance offered? 
There was no specific deadline given to back any of the demands; at best the ‘Try and 
See’ approach was applied. The DPRK on several occasions trampled over the line 
without consequence. When NK admitted to reprocessing rods in 2002 no response was 
given
144
, even though this almost led the Clinton administration to conduct a pre-
emptive strike in 1992. When NK conducted nuclear tests, in defiance of the 2005 Joint 
statement and US demands, the President emphasised that issue was to be resolved 
‘peacefully through diplomatic means’.145 Therefore, as there was no threat of returning 
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to a prior crisis at the end of any negotiations or set time to comply with a demand, it is 
taken that this does not conform to the ideal policy. 
 
AQ 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands? 
The DPRK was not given an assurance that further demands would not follow. 
However, the 2005 Joint Statement, like the AF, set out the path for NK to take and the 
demands they were to comply with. Therefore, it can be taken that there was an 
assurance that no future demands would be made. If the US did make more demands 
this would have broken the agreement. This element conforms partially to the ideal 
policy. 
 
AQ 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance?            
During the first administration the US did approach NK with the intention of offering 
‘economic and political steps to improve the lives of the North Korean people’146 
however the confirming of the HEU programme soon squashed this, and rather than the 
quid pro quo approach of the AF, the approach was very much that rewards would only 
be received once CVID had been achieved.    
  
The incentives offered by the second administration were economic assistance, security 
pledges and a move towards improved relations.
147
 Furthermore, through the Banco 
Delta Asia the US held a clear pressure point that could be utilised to incentivise the 
regime. However, the position of the lead negotiator was that it was a ‘financial 
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regulatory action and not a subject appropriate for discussion at the Six-Party Talks’.148  
Then at a later date, after the first nuclear test, the US leveraged the funds to be returned 
without any notable reciprocity from NK. Therefore, an element that could have been 
used to persuade NK was given up for very little return. Although the US could have 
made more of the latter, there was clearly incentives offered for NK to comply, 
therefore, this element conforms to that of the ideal policy.  
 
Evaluation of the implementation of the ideal policy and coercive diplomacy applied 
The coercive diplomacy applied by the US within this episode does not conform to that 
of the ideal policy. There were threats that a NK nuclear weapon would not be 
‘tolerated’ or that it was a threat that the US and friends would ‘rid the world of’ which 
combined with the invasion of Iraq, clearly could be taken by NK that it could be next.  
However, there was no deadline given for when any of these threats would be 
undertaken. There was an assurance implied of what was demanded within the 2005 
Joint Statement and the US did offer incentives, although arguable the biggest incentive 
the releasing of funds was given for little in return.   
 
AQ 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war? 
Although the US clearly made implied threats that after the invasion of Iraq NK could 
be next, as time went on the DPRK either did not believe the threat to be credible or was 
willing to risk a war. The initial threat and invasion may have aided in persuading them 
to enter 6 Party Talks in April 2003. However, whether at the time taking part in these 
talks was a delaying tactic until they could develop a nuclear weapon capable of 
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deterring the US or a genuine desire to partially comply rather than risk going to war is 
unclear.    
 
AQ 7 – Did the opponent act rationally, miscalculate or suffer from 
misperception? 
The DPRK’s actions were rational if the goal was preserving the regime as its actions 
continued its grip on power. Viewed through the prism of realism NK’s logic would 
seem to be rational. For example the DPRK stated:  
A people without reliable war deterrent are bound to meet a tragic death and the 
sovereignty of their country is bound to be wantonly infringed upon. This is a 
bitter lesson taught by the bloodshed resulting from the law of the jungle in 
different parts of the world.
149
 
 
Furthermore that:  
The DPRK's nuclear weapons will serve as reliable war deterrent for protecting 
the supreme interests of the state and the security of the Korean nation from the 
U.S. threat of aggression and averting a new war and firmly safeguarding peace 
and stability on the Korean peninsula under any circumstances.
150
 
 
This logic conforms to realism argument that in an anarchical system; states cannot rely 
on anyone for the means to ensure their own survival. Therefore, seeking a nuclear 
deterrent would seem to be logical, particularly when feeling threatened by the worlds 
remaining superpower. Ambassador Laney argues NK was a rational actor stating:   
When President George W. Bush linked North Korea with Iran and Iraq as the 
Axis of Evil, and then invaded Iraq, it gave them incentive to build bombs and 
make it too costly to take them down.  I think what they have tried to do is make 
it virtually impossible for us to go to war with them without exacting enormous 
costs.  That for them is a rational policy.
151
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However, this logic also leads to why the US would threaten the regime as expressed by 
Dr Eberstadt: 
The imperative of becoming a nuclear state is so central to NK policy making it 
may never have been viable to imagine that the NK would voluntarily relinquish 
the nuclear option, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction the option 
or possibility of threatening the US with nuclear weapons, are in a sense the 
keys to the kingdom for regime survival for the DPRK, and governments don’t 
negotiate away their presumed means for survival. Why I always thought the 
solution to NK is a new government.
152
 
 
 
NK does appear to have made some tactical miscalculations; admitting to Jim Kelly in 
2002 that they had a HEU programme was perhaps one. It is possible they were looking 
to raise the stakes to gain a reward; however, this clearly risked the aid and fuel they 
were already receiving through the AF.
153
 Furthermore, if they had not mentioned the 
HEU, it may have been possible to continue the programme for longer whilst receiving 
‘carrots’ that the US claimed it was ready to offer them.   
 
A vague admittance to an HEU programme may have been made with the calculation 
that US hardliners would use it to break the AF; therefore NK could appear justified in 
leaving the NPT and restarting its plutonium programme which was more likely to lead 
to a bomb. However, there is no evidence that supports this hypothesis, and even if true 
it would not have been rational to risk the rewards being received through the AF.  
There is of course the possibility that they did not admit to the HEU, but elements of the 
US administration, interpreted NK diplomat’s words in a way that suited their agenda to 
end the AF; therefore, a miscalculation by the US not NK.   
 
Another possible miscalculation was the decision to fire missiles over Japan after 
signing the Joint Statement of 2005. The September statement promised the DPRK 
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similar incentives as the AF. Firing the missiles contributed to destroying the agreement 
and gained them little. The weapon did demonstrate that NK had a delivery system for a 
nuclear warhead. It also put them back on to the international agenda and potentially 
embarrassed the US administration. It may also have been an attempt by NK to 
pressurise the US to release the funds frozen in the Banco Delta Asia, which were 
returned in 2007. 
 
 Although making some minor miscalculations the regime did appear to act rationally 
with its objective of regime survival. 
 
AQ 8 - Does credible implementation of the ideal policy lead to compliance? 
The ideal policy was not applied in this case therefore this question cannot be answered. 
 
AQ 9 - Does failure to implement the ideal policy leads to non-compliance? 
The ideal policy was not implemented and the DPRK did not comply with the demands 
made by the US. However, whether adopting a policy of coercive diplomacy that 
contained all of the elements of the ideal policy would have led to compliance is 
difficult to assess, as it may be that no policy could have been implemented that 
prevented the DPRK attaining a nuclear weapon. As pointed out by Dr Fitzpatrick ‘NK 
was determined to have nuclear weapons which, in a nutshell, is why it failed’.154   
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AQ 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be 
carried out? 
There was a threat but there was still no compliance. NK feared the US would 
emasculate them in the same manner that it did to Saddam. On April 6, 2003, a 
spokesperson for NK’s Foreign Ministry stated: 
The Iraqi war shows that to allow disarming through inspection does not help 
avert the war but rather sparks it...Only a physical deterrence force, a 
tremendous military-deterrence force powerful enough to decisively beat back 
an attack....can avert war and protect the security of the country and nation.  This 
is a drawn from the Iraqi war.
155
 
 
NK also expressed to Japan their fear of the US.
156
 In a confidential diplomatic 
exchange between China and the US, China pointed out that Pyongyang was deeply 
anxious about the possibility of a military threat’.157 The NK themselves claimed that 
‘we can dismantle our nuclear program if the U.S. makes a switchover in its hostile 
policy towards us and does not pose any threat to us’.158 However, rather than coerce 
NK it would appear that the threat drove them on, as they saw nuclear weapons as the 
only viable way to deter the US.    
 
The DPRK also had the know how to develop a nuclear weapon. It would have 
developed several plutonium based weapons by the end of the 1990s, but dismantled 
this programme after signing the AF. It may have believed that with the US 
overstretched in Iraq in late 2003, that it had a couple of years to attain nuclear 
weapons, before the US could gain the domestic support to launch another invasion. 
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EPISODE 2 - WILL TO THREATEN AND USE FORCE 
This section will now examine whether Jakobsen’s patterns explain why President Bush 
was willing to initially threaten the use of force.  
 
The nature of the threatened interests. 
Bush identified three threats emanating from a nuclear armed NK.  Firstly, it ‘threatened 
two US allies – South Korea and Japan’. Secondly it ‘could potentially reach America’s 
West Coast’. Thirdly, they would sell their nuclear technology and knowhow.159 
 
As with the Clinton administration, NK conventional forces already posed a significant 
threat to SK, therefore, a deterrence posture based on conventional forces and US 
nuclear weapons was already in place. Attainment of a nuclear weapon would increase 
the North’s power and arguably its incentive to attack. However, the US would retaliate 
to any NK nuclear attack on either ROK or Japan. Therefore, the deterrence posture 
would still be in effect. However, it would be the first time that Japan would have felt 
threatened by NK, but as long as both these states believed in the US nuclear umbrella it 
would be logical to assume that deterrence would remain intact. NK may have postured 
more and made conventional threats, calculating that they could deter the US from any 
action if they had a weapon. But as the ROK had superior conventional forces this 
approach is unlikely to gain them much. 
 
The real concern for the US is that a nuclear NK forced it to remain committed to 
providing a nuclear umbrella and assurance to its allies. If it was deterrence based on 
only conventional forces, the US could leave the bulk of this to ROK and Japan; 
allowing the US to withdraw. However, if Japan or SK doubted the US resolve to 
retaliate after a NK nuclear strike, or believed that the DPRK doubted the US resolve to 
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retaliate on their behalf, they would be under pressure to develop their own nuclear 
weapon capability. This would seriously undermine US counter-proliferation policy and 
credibility worldwide. This view was emphasised by Robert Joseph: 
Clearly if we fail in NK, if we fail in Iran, there will be more proliferation.  
Whether it will bankrupt the NPT, I don’t know.  But it will certainly move in 
that direction. There will be a number of countries – friends and adversaries -- 
that will reassess. This is especially the case if the US does not provide a 
credible nuclear guarantee. If our guarantee is questioned by our friends and 
allies, the effect will be to undermine our non-proliferation objectives.
160
 
 
 
Of course there was a possibility that if NK collapsed that a paranoid and irrational 
leader could decide to launch a nuclear attack on its neighbours knowing it was an act of 
suicide, or use it on his own people.  
 
A more likely and threatening scenario for the US and NK’s neighbours is that the 
DPRK collapsed and nuclear weapons would find their way into the hand of terrorists 
and other rogue states. This possibility gives the US a dilemma in how to deal with a 
nuclear armed NK; is it better to maintain the DPRK regime in order to avoid its 
collapse and the possibility of rogue nukes? But in doing so reward proliferation which 
could encourage others, or contain and pressurise the regime to surrender its nuclear 
weapons; risking the possibility of an uncontrolled collapse and proliferation. Clearly if 
the DPRK could be prevented from attaining nuclear weapons it would stop the US 
having to face this dilemma. 
 
There remained the threat that NK would sell on nuclear technology. The Bush 
administration suspected that NK had aided Libya
161
 and Syria with their nuclear 
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programme.
162
 Therefore, a nuclear NK clearly posed a threat to US counter-
proliferation policy. 
 
A DPRK nuclear weapon did not pose a direct threat to the US during the Bush 
administration. Theoretically NK had missiles that could reach Alaska. The technology 
was far from proven, as a failed missile launch over Japan proved. However, the threat 
was an area of debate as pointed out by a senior member of the first Bush 
administration: 
In 99/98 there was an intelligence estimate put out and the CIA concluded that it 
would be several years before NK had the capability to hit the United States, 
Senator Kyle went nuts and said they had politicised the intelligence to fit the 
Clinton administration. I was put on a committee with Bob Gates, a republican, 
to look at it and we looked at it for a month and came up with the same 
conclusion. Kyle put his own team together called the Rumsfeld commission 
and they said by 2001 NK would have the ability, they still don’t have the 
targeting ability.
163
 
 
Jack David also points out that ‘At the time North Korea was taken as a threat to our 
allies, Japan and South Korea. It was envisaged that North Korea might eventually hit 
the US mainland or Hawaii. But the main concerns were worry about troops in the area, 
our allies, the instability North Korea could cause and the importance of that area to our 
trade’.164 However, the risk posed by being able hit the US is that it would enable the 
North to effectively threaten SK and Japan as explained by Ambassador Joseph: 
There is not going to be a deliberate first strike as we thought about it in the 
Cold war.  That is not what this is about in their calculations. This is about 
deterring the United States from coming to the assistance of South Korea in the 
event of an attack by the North by holding U.S. cities hostage.  North Korean 
planners may believe that the U.S. will be deterred even if they use chemical or 
biological weapons on the peninsula.  They have these weapons and would 
likely use them.  They know that, if they go conventional against conventional, 
they lose.
165
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A nuclear armed NK was not an imminent threat to the existence of the US. The danger 
was that allies started to doubt the US guarantee of a ‘nuclear umbrella’ and develop 
their own nuclear weapons. This would threaten US damage US counter-proliferation 
policy globally. Therefore as the US had strategic interests within the region this 
element is coded high. 
 
The prospects of military success. 
 
The US and ROK clearly had a quantitative and qualitative advantage over the DPRK in 
2002.
166
 Therefore, it was highly likely that in a full scale war the US and ROK would 
win. But the ROK, not the US was the key war fighter and also the state that would 
receive the most significant casualties; therefore, any military action would need their 
permission. The US would also need Japanese support as US troops would have been 
surged through their country. However, as in all warfare there is always the possibility 
that NK would be willing to take more punishment than its opponents. As pointed out 
by Cordesman: 
The DPRK‘s ideological hostility to the ROK and the US could lead Pyongyang 
to escalate in ways that are unpredictable and make a ―rational bargainer 
approach to scenario planning and predicting escalation highly uncertain 
because the perceptions of both sides can differ so much in any given 
scenario.
167
 
 
Therefore, even if likely to lose the DPRK may escalate in the belief that the threshold 
of pain that its opponents were willing to take was far less, and that they would submit 
first. Furthermore, the Iraq War and operations in Afghanistan clearly decreased the 
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number of forces that US could deploy; but even the ROK forces on their own would 
most likely win a full scale war with a non-nuclear NK.  
A factor that had changed since 1994 was that the amount of support that NK could call 
upon. China’s military and political ambitions steadily increased throughout the 90s 
giving it more influence. Furthermore, whereas in 1994 ROK President Kim Young-
Sam took an extremely hard line towards the DPRK, in 2003 President Roh Moo-hyon 
seemed to be accommodating NK.
168
 Therefore, consent for any military operation was 
less likely than 1994. 
 
Even a pre-emptive strike was more difficult than in 1994 as in 2003 it was not clear 
where the HEU program was being developed.
169
 There was no guarantee of destroying 
the programme or even threatening to destroy the programme by naming where it was 
located. The DPRK also had an enhanced counter coercion capability with 200 Rodong 
missiles deployed that could strike the ROK or Japan.
170
 Furthermore, any pre-emptive 
strike would most likely have led to a counter strike by NK who would have seen it as 
an attack on the regime not a counter-proliferation action. Therefore, any military action 
would have risked escalating to a full scale war which was estimated ‘could entail 
economic costs of $1 trillion and result in one million casualties’.171 
 
As it was unclear where the DPRK’s nuclear programme was the prospect of success 
was unclear. Furthermore, any military action had a high risk of escalating and 
becoming costly in terms of casualties. Therefore the prospects of military success for 
the objective of destroying NK programme are deemed to be ‘low’.  
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The level of domestic support 
If the case had been put forward to conduct a pre-emptive strike in late 2002, when NK 
announced that it was restarting its plutonium programme and broke its safeguards, it is 
most likely it would have been widely debated with an equal measure of proponents and 
opponents. However, at that point the Bush administration was highly focussed on 
dealing with Iraq. After the war in Iraq started to become a prolonged COIN operation, 
there would have been little domestic support for another highly risky intervention into 
a foreign country, especially one likely to have even greater casualties, over the issue of 
WMD. Therefore, for a small window between November 2002 (NK breaking of 
safeguards) to late 2003 (when the insurgency in Iraq started) the domestic support is 
coded medium.  However, from late 2003 war onwards it is coded as ‘low’. 
 
AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten 
and use force? 
The US through the Chinese could be seen to directly threaten the use of force, even 
though none of the patterns conform to the hypothesised patterns. From the resumption 
NK programme in late 2002 to the start of the insurgency in Iraq war in late 2003 it is 
assessed that the US national interest in preventing a nuclear weapons programme was 
high, the chances of military success were low and domestic support would have been 
medium. This pattern is not one that is predicted to lead to states threatening the use of 
force. However, if the chances of success of military force had been coded one higher 
(medium) then this would have conformed to an interest driven pattern that would 
indicate the willingness to threaten force. Therefore, it is possible that the US forces 
believed they could win with little cost.   
 
216 
 
However, once the insurgency starts in Iraq and the invasion loses domestic support, it 
is highly likely that any suggestion of intervening in NK would have been vehemently 
opposed domestically. Therefore, through the logic Jakobsen patterns the lack of 
success of the Iraq war would suggest that the government would be even less inclined 
to issue threats of force against NK’s nuclear programme. 
 
This does conform to an extent with the empirical evidence. Although the US did use 
threatening language towards NK it did not actively consider surging troops into the 
country or conducting a pre-emptive strike in the manner of the Clinton administration.  
The most threatening rhetoric was made 2002 to 2003. As the Iraq war moved into an 
intensive COIN phase (late 2003) the Bush approach became fully vested in the 6 party 
talks established April 2003 to deal with the issue of NK diplomatically.
172
 As pointed 
out by Douglas Feith “the fact that the Iraq war went badly affected U.S. policy. It made 
the U.S. less willing to consider using military action in other contexts, for example, 
North Korea. In any event, I don’t think any American president would give serious 
consideration to military action against any country until after all means short of war 
have been exhausted”.173   
 
Therefore, what Jakobsen’s patterns perhaps shows is that although there was clearly 
threatening language, that to NK must have constituted a threat, as Iraq deteriorated the 
Bush administration was actually unlikely to use force against the DPRK. This may 
have been the DPRK calculation when they decided to attain a weapon.  
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AQ 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to 
threaten and use force? 
As discussed in Q11, although the patterns indicate there should have been no threat to 
use force, the Bush administration did issue threats. However, what this perhaps 
demonstrates is that the rhetoric was not deemed credible by NK. 
    
AQ 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from 
leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important 
interests are threatened? 
There was no coalitional threat to use force. Clearly Seoul had more to fear a nuclear 
armed NK than anyone as it calculated that it would place them at a military 
disadvantage.
174
 However, the South adopted the Sunshine policy that aimed to lessen 
the confrontation between the Koreas and remained committed to the AF.
175
 Therefore, 
it would not support any aggressive US posture.  The difficulty with this approach was 
highlighted by Jack David who at the time was Deputy Secretary of Defence: 
It was amusing to meet with the South Korean military and officials, in the 
context of preparing for a war where the North Koreans might use Chemical 
weapons in particular or North Koreans, to talk about that whilst the official 
position was not to talk about war with NK. So, South Korea was an impediment 
in that respect, but at the end of the day it is their peninsula not ours.
176
 
 
There were also reports that after the North protested over the term CVID during six 
party talks, that the South requested the US refrain from using the term.
177
 The South 
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also clearly disagreed with the US at times on how the six party talks should be 
conducted.
178
 SK also took the Libyan model as a framework believing that nuclear 
dismantlement would occur if diplomatic normalisation was realistically worked 
towards. Furthermore, that as with Libya what was required was quiet diplomacy 
through SK and Japan.
179
 
 
Japan also shared a clear interest with the US and the ROK in preventing a nuclear 
DPRK.
180
 Furthermore, it was a strong partner to the US as demonstrated by its 
deployment of Self-Defence Forces to Iraq.
181
 Therefore, it was largely willing to follow 
the US lead. 
  
China’s interests conflicted with that of the US, as Bush pointed out: 
The Chinese wanted stability; we wanted freedom. They were worried about 
refugees flowing across the border; we were worried about starvation and human 
rights. But there was one area where we agreed: It was not in either of our 
interests to let Kim Jong-Il have a nuclear weapon.
182
 
 
Furthermore, Bush clearly implied that it was the threat of US force against NK that 
persuaded China to push for the six-party talks.
183
 China had privately pointed out that it 
shared the US goal to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons on the peninsula and 
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that this did not ‘sit well’ with NK.184 However, as pointed out by a former UK 
ambassador to the DPRK: 
China still considers it in its strategic interest to maintain NK as a buffer to 
South Korea and the US troops based there. China has shown itself prepared to 
take some political heat to defend that interest, for example at the UNSC, and 
the chances are that it will continue to provide political and material support to 
North Korea until China decides that it no longer needs that strategic buffer.
185
 
The US clearly recognised this role and repeatedly urged China to ‘to use its 
considerable influence with NK to make meaningful progress toward a Korean 
Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons’.186  
 
US leadership and shared interests were essential in forming the six-party talks.  
However, there was no appetite, or even consideration, among either ROK or PRC to 
use the threat of force to achieve their shared objective of a NK without nuclear 
weapons. The ROK was not willing to risk the escalation to a full war that a more 
aggressive posture could initiate. China was concerned that more pressure could lead to 
the collapse and instability that could spread across their border.  
 
AQ 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when 
none of the above conditions are met? 
Although there was the shared goal and US leadership, the ROK and PRC were not 
willing to risk a war that could lead to instability within the region. 
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AQ 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise 
support for policies involving threats and use of force? 
The US threats towards NK did not reach a point where it was looked as though an 
imminent strike would be conducted or a decision to possibly seek legitimacy through 
the UN. The UNSC did pass resolution 1695 that strongly urged that: 
The DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondition, to 
work towards the expeditious implementation of 19 September 2005 Joint 
Statement, in particular to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programmes, and to return at an early date to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
187
 
 
This was clearly not a threat of force. It is highly likely that any UNSC resolution 
stronger than this would have been vetoed by China. 
 
AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to 
develop nuclear weapons?        
The threat posed by the US was certainly stated by the NK as a justification for why 
they needed to develop a nuclear weapon. Therefore, on face value it would appear 
more threats actually increased their motivation to attain a nuclear weapon. However as 
pointed out by Joseph; perceived threats like ‘they could be next after Iraq’ may have 
had an affect but ‘did they do anything differently no, but it does feed their sense that 
nuclear weapons are essential for deterrence.  But they had that sense before; it just adds 
to it’.188 
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CONCLUSION 
Table 4.1 shows the key findings of this chapter. 
 
The political objective throughout the Clinton administration was to prevent the DPRK 
obtaining a nuclear weapon. This was done through a series of escalating demands; that 
brought the crisis to the brink of war in 1994, as NK looked set to walk over a US red 
line and move fuel rods to re-processing installation without supervision of the IAEA. 
This led to Clinton considering a pre-emptive strike and reinforcing SK in order to deter 
any NK attack that might occur in response to further UN sanctions. The Carter 
intervention de-escalated the situation, but there remained the underlying threat that the 
crisis could return to the brink of war. The US had demonstrated that it was not willing 
to back down even if it risked war. Therefore, a return to the crisis, and the implicit 
threat of force that implied was ever present throughout the negotiations that led to the 
AF. 
 
The strategy of coercive diplomacy that was applied throughout this episode was further 
complicated by several actors (DPRK, ROK, US, IAEA, UN and Japan) with slightly 
differing agenda; but at the centre throughout was the US. It was the threat of US 
military action similar to that of the Gulf War that concerned NK and compelled them 
to enter talks leading to the AF. It was the assurances contained within the AF that 
mapped out what the reciprocal the US action would be if they met key demands. 
  Threat 
to use 
force 
Deadline 
given 
Assurance 
given 
Incentives 
offered 
Ideal 
policy 
Predicted 
outcome 
of CD 
Actual 
outcome 
of CD 
Will to 
threaten 
and use 
of force? 
Impact of org. 
NK 
Ep.1  
Yes No-
implied 
Partial Yes No Failure Success No Negative 
NK  
Ep.2  
Partial 
– Yes 
at first 
No Partial Yes No Failure Failure No No impact 
Table 4.1 
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However, these assurances did not go far as saying there would not be further demands. 
It was the incentives of a LWR and heavy oil that the US promised NK that induced 
them. Although there were implied deadlines of the end of programmed AF talks, at no 
point was there a hard deadline backed with the threat of force set; therefore, the form 
of coercive diplomacy adopted did not conform to the ideal policy.  
 
The Carter intervention was pivotal to the crisis as it provided a way out for NK that 
enabled it to save face. The DPRK did not want to enter a war that it must have known 
it would lose, but could see no way of complying without the regime losing face. 
Therefore, it was willing to go to war, even if it was likely to lose. Having studied the 
Gulf War, NK perhaps believed that the US would only conduct a pre-emptive strike or 
limited campaign. Pyongyang then could sell such an action to their domestic audience 
as an example of ‘Western aggression’ and claim victory if the US did not commit to a 
full invasion and regime change. Assuming that NK key objective was regime survival 
its actions were rational. Obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent or a 
bargaining chip to trade for the resources and money it required to exist.  
 
There was clearly a willingness to threaten force by the US; although Jakobsen’s 
patterns predicted there should not have been. There are several explanations for why 
Jakobsen’s patterns and US willingness to threaten force do not align. Firstly, 
Jakobsen’s logic could be wrong and states may in fact willing to go into a costly war 
over an issue that does not affect vital interest, would are controversial domestically, 
and possible would not succeed. It could be the US saw the credibility of its counter-
proliferation policy as essential to its long term survival; however, this would lead to the 
US threatening the use of force over other proliferation issues. Another possibility is 
that the US was gambling that the deployment of US troops would not lead NK to 
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escalate to a point of engaging in a war that it could not win. Clearly if the surge did 
cause an escalation it would have been a significant US miscalculation. It may be that 
the US felt that it had no option, as if it did not seek a UNSC resolution, surge troops to 
deter NK, it would be viewed as a ‘paper tiger’ and would have lost credibility globally. 
Therefore, it was caught in an escalatory cycle with NK.  
 
Although coercive diplomacy was successful in achieving the AF, it was not the grand 
strategy required to bring NK further into the IC and sort out the underlying issues that 
initiated the crisis. However, it is not a failure necessary of coercive diplomacy that the 
AF fell apart in 2003, but of US ability to form a longer term policy towards NK. 
 
The Bush administration also started with the objective that the DPRK did not attain a 
nuclear weapon. However, the strategy adopted varied between the first and second 
administrations. The US made clear threats towards NK. President Bush told China that 
he may have to consider military action, a threat he must have known would reach NK 
ears. Furthermore, the invasion of Iraq, another member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ along with 
the rhetoric must have given the DPRK regime the feeling of being threatened; 
however, as the Iraq War moved into an intensive COIN phase (late 2003) the Bush 
approach became fully vested in the 6 party talks which were established in April 2003 
to deal with the issue of NK diplomatically.
189
  
 
The US willingness to imply threats publicly and directly privately did not conform to 
Jakobsen’s hypothesised patterns either. From the resumption of NK plutonium 
programme in late 2002 to the start of the insurgency in Iraq war in late 2003 it is 
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assessed that force should not have been threatened as it would have been difficult to 
succeed at low cost. Furthermore, once the insurgency starts in Iraq and domestic 
support for any intervention declines, it seems that threats should decline further.   
 
What Jakobsen’s patterns perhaps explain is that although there was clearly threatening 
language, that to the NK must have constituted a threat, the Bush administration was 
actually unlikely to use force against the DPRK or the US overestimated its ability to 
achieve a military objective in NK; reassessing only after Iraq started to deteriorate.   
What both NK episodes demonstrate is the difficulty in persuading an opponent who is 
determined that they need nuclear weapons for regime survival and has potent counter 
coercion capabilities in the form of military forces that although inferior could still 
cause significant damage particularly to vulnerable civilian targets. 
 
The next chapter will now conduct a more detailed structured focussed comparison of 
all the case episodes. 
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CHAPTER 5 – FOCUSSED STRUCTURED 
COMPARISON OF THE CASE STUDIES 
Within this chapter I will compare the case studies in a structured manner through 
application of the analytical questions, derived in Chapter 2 and used in the previous 
two chapters. Although it will raise some of the issues regarding the use of the ideal 
policy as a framework to conduct a comparative analysis, it will not conduct an in-depth 
critique of the ideal policy; that will occur in the concluding chapter. This chapter will 
be primarily focussed on the findings that emerge from the use of the ideal policy as a 
framework to conduct a comparative analysis.     
 
Table 5.1 shows the findings from the four episodes. Clearly four episodes is not a large 
enough data set to statistically validate a correlation between application of the ideal 
policy and outcome. However, it should be noted that in only 1 case did the predicted 
result occur (NK Ep.2). Although, even this finding does not offer any analytical value 
as failure to employ a range of different policies could lead to failure in achieving the 
objective. Furthermore, at no time did the US apply coercive diplomacy in the form of 
the ideal policy. 
 
  Threat 
to use 
force 
Deadline 
given 
Assurance 
given 
 
Incentives 
offered 
Ideal 
Policy 
Predicted 
outcome of 
CD 
Actual 
outcome 
of CD 
Will to 
threaten 
and use 
of force? 
Impact of 
org. 
Libya
Ep.1  
No Partial Partial Yes No Failure Partial 
Success 
Yes Sanctions 
only 
Libya 
Ep.2  
Yes No - 
implied 
Partial Yes No Failure Success Yes No impact 
NK 
Ep.1  
Yes No -
Implied  
Partial Yes No Failure Success No Negative 
NK  
Ep.2  
Partial 
– Yes 
at first 
No Partial Yes No Failure Failure No No impact 
Table 5.1  
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As the US did not apply the ideal policy in any of the episodes; I argue that applying the 
ideal policy to stop attainment of nuclear weapons is more difficult than applying it over 
acts of aggression. The prime reason for this is that it is difficult for a state to issue a 
demand backed by a clear deadline, especially one that will be backed by direct threat of 
force. Furthermore, although the policy objective was always clearly to prevent the 
target attaining nuclear weapons, there were other security issues that influenced the 
demands being made. The opponent’s development of a nuclear weapon is an abstract 
threat to the opponent until it is detected. Even upon detection the US did not view the 
threat, in the cases studied, as imminent. Therefore, issuing a deadline backed by force 
would possible have tied the coercer into having to act in order to maintain credibility 
rather than for the objective of achieving compliance with their demand.   
 
Another complication is that the dual nature of nuclear technology and the difficulty of 
categorically verifying that the opponent is seeking, or the stage of development of, a 
nuclear weapons capability leads to a strategic game between the two parties. The 
coercer issues incremental demands aimed to stop the known progression of the nuclear 
programme, whilst the coerced seeks to hide the extent of its military nuclear 
programme. Most likely the aim is to obtain a nuclear deterrent before a more coercive 
policy can be enacted or develop its capability to the point where maximum concessions 
can be drawn out of any diplomatic negotiations. This game further complicates the 
issuing of demands. For these reasons the strategy that seems to be adopted most 
frequently by the US is sanction based coercive diplomacy backed by an implied threat 
with no set deadline for compliance. 
 
I also argue that the lack of a clear deadline to comply with the demand of stop or undo 
the development of nuclear weapons often makes the line between coercive diplomacy 
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and deterrence blurred. NK was told that the development of nuclear weapons was a US 
red line. As they had already started their nuclear weapon this was a demand to stop 
(which a coercive diplomacy demand); however, it could be argued that if they had 
stopped it was because they did not act beyond the stated point that would initiate US 
action (which is a deterrent demand). The importance of this distinction is perhaps 
academic, as to policy makers it is purely applying what makes political/diplomatic 
sense at the time, and will be examined in more depth in the concluding chapter. 
 
The most interesting finding comes from an examination of the cases using 
Jakobsen’s criteria for when states should threaten force. The US was willing to take 
action that was a clear threat to NK and could have escalated to war when Jakobsen’s 
criteria predicted it should not have. Furthermore, in the case of Libya, Clinton did not  
make a threat when Jakobsen’s theory predicts he should have. This chapter will argue 
that these findings demonstrate that rationality can be analysed at different levels.  
Policy makers can act rationally to achieve their set objectives within the bounds of 
their perceived reality of the situation; however, a more distant examination presented 
with different information can find that they don’t conform to what would appear to be 
rational.  
 
I will now compare the selected cases using the analytical questions derived from 
Jakobsen’s ideal policy. 
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AQ 1 - What was the US policy objective and demand? 
 
Although always a clear policy objective that states stop their development of nuclear 
weapons, the actual demands made were often more complicated and often linked to 
other policy issues such as terrorism and general security issues.    
 
The demands that the Clinton administration issued to Libya were primarily over 
terrorism and the policy objective of ending Libyan ‘efforts to develop or acquire 
weapons of mass destruction’ was mentioned as a lower priority. The Clinton 
administration articulated a position of ‘concern’ regarding Libyan efforts to develop 
WMD
2
; however, no public demand specifically stating that action would be taken if 
Libya progressed with its nuclear weapons program was made. The Bush administration 
initially continued with the Clinton administration’s policy; however, after 9/11 
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 Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, pg.330. 
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 Ronald E Neumann, Statement of Hon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for near eastern affairs, 
Department of State, S-HRG. 106-740, US Foreign policy toward Libya, hearing before subcommittee on 
near eastern and South Asian affairs of the committee on foreign relations US senate one hundred sixth 
congress second session, 4 May 2000, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67394/pdf/CHRG-
106shrg67394.pdf , accessed 10 January 2015, pg.5. 
 Episode Demand 
Libya Ep.1  Gaddafi gives up his support of terrorists. 
Hand over terrorist suspects and pay reparations to the families of the Lockerbie victims. 
Concern over WMD programme. 
Libya Ep.2  States that supported terrorism and sought nuclear weapons halt their activities. 
NK Ep.1  Demand 1 (from 14 March 1992). Hold talks with ROK over denuclearisation agreement leading to 
inspections.  
Demand 2 (from November 1992). Comply with the IAEA special inspections and safeguard agreement and 
comply with demand 1. 
Demand 3 (from 12 March 1993). Stay within the NPT. 
Demand 4 (from 4 March 1994) . Do not move fuel rods to re-processing installation without supervision of 
the IAEA; conform with demands 1&2. 
Demand 5 - (From 19 July 1994). Freeze and dismantle plutonium production programme, ship spent fuel out 
of NK, comply with NPT and ROK-DPRK denuclearisation agreements. 
NK  Ep.2  Demand 1 - Abolish comprehensibly and permanently all nuclear development activities (made by Jim Kelly 
on 23 April 2003). 
Demand 2 - Present concrete means for verification of compliance with that request. (made by Jim Kelly on 23 
April 2003).1 
Demand 3 - Conform to Joint Statement (2005). 
Demand 4 - Return to six party talks (2006). 
Demand 5 - Do not conduct nuclear test. 
Table 5.2  
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demands were made that all states cease supporting terrorism or developing weapons 
mass destruction. The US also clearly articulated a policy objective that states 
supporting terrorism, who also sought nuclear weapons, halt their activities or face the 
possibility of pre-emptive military action. Libya identified as a state ‘beyond the Axis 
of evil’, who had a history of supporting terrorists and seeking WMD clearly fell into 
the category of a potential ‘target’ of a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, Gaddafi must 
have viewed the demand that states should halt their pursuit of nuclear weapons was 
being directed at him.    
 
In the case of NK the Clinton administration clearly sought to prevent them attaining a 
nuclear weapon. The strategy was to keep NK within the NPT which was seen as a 
mechanism for ensuring that NK did not push ahead with its programme. This led to a 
series of escalating demands in response to various NK actions. Eventually demands, as 
stated within the Agreed Framework (AF) were met, at least until 2002.  
 
Bush’s strategy varied between the first and second administration. Initially starting 
with a strategy that was more coercive (without the diplomacy) this then changed to a 
similar approach to that of the AF in the form of the Joint Statement of 2005. 
 
There are several points that can be drawn from these cases. Firstly, that the clandestine 
nature of nuclear/WMD programmes makes it very difficult to calculate the stage of the 
opponents programme and therefore the demand that should be made. This is further 
complicated by the fact that much of the technology for developing a military nuclear 
programme is also used in civilian nuclear programmes. Issuing a demand that a state 
should give up all its nuclear technology is therefore very difficult and arguably 
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illegitimate. NK continually argued that it had a right to develop nuclear technology for 
civilian purposes within its own borders.  
 
To issue a credible demand the coercer needs to know what technology the opponent 
has and the stage of their nuclear programme. Therefore, demands tend to escalate 
incrementally until a point is reached where there is clear evidence of capability and 
intent. In Libya’s case there is clear evidence of intent and capability provided by the 
interdiction of the BBC China; and they complied before a more coercive demand was 
made. In the case of NK during the Clinton administration its intent became clear when 
it pulled out of the NPT and declared its intent to reprocess spent fuel rods. During the 
Bush administration, NK’s capability and intent became completely transparent when it 
conducted nuclear tests. 
 
As will be discussed in more depth in this chapter, requiring the agreement of allies 
further complicates the calculation of what demand can be made of the opponent. The 
US and UK specifically left the IAEA out of the negotiations with Gaddafi in 2003 as it 
was assessed that they would complicate the issue by adding additional demands.  
Having two close allies conducting the negotiation meant demands and policy could be 
closely coordinated. During the NK case the conflicting objectives of the US, South 
Korea and IAEA did impact upon the demands that were made of NK. 
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AQ 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his 
objectives quickly with little cost? 
 
In three of the four episodes it was assessed that a threat to use force was made towards 
the target. However, what constitutes a threat is difficult to define and could be 
interpreted differently. For example it could be argued that the Clinton administration 
did propose a direct credible threat of force towards Libya. Secretary of Defence 
William Perry in 1996 stated, then later retracted, that the US would not allow the Libya 
to open a suspected chemical plant and ‘wouldn’t rule out or anything in’3 in relation to 
US military action; it was clearly an implied threat but not a direct one. However, 
Gaddafi did appear to take this threat seriously as he halted construction on the plant 
shortly after.
4
 In others episodes I have argued that an implied threat is still a threat. 
Although I have discounted the implied threat in the case of Libya episode 1 as it 
appears to have been accidental and not consistent with the policy position of the 
administration. Martin Indyk and Ambassador Welch clearly emphasised that force was 
not an option in their dealings with Libya and the policy was to pressure Gaddafi 
through diplomatic and economic means.   
 
The Bush administration’s threats against Libya, although still implied, were not an 
accidental remark to media but consistent with the administration’s policy stance. John 
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 Perry, ‘Transcript: Perry media availability’, Ismailia, Egypt, (Expresses concern about Libya's chemical 
weapons program), 4 April 1996, http://www.fas.org/news/libya/dd3_4-9.htm, accessed 18 February 2014 
4
 Freedman, Deterrence, pg.93. 
 Episode Threat to use force 
Libya Ep.1  No 
Libya Ep.2  Yes 
NK Ep.1  No 
NK  Ep.2  Partial – Yes at first 
Table 5.3 
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Bolton’s ‘Beyond the Axis of Evil’ speech specifically named Libya and pointed out 
that ‘states that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our effort. But 
those that do not can expect to become our targets’.5 Furthermore, Douglas Feith 
pointed out that the administration believed that military action in Iraq would aid their 
coercive diplomacy with states like Libya. Furthermore, Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech 
was vague enough for Libya to fall into ‘states like these’ category. Therefore, although 
implied, it meant to threaten states like Libya, unlike Perry’s public statement which 
was later retracted.  
 
The threat made by the US to tackle states who supported terrorism and sought WMD 
was given clear credibility after the invasion of Iraq based on the premise that Saddam 
had a WMD capability that could posed an imminent threat. Therefore, although there 
was not a direct threat stated from the President of the USA, the rhetoric of elements of 
the Bush administration, combined with credible demonstration of the Bush doctrine of 
pre-emptive force in Iraq clearly were perceived as a threat to Gaddafi and an indicator 
that he could be next.   
 
Due to unresolved issues of the Korean War, there was always the threat of military 
force being used by either side of the DMZ. Therefore, although there was no direct 
threat made, any implied threat or military signalling must have been conducted 
knowing that it could be taken by the DPRK as a direct threat. The US had 
demonstrated in the Gulf War of 1991 that it had a superior military capability to the 
DPRK and would use force if it deemed necessary. The Clinton administration initially 
started with threats of sanctions for specific demands; however, at the point that it was 
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 John Bolton, 'Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction’, US 
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, The Heritage Foundation, 
(Washington,6 May 2002),  http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0205/doc01.htm, accessed 6 January 2014. 
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clear that the DPRK would possible cross a US red line and move spent fuel rods to the 
reprocessing plant the threat of military action was clear. Gallucci told NK negotiators 
‘that I personally did not believe that the President of the United States would tolerate a 
nuclear programme in NK’.6 The US sent 26 patriot missiles to SK and it was reported 
that US helicopters and an aircraft carrier were deploying to the region. Even though 
tensions were finally reduced by the intervention of former President Carter there 
remained the underlying threat that the crisis could return to the brink of war throughout 
the follow on AF negotiations.   
 
The first Bush administration sent the clearest signal that it posed a credible threat to 
NK’s regime both in the administration’s public rhetoric and closed door measures. 
Statements such as ‘We will not tolerate nuclear weapons in NK. We will not give into 
blackmail. We will not settle for anything less than the complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible elimination of NK's nuclear weapons program’.7 Although not a direct 
threat, it was clearly implied and given credibility as fellow member of the ‘axis of evil’ 
Iraq had been invaded by the US only months earlier.   
 
However, the credibility of this threat clearly did not endure into the Bush’s second 
term. The policy shifted towards six party talks and the implied threats decreased. This 
did change prior to NK’s nuclear test with clear threats from President Bush and his 
National Security Advisor. Although after NK announced that it had made its first 
nuclear test that President clearly emphasised that diplomacy, not military action, was 
the primary approach.   
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 Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Gallucci, by telephone, 12 February 2013. 
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  George W. Bush: "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan 
in Crawford, Texas," May 23, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American 
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234 
 
Although in three of the case studies it is assessed that there was a threat, in all of those 
cases the threat was implied rather than clearly stated clearly. The threat in the case of 
the Bush administration was initially given clear credibility by the US invasion of Iraq 
in 2003. The most obvious explanation for implying rather than directly threatening a 
named target is it allowed the US to have room to manoeuvre and did not tie it in to a 
course of action that it felt it would have to take to remain credible.    
 
AQ 3 - Was a deadline for compliance offered? 
 
Of the four cases examined none of them contained a clear deadline that if compliance 
was not forthcoming that strikes would follow. In the case of Libya Ep.1 it is assessed 
that there was a partial deadline as UNSC resolution 883 pointed out that if they were 
not compliant by a set time sanctions would be applied. Although there was no formal 
deadline for ILSA the legislative programme was well known therefore it can be seen as 
partially fulfilling the deadline criteria. However, none of these deadlines were 
specifically over Gaddafi’s nuclear programme but were due to his support of terrorism 
with WMD as a lower priority issue. However, under the Bush administration there was 
no specific time given to Libya to halt its nuclear weapons programme or face military 
strikes. Pressure was maintained on Libya through US unilateral sanctions in the form 
of the ILSA and the open demands and threats already discussed. The approach was that 
of the 'gradual turning of the screw'; once Libya initiated talks with the UK and US over 
 Episode Deadline given 
Libya Ep.1  Partial 
Libya Ep.2  No – implied 
NK Ep.1  No – implied 
NK  Ep.2  No 
Table 5.4 
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the issue of WMD, the programme of talks between the parties, in effect became a 
deadline that Libya had to comply with, but it was still implied rather than stated. 
Although not specifically linked to the threat of force, the Clinton administration did 
continue to use deadlines to pressure NK into complying with specific demands.  
Regarding the demand that NK stay within the NPT, the deadline adopted was what 
George would have termed the “try and see”, as no specific timing was given but a 
warning that actions would take place if they were to go through with the threat and 
leave the NPT. A ‘try and see’ approach was also applied to the demand that NK did not 
move and reprocess fuel rods. NK had been told on several occasions that the US would 
not allow them to obtain nuclear weapons. Once the crisis instigated by NK’s apparent 
intent to move the rods had been averted there was only an implicit deadline that an 
agreement needed to be reached by the end of the bilateral talks between the US and UK 
held in Geneva between 5-12 August 1994. Therefore, although red lines were set that 
could lead to military strike, and there was clear programme set out in the AF, which if 
veered from may have re-ignited the threat of military action. However, there was no 
clear deadline set that if NK did not comply they would face military action.  
 
The Bush administration also applied no specific deadline given to back any of the 
demands; at best the ‘try and see’ approach was applied. The DPRK on several 
occasions trampled over the line without consequence. Even, when NK conducted 
nuclear tests, in defiance of the 2005 Joint statement and US demands, the President 
emphasised that issue was to be resolved ‘peacefully through diplomatic means’.8 
Therefore, as there was no threat of returning to a prior crisis at the end of any 
negotiations or a set time to comply with a demand, it is taken that this does not 
conform to the ideal policy. 
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The deadlines if applied over the use of force were mainly of the ‘try and see’ or tacit 
ultimatum. Again this enabled US the freedom of manoeuvre rather than boxing 
themselves into a corner where they would have to back down or take action to maintain 
credibility. By not being fully explicit it meant that if an implied line was crossed the 
US credibility was not damaged to the same extent. However, clearly this also 
weakened the credibility of any implied deadline as it was felt that it could be crossed 
without impunity. This is most obvious in the case of NK. Even after the US implied 
that force would be used if it conducted nuclear tests; these were quickly backtracked on 
after the nuclear tests.   
 
An issue for theory is whether the setting of red lines is a deterrent or coercive 
diplomacy strategy. Red lines indicate to an opponent if you do this (i.e. cross this red 
line then I will act against you – which is deterrence) then we may do this. However, in 
both NK cases, although the demand not to move spent fuel rods could be taken as 
either coercive diplomacy or deterrence. Therefore, it is possible to see where the lines 
between these two concepts become blurred. Whether this blurring matters beyond 
academic debate will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
AQ 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against future demands? 
 
It is assessed that this assurance was partially given in all of the cases; as in none of the 
episodes was a full assurance that no more demands would follow given. 
 Episode Assurance given 
Libya Ep.1  Partial – no regime change. 
Libya Ep.2  Partial – no regime change. 
NK Ep.1  Partial – no regime change. 
NK  Ep.2  Partial – no regime change. 
Table 5.5 
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Gaddafi had reason to mistrust US assurances in episode 2; in episode 1 he clearly 
believed that if he complied with UK/US demands and handed over suspects of the 
Lockerbie bombing that his regime would no longer be targeted and that he could start 
the integration back into the international system. However, the US still maintained its 
pressure on Gaddafi over concerns about its WMD programmes. Therefore, as 
assurances were given, but not assurances that further demands would follow, this 
element only partially conforms to the ideal policy. The Bush administration even after 
Gaddafi surrendered his WMD, continued to pressure Libya on terrorism and issues of 
human rights.
9
  
 
There was a clear assurance given to Gaddafi that if he complied with US and UK 
demands they would not seek regime change. However, there was not a clear indication 
that further demands, regarding normal diplomatic issues such as human rights would 
not be made. Although this security assurance was clearly violated in 2011, in particular 
by the UK, as at the time this assurance was given it partially conformed to the ideal 
policy.  
 
The clearest example of an assurance was contained in the AF where the US clearly 
indicated that no further demands would be made regarding regime change. 
Furthermore, as long as the DPRK stuck to the agreement the US would maintain its 
part of the deal. This same approach was finally adopted by the Bush administration in 
the Joint Statement of 2005. However, by this point it was too late as NK were close to 
their goal of passing the nuclear threshold.    
 
                                                          
9
 William J Burns, Statement of Hon. William J Burns, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of near 
eastern affairs, S. HRG. 108–496,  Libya – next steps in US relations, Hearing before the committee on 
foreign relations United States Senate one hundred eighth congress second session,( Washington, DC 
Government Printing Office, 2004), 26 February 2004https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
108shrg94557/pdf/CHRG-108shrg94557.pdf, accessed 24 June 2012, pg.6. 
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The episodes demonstrate the fundamental difficulty with the assurances component of 
the ideal policy. If coercive diplomacy is seen as an option that has worked in the past it 
becomes tempting to use the strategy again to achieve your next political objective. 
Coercive diplomacy through military strikes in 1986 was viewed a success in 
influencing Gaddafi to pull back from supporting international terrorism; therefore, it 
was asserted that “Gaddafi would responsive to pressure” over the issue of WMD.10 
 
Furthermore, it is difficult for democracies to give a credible promise that further 
demands will not be made over a future issue. Future administrations/governments are 
not bound to maintain the same policy. Moreover, Libyan and North Korean human 
rights abuses were always going to be an issue which would lead to subsequent US and 
international demands. This was demonstrated clearly in 2011 with Gaddafi’s attempt 
to crush an internal rebellion with the threat of decimating Benghazi led effectively to 
the US and UK supporting forces opposing him.  
 
AQ 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance? 
 
In all of the cases the US offered incentives for compliance. For Gaddafi the carrot was 
the lifting of international sanctions and reintegration into the international community, 
and in particular an improved relationship with the US. Removing sanctions would 
enable Gaddafi to attract the investment required to improve Libya’s ageing 
                                                          
10
 Author’s interview with Mr Douglas Feith former Deputy Secretary for Defence, in person, 13 March 
2013. 
 Episode Incentives offered 
Libya Ep.1  Yes 
Libya Ep.2  Yes 
NK Ep.1  Yes 
NK  Ep.2  Yes 
Table 5.6 
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infrastructure and gain access to markets to sell oil. The oil revenues would enable him 
to secure his position within Libya. Furthermore, the lifting of the travel ban would 
allow him to increase his influence abroad aiding in Gaddafi’s personal ambition to be a 
regional leader. The US demonstrated that it was serious about the possibility of an 
improved relationship with Libya by its willingness to enter secret negotiations with the 
Libyan regime in 1998 and in 2003. The AF contained clear incentives to NK including 
the provision of fuel and the building of two LWR. It also held out the prospect of 
moving towards more normalised relations with the US.  
 
In all cases the clearest incentive for the opposition was the normalisation, or at least 
improvement of relations with the US. However, this was always going to be difficult as 
even with the removal of the nuclear issue there remained issues of terrorism, human 
rights and security that needed to be resolved. Furthermore, offering clear incentives 
often would be jumped upon by hawks in the US as appeasement and seen as rewarding 
bad behaviour. Particularly in the case of the NK where many felt that it was being 
rewarded for flouting the international system and was still likely to be covertly 
maintaining a uranium based nuclear weapons programme. However, as incentives were 
offered in all the cases it demonstrates that the US was always willing to use methods 
other than force to persuade an opponent to comply. 
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Evaluation of the implementation of the ideal policy and coercive diplomacy 
applied 
 
None of the cases conformed to the Jakobsen’s ideal policy. The strategy that was most 
commonly adopted by the US was sanction based coercive diplomacy backed by an 
implied threat with no set deadline for compliance. 
 
 Libya episode 1 was dominated by incentives, assurances and the threat or actual 
implementation of sanctions. As there was neither direct nor an implied threat of force 
this strategy I would call sanction based coercive diplomacy. Libya episode 2 contained 
an implied threat of force, but without a deadline and clear demand of the target, 
therefore it was coercive diplomacy but not in the form of the ideal policy. The US had 
laid out a threat to all states of pre-emptive strike if they were caught crossing a red line. 
Once the interdictions of the BBC China demonstrated clearly the extent of Libya’s 
programme that is when deterrence failed and it became a strategy of coercive 
diplomacy, as at that point the US was directly demanding them to fully reveal, stop and 
undo their programme.  
 
In both NK episodes there were red lines set, which is an element of a deterrent strategy. 
However, a demand of stopping or undoing is typically classed as a demand relating to 
coercive diplomacy. So if a target stops before a red line (i.e. does not move spent fuel 
  Evaluation of Strategy adopted 
Libya Ep.1  Sanction based coercive diplomacy. 
Libya Ep.2  Coercive diplomacy (not in form of ideal policy) 
NK Ep.1  Sanction based coercive diplomacy /deterrence/ coercive diplomacy 
(not in form of ideal policy) 
NK  Ep.2  Sanction based coercive diplomacy /deterrence/ coercive diplomacy 
(not in form of ideal policy) 
Table 5.7 
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rods) it could be viewed as either deterrence or coercive diplomacy working. It is only 
when the demand to undo their programme is it clearly a strategy of coercive 
diplomacy. Furthermore, in both episodes the threat and use of sanctions was the initial 
tool employed, rather than a direct threat. 
 
AQ 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to war? 
 
There is not a pattern that emerges when comparing Libya and NK on whether the 
opponent preferred to comply rather than go to war. It is only in the case of NK.Ep1 that 
the threat of war was actually an imminent possibility. NK was willing to go to war 
rather than lose face; it took the intervention of former President Carter to open an 
avenue that led both sides to de-escalate. Libya’s primary motivation was always to 
remove sanctions; therefore, it was willing to comply if this incentive was offered 
before the threat of war was imminent. However, the increased chance of war after 9/11 
did motivate them to surrender their nuclear programme. 
 
Although the US clearly made implied threats after 9/11; NK seemed to have reasoned 
correctly that as time went on it either did not believe the threat to be credible or that the 
US was not willing to risk a war. The initial threats and invasion of Iraq may have aided 
in persuading them to enter 6 Party Talks in April 2003. However, whether at the time 
taking part in these talks was a delaying tactic until they could develop a nuclear 
weapon capable of deterring the US or whether it was a genuine desire to partially 
comply rather than risk going to war is unclear. Overall there is no pattern amongst the 
Libya Ep.1  Desire to remove sanctions. 
Libya Ep.2  Primarily to remove sanctions but threat increased motivation. 
NK Ep.1  Was likely to go to war rather than lose face. 
NK  Ep.2  Initially complied but unclear if this was a delaying tactic. 
Table 5.8 
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episodes; which would indicate that the answer to this element is highly dependent on 
the context of the individual cases and decision makers involved.  
 
AQ 7 – Did the opponent act rationally, miscalculate or suffer from 
misperception? 
 
The cases studied would indicate that the opposing leaders did act rationally. Although 
often publicly appearing as a ranting madman, Gaddafi’s actions would appear to be 
rational. He started to comply with the US and UN demands over issues of terrorism 
which clearly brought him closer to re-integration into the international community. 
Furthermore, as the US did not have clear evidence of his nuclear programme and there 
was no direct threat made, Gaddafi’s pursuit of nuclear weapons program would appear 
to be rational as it gave him the opportunity to either obtain a deterrent and mark of 
prestige, or possible increase any future bargaining position with the US. He had 
grounds to believe that the latter was a possibility as he had seen the incentives that NK 
had obtained through the AF. 
 
Gaddafi also acted rationally in surrendering his nuclear weapons in 2003. The only 
misperception he could be accused of suffering from was an over estimation of the US 
willingness to use force at that time, as discussions with policy makers would indicate  
that, although the US was content for Gaddafi to believe there was a threat, they were 
not actually considering an attack on Libya. However, this policy could have changed 
Libya Ep.1  Libya acted rationally. 
Libya Ep.2  Libya acted rationally. 
NK Ep.1  NK acted rationally. 
NK  Ep.2  NK acted rationally. 
Table 5.9 
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rapidly after the interdiction of the BBC China provided clear evidence of Gaddafi 
nuclear programme.
11
 
 
With no immediate attainment of nuclear weapons Gaddafi’s decision to surrender his 
nuclear programme was rational. He was left with the choice of either continuing to 
develop a nuclear weapon, which in light of US policies enacted after 9/11 was at 
increased risk of detection, and if detected would have been at a high risk of being 
punished economically or destroyed militarily. Negotiating and surrendering this 
programme seemed to be a clearer path to achieving his goals of re-integration into the 
international community and developing a stable economy.     
 
Assuming that NK key objective was regime survival its actions can be viewed as 
rational. Obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent or a bargaining chip 
to trade for the resources and money it required to exist. Even if it miscalculated US 
resolve and the crisis escalated into conflict it had good reason to believe that it would 
be a limited conflict that the regime could weather and then use to its advantage 
internally. 
 
If rationality is taken as state decision makers following the most logical path towards 
achieving their implicit or explicit objectives then it is assessed that in all four of these 
cases the leadership’s acted rationally. However, in making this assessment it is realised 
that determining exactly what those objectives are is very difficult without access to key 
individuals at the top of these dictatorships or sensitive government documents. 
 
                                                          
11 Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013. 
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AQ 8 - Does credible implementation of the ideal policy lead to compliance? & AQ 
9 - Does failure to implement the ideal policy lead to non-compliance? 
 
With such a low number of cases it is not possible to make statistically verifiable 
correlations between application of the ideal policy and its relation to an outcome.  
However, only one of the four cases examined aligned with its predicted outcome. The 
Bush administration’s policy towards NK did not conform to the ideal policy and NK 
did attain a nuclear weapon; therefore the predicted failure was the actual outcome. 
However, the difficulty with this assessment is that there are a range of policies 
(diplomatic bargaining, economic sanctions, deterrence, pre-emptive strikes etc.) that if 
applied on their own may also have failed. Therefore, this case should be discounted as 
a positive correlation of prediction to outcome.       
 
Although the ideal policy was not applied; two of the cases had partially successful 
outcomes. Clinton had partial success with Gaddafi meeting the demands that were set 
for him handing over terrorists and shutting down WMD programmes for a time. This 
was done even though there was no credible threat, just one accidental implied threat.  
The Bush administration gave no deadline for demands to be met and only partial 
assurances. However, this was the clearest success as Libya completely surrendered its 
nuclear weapons programme.   
 
  Ideal Policy Predicted outcome of CD Actual outcome of CD 
Libya Ep.1  No Failure Partial Success 
Libya Ep.2  No Failure Success 
NK Ep.1  No Failure Success 
NK  Ep.2  No Failure Failure 
Table 5.10 
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Perhaps the most interesting element to this is that it demonstrates that Gaddafi was 
always willing to comply, not primarily because of the threat of force or application of 
coercive diplomacy, but because he saw it in his interest (i.e. survival of his regime) to 
do so as it opened the possibility of being re-integrated into the international system; a 
goal that he clearly sought. Therefore, it did not require a crisis to rise to the level where 
policy in the form of the ideal policy was being applied in order for him to conform.    
What this limited sample of cases also demonstrates is that coercive diplomacy in the 
form of the ideal policy is not readily applied to the objective of preventing nuclear 
proliferation. Fundamentally, this is because states do not threaten with a specific 
deadline for when compliance has to be met. This arguably could be because none of 
the cases studied reached a crisis stage where this direct threat was necessary. Libya 
buckled way before this point was reached.  The US was threatening to use against force 
NK in 1994, but this was not by a set deadline.  
 
Primarily the reason that no direct threat backed by a clear deadline for implementation 
was set was that the US did not want to limit its room for manoeuvre. Setting hard 
deadlines would mean it would have to act or lose credibility. Furthermore, there does 
not seem to be an instant pattern where failure to apply the ideal policy necessarily leads 
to failure; what it shows is that the strategy that was applied in that episode did not lead 
to success. It is highly probable that there are numerous strategies if applied skilfully 
would come to a successful outcome. The difficulty is determining whether these 
strategies would have been at less cost than the one adopted; however, that question is 
beyond the scope of this thesis as it would hypothetical and not based on any empirical 
evidence. 
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AQ 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened action would be 
carried out? 
 
In none of the cases is it clear that the opponent complied purely out of fear; but it was a 
contributing factor. Gaddafi clearly felt threatened that he could be next on the US 
target list. Even in 2008 he stated that ‘one of these days, America may hang us’12, a 
clear indication that he felt threatened. It is not possible to assess what balance fear and 
incentives was required to bring Gaddafi finally to the decision to comply. President 
Carter gave NK a way out that allowed them to save face and avert a military 
confrontation which the DPRK took. This would imply that they were fearful that 
further pressure could be applied to them including military strikes, but needed the offer 
of incentives that would allow them to save face, gain a reward and enable them to 
negotiate. 
 
The implied threat of carrying out military force was a motivating factor for Libya in 
2003 and NK in 1994, however, incentives were also an essential ingredient that 
enabled them to comply without losing face. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Gaddafi, ‘Gaddafi attacks Arab leaders at the Arab summit in Syria’ (2008), translated by memritv.org, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZZvPlGCt_8, accessed 17 September 2013. 
Libya 
Ep.1    
No – continuation of sanctions led to surrendering of terror suspects and 
negotiations/. 
Libya 
Ep.2  
Partial - the fear of the implied threat of military action increased 
motivation to surrender WMD programme. 
NK Ep.1  Partial – the fear of possibility of military strikes combined with incentives 
led to surrendering of plutonium based programme. 
NK  Ep.2  No – May have feared attack after 9/11 but still did not comply. 
Table 5.11 
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WILL TO THREATEN AND USE FORCE 
Perhaps the most interesting element of Jakobsen’s work is his theory on when states 
should be willing to threaten the use of force. Table 5.12 shows the coding that was 
given to each variable for each of the episodes, whether that combination of variables 
should lead to the US threatening to use force and whether there was actual a threat of 
force emanating from the US.      
 
The most interesting results that jump out from this comparison are those that do not 
conform to Jakobsen’s theory. According to his theory the Clinton administration 
should not have been willing to threaten force against NK and should have been willing 
to threaten force against Libya. I will now go onto examine in more depth what these 
results indicate. 
 
AQ 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present when states threaten 
and use force? 
 Variables Predictions - 
Will to threaten 
and use of 
force? 
Was 
there a 
threat to 
use force? The nature of 
threatened 
interests 
The prospect of 
military success 
Domestic 
support 
Libya 
Ep.1  
High High Medium Yes No 
Libya 
Ep.2  
High High Medium Yes Yes 
NK Ep.1  High Low Medium No Yes 
NK  Ep.2  High Low Low No No 
Table 5.12 
 Variables Predictions - 
Will to 
threaten and 
use of force? 
Was there a 
threat to use 
force? 
The nature of 
threatened 
interests 
The prospect of 
military success 
Domestic 
support 
Libya 
Ep.2  
High High Medium Yes Yes 
NK Ep.1  High Low Medium No Yes 
Table 5.13 
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Out of the 2 cases there was a threat to use force (Libya Ep.2 and NK Ep.1) a pattern 
that Jakobsen predicts would lead to a threat is only in present in Libya Ep.2. The only 
variable that differs between these two episodes is the coding of the prospect of military 
success at low cost; which is coded high against Libya and low against NK. There are 
several explanations that I believe all contribute to the difference in prediction and 
actual outcome.   
 
Firstly, Jakobsen’s logic that states may in be fact willing to commit to a costly war 
over an issue that does not affect vital interest, would not be fully supported/or opposed 
at home and would have little chance of being achieved militarily at low cost is not 
always correct. Psychological biases and the exact context of the crisis can affect the 
path that decision makers on both sides take. Therefore, they become stuck in a 
gradually increasing face off where the stakes get higher and higher and credibility 
domestically and internationally becomes an issue. Similarly, both sides may be acting 
according to what they deem to be rational to reach their specific objective; however, to 
an external detached observer with all the available information their actions can appear 
irrational. Jakobsen’s ideal policy has been derived from a detached rational viewpoint 
base on how states should try to stop or undo an opponent’s acts of aggression; how 
actors behave in achieving an objective that tends to emerge over a greater period of 
time, and is harder to detect, appears to be different; this does not make their actions 
irrational. 
 
Secondly, it could be that my assessment of the variables is incorrect and that for NK 
episode 1 either the prospect of military success should be coded high for the USA as it 
in fact deemed it a vital interest. My assessment is based on open source information 
with the gift of hindsight. However, there is clearly intelligence and other governmental 
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papers that may have revealed information that was known to the decision makers of the 
time. Furthermore, often the coding is based on what is my interpretation of the 
information I have access to. For example what are the objective figures to differentiate 
between a coding of medium for prospect of military success compared to high; is it 100 
deaths, 1000 deaths or 100000 deaths. Clearly what is deemed as an acceptable cost is 
very much the judgement of the individuals making the decision and the context of 
willingness to take loss at the time. So the psychological profile of decision makers, the 
context of the crisis and the importance of the goal they are seeking are fundamental.   
 
Willingness to accept loss could be viewed like a commodity. Like a trader needs to 
judge what the market is willing to pay for the commodity being sold, the decision 
maker has to evaluate what the market (Congress, Voters etc.) are willing to pay in 
blood and treasure to achieve a particular objective. If the value of the objective is clear 
and the market at that time is willing to pay the cost then action may take place.  
Therefore, like commodity prices can be affected by confidence in the economy, the 
willingness to accept loss can change dependent on the perceived value of the goal at 
that time.  
 
The Clinton administration was actively considering a pre-emptive strike on NK, or at 
the minimum UNSC resolution imposing sanctions that would have required a surge of 
a 100,000 troops. Due to the overt nature of NK nuclear programme and the continuing 
escalating crisis it could be the US saw the credibility of its counter-proliferation policy 
which it deemed as essential to it long term survival. Arguably this would have led the 
US threatening the use of force to a range of states over proliferation issues; however, 
NK was the most obvious state to defy the US, having left the NPT and was clearly a 
direct threat to US allies such as the ROK and Japan. Therefore, unlike Libya where it 
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was less certain of the stage of its programme and did not threaten US strategic partners 
so directly, the President clearly judged that stopping NK attaining nuclear weapons 
was worth the possibility of war even if potentially the cost would have been high.  
Thirdly, it could be that the Clinton administration in fact miscalculated and either 
perceived NK as vital threat to its interests, felt it had to continue to escalate the 
situation in order to maintain credibility or that NK would eventually back down. There 
is no evidence to suggest that the US deemed NK to be an imminent threat to the 
survival of the US, although clearly he deemed the crisis as a threat to key strategic 
allies, US proliferation policy and the credibility of the US. It is plausible that the US 
was gambling that the deployment of US troops would not escalate to war. Clearly if the 
surge did cause an escalation it would have been a US miscalculation. Therefore, it may 
be that the US felt that it had no option, as if it did not seek a UNSC resolution, surge 
troops to deter NK, it would be viewed as a ‘paper tiger’ and would have lost credibility 
globally. 
 
There is not enough evidence to lead to any conclusions on the accuracy of Jakobsen’s 
theory. However, examining the cases through the rational lens of Jakobsen’s model 
does raise intriguing questions of why the US was almost willing to go to war with NK 
even though it knew that this would have devastating consequences and not go to war 
with Libya. Therefore, Jakobsen’s theories do have utility as an analytical tool for 
questioning the deeper logic underlying the behaviour of the US in these episodes. 
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AQ 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states lack the will to 
threaten and use force? 
 
Of the four episodes there are two episodes (Libya episode 1 and NK episode 2) where 
the US did not threaten to use force; however, in the Libya episode 1 it was predicted 
that they would.  There are several explanations of why the Libya episode 1 does not 
conform to the predicted pattern. 
 
Firstly, it could simply be that the context of this case involved psychological factors 
and asymmetric information that affected decision makers so they did not act rationally 
and conform to the way that Jakobsen’s theory predicted. Secondly, the assessment of 
how much of a threat to US interests and whether victory could be achieved at low cost 
may be overestimated. The US may have deemed Libya as not enough of a threat to 
consider even a small number of US casualties or the expenditure of money, especially 
if it believed correctly that it could achieve its objective through diplomacy and 
sanctions at lower cost.   
 
Thirdly, the most likely explanation is that threatening to use force before exploring all 
diplomatic and measures short of force would have defied international norms and been 
deemed illegitimate. Therefore, not believing Libya to be an imminent threat worth the 
expenditure of blood and treasure, it was willing to follow the normal international 
 Variables Predictions - 
Will to threaten 
and use of 
force? 
Was there a 
threat to use 
force? 
The nature of 
threatened 
interests 
The prospect of 
military success 
Domestic 
support 
Libya 
Ep.1  
High High Medium Yes No 
NK  Ep.2  High Low Low No No 
Table 5.14 
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process of taking the issue to the UNSC and implementing sanctions. The US thus did 
not undermine the international norms laid out in the UN charter.     
 
Lastly, as stated previously it may be that the Jakobsen’s model is simply incorrect and 
that cases are so context dependent that predictions in any form of statistical and 
scientifically verifiable way is not possible. More cases would need to be studied to 
build a statistical validation of whether this is the case. But even this would be difficult 
due to the difficulties in ensuring that any subsequent studies analyse cases in a 
consistent way.  
 
Evaluation of the Willingness to Threaten 
 
In four of the cases only two resulted in the prediction matching the outcome 
(highlighted in Tan). Again although not enough to validate a correlation, clearly only 
two out of four would give the initial indication that either there is no correlation or that 
we are dealing with 2 statistical variations in the case of Libya episode 1 and NK 
episode 1.  What is interesting is that the two cases that do not conform to Jakobsen’s 
prediction occurred within the Clinton administration. This could indicate that the logic 
that Clinton applied when calculating whether to use force differs from that of Bush. By 
 Variables Predictions - 
Will to threaten 
and use of 
force? 
Was there a 
threat to 
use force? 
The nature of 
threatened 
interests 
The prospect of 
military success 
Domestic 
support 
Libya 
Ep.1  
High High Medium Yes No 
Libya 
Ep.2  
High High Medium Yes Yes 
NK Ep.1  High Low Medium No Yes 
NK  Ep.2  High Low Low No No 
Table 5.12 (repeated) 
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examining this further may provide further indication of whether Jakobsen’s model is 
valid, as if it is clear that Clinton’s logic was different it would add value to the 
possibility that these outcomes would turn out to be in a larger study statistical 
variations from the norm.  
 
The only difference in the variables is the assessment that prospect of achieving success 
in NK was deemed low compared to High for Libya. Clearly if based purely on these 
codings it would appear that Clinton was acting irrationally as he threatened force in a 
crisis that he would have less chance of achieving success. But as stated there are 
several contextual differences between the two crises which need exploring further: 
Firstly, although both interests are coded high as they affected strategic aims of the 
United States, NK’s was more distinct and urgent. NK had a clear nuclear programme 
and was clearly flouting international rules and endangering US counter proliferation. 
Also because of the cease fire that was still in place, the size of the NK army and the 
deployment of 35000 US troops within range of those forces, NK clearly appeared more 
of an obvious threat than Libya. Libya was only a threat in that it was developing WMD 
(although more chemical and biological, its nuclear programme was not well known or 
established) and although this would give it the ability to threaten the interests of the US 
it was not as threatening as NK. Neither state was threatening vital interests (i.e. the 
survival of the US). Secondly, the crisis in NK actively involved allied partners who 
often complicated and influenced US actions.  
 
 Variables Predictions 
- Will to 
threaten 
and use of 
force? 
Was there a 
threat to 
use force? 
The nature of 
threatened 
interests 
The prospect of 
military success 
Domestic 
support 
Libya 
Ep.1  
High High Medium Yes No 
NK Ep.1  High Low Medium No Yes 
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The most likely explanation for the US not acting in Libya is that the Clinton did not 
view the nuclear issue as an immediate threat and was more concerned with the more 
immediate electoral damage that could be done by not dealing with the highly motive 
issue of reparations for the Lockerbie victims’ families. Raising the issue of nuclear 
weapons backed by the threat or actual use of force would clearly have complicated 
gaining compensation. Whereas dealing with the issue that would affect domestic votes 
first (compensation), then dealing with the less immediate, but important issue of 
Gaddafi’s emerging nuclear programme seemed a more logical strategy.   
 
Thirdly the motivations of the two sides opposing the US were very different. NK was 
an isolationist state that wanted to deter the US and had a genuine fear of invasion.  
Nuclear weapons were seen as a way of achieving this objective. Furthermore it was a 2 
year crisis with the threat of violence only coming to the fore towards the end. Gaddafi 
was an outward seeking leader who sought to galvanise the Arab people into believing 
that he was a leader to be followed, in order to do this he needed wealth which involved 
trying to reintegrate back into the international community and more importantly 
economy. Therefore, he was willing to submit to demands before the US needed to 
actively threaten him. 
 
Fourthly, the relative power of the US at different times may explain Clinton’s 
willingness to more directly threaten force. In 1994 the US was clearly the world’s only 
superpower both economically and militarily. The USSR had collapsed in 1989 and the 
US convincingly defeated the Iraq army in the Gulf war. There was a belief stated by 
George Bush Snr that a new world order was emerging that the US would be at the head 
of. Therefore, emboldened by the US’s position in the world, the use of US power 
255 
 
including US force may have been seen as more viable tool by the Clinton 
administration.  
 
Bush’s administration was clearly willing to use force as demonstrated by its invasion 
of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, which may have resulted in many US 
causalities, the following counter insurgency operation clearly made these wars highly 
unpopular with the domestic audience. Furthermore, the controversial nature of legal 
premise of the invasion of Iraq damaged the US relationship with many states. 
Therefore, an over expanded military and damaged political ties with surrounding states 
meant that, although still a super power, its influence had waned by 2004. This 
reduction in relative power clearly curtailed the US to act so aggressively against NK.   
What these episodes show is that the finer detail of the specific scenarios is important 
and can lead to the threat of force even if it would appear from a more detached 
examination that this would not be rational. 
 
AQ 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force result from 
leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception that important 
interests are threatened? 
 
Libya 
Ep.1    
No direct threat of force so no consensus. US leadership in conjunction with 
UK. 
Libya 
Ep.2  
Implied threat of force by the US.  UK and US shared approach key factor. 
NK Ep.1  Implied threat of force and deterrence.  South Korea, Japanese and IAEA 
complicated US strategy but were essential to AF; all had shared interests.  
US leadership. 
NK  Ep.2  Implied threat of force initially.  Diplomatic coalition (6 party talks) built in 
second administration.  US leadership. 
Table 5.15 
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There was no direct threat to use force in any of the cases so it is not possible to assess 
whether coalitional consensus concerning threat of force required leadership or shared 
perception of various states that important interests are threatened. If the US had 
negotiated with allies to put forward more than an implied threat of force it would have 
escalated both crisis and limited its freedom of manoeuvre. However, an assessment of 
coalitional consensus required to threaten and implement sanctions and other measures 
can be assessed. 
 
US leadership was fundamental to achieving sanctions; however, other actors with 
shared interests also joined them. UN sanctions against Libya required US leadership to 
formulate and implement. Furthermore, the enactment of sanctions was aided 
significantly by the US, UK and France sharing the policy objective that Libyan 
terrorist issues should be resolved. This united front by three members of the permanent 
members of the UNSC clearly influenced states to back their claims and led to UN 
sanctions. Therefore, the instigation of sanctions against Libya over the issue of 
terrorism required US leadership and relied on shared interests with the UK and France.   
There was only a strong implied threat from the US, who in the aftermath of 9/11 firmly 
warned states that both supported terrorists and sought nuclear weapons that they could 
be potential targets. Although the UK did not issue similarly strong implied threats, it 
did support the US in invading Iraq over the issue of WMD demonstrating its 
willingness to follow US lead.  
 
It was the UK who was initially approached by Libya regarding surrendering of its 
WMD. The UK/US had several shared interests in preventing Gaddafi attain WMD.  
Firstly, both states had historic issues over Libya’s behaviour, in particular regarding its 
previous support of terrorism. Therefore, both were concerned that a WMD armed 
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Gaddafi would be a destabilising influence within the region. Secondly, as both the UK 
and US were signatories of the NPT, permanent members of the UNSC and recognised 
nuclear powers there was not only an obligation, but it was in their interests, to prevent 
proliferation of WMD. Libya’s attainment of WMD could have led to a weakening of 
the proliferation regime and destabilise international security.   
 
Japan, ROK and the US shared the interest in preventing NK attaining nuclear weapons. 
To the ROK and Japan it was a vital interest, as unlike the US, a nuclear armed DPRK 
posed an almost immediate threat to those states. However, the ROK often opposed a 
US aggressive stance with the North, as they had the most to lose from any 
confrontation; as pointed out by former Clinton staffer Robert Carlin; ‘the South 
Koreans don’t want to see their beautiful country destroyed in the interest of US non-
proliferation goals– big problem’.13 Therefore, although there were shared interests that 
drove all parties to engage diplomatically, there was not a clear coalitional consensus to 
use force.   
  
There was no coalitional threat to use force. Clearly Seoul had more to fear a nuclear 
armed NK than anyone as it calculated that it would place them at a military 
disadvantage.
14
 However, the South during the initial years of the Bush administration 
adopted the Sunshine policy that aimed to lessen the confrontation between the Koreas 
and remained committed to the AF.
15
 Therefore, it would not support any aggressive US 
posture. There were also reports that after the North protested over the term CVID 
                                                          
13
 Author’s interview with Mr Robert Carlin, in person, 4 March 2013. 
 
14
 US Secretary of State, A/S Kelly discusses Korea, bilateral relations with PRC Ambassador Yang 
Jiechi (10 January 2003). http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/03STATE8026.pdfaccessed 23 June 2014. 
 
15
 Thomas Hubbard, Interview in 2003,  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/hubbard.html, accessed 14 May 2014. 
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during six party talks, that the South requested the US refrain from using the term.
16
 The 
South also clearly disagreed with the US at times on how the six party talks should be 
conducted.
17
 SK also took the Libyan model as a framework believing that nuclear 
dismantlement would occur if diplomatic normalisation was realistically worked 
towards. Furthermore, that as with Libya what was required was quiet diplomacy 
through SK and Japan.
18
 
 
Japan also shared a clear interest with the US and the ROK in preventing a nuclear 
DPRK.
19
 Furthermore, it was a strong partner to the US as demonstrated by its 
deployment of Self-Defence Forces to Iraq.
20
 Therefore, it was largely willing to follow 
the US lead during the Bush era.   
 
US leadership and shared interests were essential in forming the six-party talks.  
However, there was no appetite, or even consideration, among either ROK or PRC to 
use the threat of force to achieve their shared objective of a NK without nuclear 
weapons. The ROK was not willing to risk the escalation to a full war that a more 
aggressive posture could initiate. China was concerned that more pressure could lead to 
the collapse and instability that could spread across their border.
21
  
 
                                                          
16
 Korean Central News Agency, “KCNA Urges US to Accept DPRK’s Proposal”, 22 May 2004, in 
Funabashi, The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, pg.353. 
 
17
 George W. Bush: "Remarks Following Discussions With President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea and 
an Exchange With Reporters," 14 September 2006, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The 
American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=868. 
18
 Interview with a senior Blue House Official, Seoul, September 4, 2006 in Funabashi, The Peninsula 
Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, pg.354. 
19
 James Kelly, US Secretary of State, A/S Kelly discusses Korea, bilateral relations with PRC 
Ambassador Yang Jiechi (10 January 2003), http://caledavis.com/Sources/2003/03STATE8026.pdf, 
accessed 23 June 2014. 
20
 Op.cit. Funabashi, pg.71. 
21
 Bush, Decision Points, pg.424. 
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In the three of the episodes the US clearly took the lead and tried to gather consensus 
for action, less than force, with allies who had shared interests. In only one case (Lib 
episode 2) was the approach shared between the US and UK. The fact that the US did 
seek to corral allies to support it, despite being the world superpower, does indicate that 
it felt there was a clear need to do this. Primarily this was because for sanctions to be 
effective they need to be supported internationally, which involved support from allies, 
who in turn could also seek to gain further support through the UN.  
 
AQ 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of force fail to emerge when 
none of the above conditions are met? 
 
As soon as the Libya handed over the Lockerbie suspects; the UN, against US wishes, 
suspended its sanctions. The US wished to maintain the pressure on Gaddafi until full 
compensation for the families of Lockerbie victims had been achieved and issues 
regarding Libya’s pursuit of WMD had been resolved. However, the leadership of the 
only remaining superpower was not sufficient to influence the UN to maintain these 
sanctions. Once the issue of terrorism seemed to have been resolved many states within 
Europe believed it was in their interest to form economic ties with Libya against the 
wishes of the US.  
 
Libya 
Ep.1    
No direct threat of force so no consensus because crisis did not reach that 
point – Gaddafi surrendered terrorists. 
Libya 
Ep.2  
Implied threat of force and Gaddafi surrendered nuclear programme 
before crisis reached that point. 
NK Ep.1  US, Japan, IAEA and SK had same objectives but different willingness to 
risk war. 
NK  Ep.2  US unilateral policy at first; followed by diplomatic measure (6 party 
talks).  Threat of force never seriously considered. 
Table 5.16 
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A consensus on whether to threaten force did not emerge because Libya had approached 
the UK to surrender its weapons before its pursuit of WMD had become an international 
issue. It is highly likely that if Libya had not come forward when it did a more robust 
approach, including seeking international action against Libya, would have been taken 
by the US when the interdiction of BBC China supplied indisputable evidence of 
Gaddafi’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. At this point it is more likely that a consensus on 
action, including possible strikes, would have been discussed. 
 
As there was not a coalitional consensus concerning to threaten the use of force over 
NK nuclear programme this question cannot be answered.  Although there was the 
shared goal and US leadership, the ROK and PRC were not willing to risk a war that 
could lead to instability within the region. 
 
AQ 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for leading states to mobilise 
support for policies involving threats and use of force? 
 
In none of the episodes did the US seek to use international organisations to mobilise 
support for policies involving the threat or use of force. If the US had sought to do so it 
would have changed its threat from implied to direct, which as discussed previously was 
not deemed to be appropriate in this issues and would have limited its room to 
manoeuvre. 
Libya 
Ep.1    
No threat of force – so not assessed. UN sanctions made it easier to 
organise effective sanctions. 
Libya 
Ep.2  
Implied threat of force. Threat of UN involvement was an important 
element. 
NK Ep.1  IAEA complicated US negotiation strategy.  Final referring of NK to 
UNSC for sanctions may have led to war.  
NK  Ep.2  No threat of force. 
Table 5.17 
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However, the threat of UN sanctions for non-compliance was an element in the US 
strategy to persuade NK. However, the reliance on the IAEA complicated the strategy 
as it was not under US control. The IAEA threatened to refer issues to the UNSC at a 
moment when the US did not want to increase pressure. To some seeking legitimacy 
through the UN seemed to unnecessarily complicate the crisis; as stated by former state 
department intelligence officer, Robert Carlin ‘we made it pretty clear to the North 
Koreans that once we had got done with this UN thing we would sit down and have bi-
lateral talks with them’.22  
 
AQ 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of the coerced to 
develop nuclear weapons?   
 
There is no direct evidence that the implied threats increased the motivation of states to 
obtain nuclear weapons. There was no threat issued implicitly to Libya directly 
concerning nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is not possible to ascertain what impact this 
would have had on his nuclear programme. The implied threat toward states such as 
Libya seems to have decreased Gaddafi motivation to attain nuclear weapons as he 
initiated the negotiations that led to the surrendering of their WMDs. However, even 
whilst US, UK and Libyan negotiations were under way, Libya was continuing with its 
nuclear weapons programme, as demonstrated by the interdiction of parts on the BBC 
China that were destined for Libya. This would indicate that Gaddafi was hedging his 
                                                          
22
 Author’s interview with Mr Robert Carlin, in person, 4 March 2013 
Libya 
Ep.1    
No direct threat over nuclear weapons. 
Libya 
Ep.2  
No direct evidence. 
NK Ep.1  No direct evidence 
NK  Ep.2  No direct evidence 
Table 5.18 
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bets, looking to surrender the weapons only if the deal was right.      
 
There is no evidence to link threats to a change in the pace of NK programme.  
However, the continual NK rhetoric about the mistakes that Saddam made would 
suggest they were concerned that a similar fate awaited them. Therefore, it is logical to 
assume that they increased the pace of their nuclear programme to gain a bigger 
bargaining chip to achieve a better security arrangement with the US or attain a 
deterrent. The only evidence of a possible connection is that when first threatened with 
sanctions they threatened to leave the NPT, and when the pressure had mounted further, 
the DPRK started to unload spent fuel rods. Both of these actions were on the path that 
would eventually enable them to attain a nuclear weapon. 
 
The threat posed by the US was certainly stated by the NK as a justification for why 
they needed to develop a nuclear weapon. Therefore, on face value it would appear 
more threats actually increased their motivation to attain a nuclear weapon. However as 
pointed out by Joseph; perceived threats like ‘they could be next after Iraq’ may have 
had an affect but ‘did they do anything differently no, but it does feed their sense that 
nuclear weapons are essential for deterrence.  But they had that sense before; it just adds 
to it’.23 
 
Although it may appear reasonable to assert that the seeking of a nuclear weapon in the 
first place must have been because the states involved felt threatened, it is not the only 
factor. Developing a nuclear weapon clearly raised the stakes at any negotiation with the 
US or if developed would have enabled the state to extort neighbouring states and deter 
the US. Without access to intelligence reports and policy makers within Libya or NK it 
                                                          
23
 Author’s interview with Ambassador Robert Joseph, in person, 11 March 2013. 
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is not possible to ascertain confidently that threats had any impact on their nuclear 
programmes or to ascertain what there internally stated goal in possessing weapons was. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Table 5.1 summarises the key findings of the comparative analysis. As stated previously 
there is insufficient evidence to categorically state whether there is correlation 
between the application the ideal policy and success. In only 1 of the cases (NK episode 
2) did the outcome and prediction align. Furthermore, this result is discounted as 
there are range of policies that weren’t applied and failure may have still been the 
outcome.  
 
In none of the episodes did the US apply coercive diplomacy in the form of the ideal 
policy. The key element of the ideal policy that was not applied in any of the episodes 
was the issuing of a direct threat that force would be applied if the opponent did not 
comply by a set deadline. The deadlines applied over the use of force were mainly of 
the ‘try and see’ or gradual ‘turn of the screw’ approach. Although in three of the 
episodes studied it is assessed that there was a threat, or at least a partial threat, to use 
force, the threat was implied rather than clearly stated.  
  Threat 
to use 
force 
Deadline 
given 
Assurance 
given 
 
Incentives 
offered 
Ideal 
Policy 
Predicted 
outcome of 
CD 
Actual 
outcome 
of CD 
Will to 
threaten 
and use 
of force? 
Impact of 
org. 
Libya 
Ep.1  
No Partial Partial Yes No Failure Partial 
Success 
Yes Sanctions 
only 
Libya 
Ep.2  
Yes No – 
implied 
Partial Yes No Failure Success Yes No impact 
NK 
Ep.1  
Yes No -
Implied  
Partial Yes No Failure Success No Negative 
NK  
Ep.2  
Partial 
– Yes 
at first 
No Partial Yes No Failure Failure No No impact 
Same as table 5.1 
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The most obvious explanation for not giving a specific deadline and a clear threat is that 
doing so would tie the regime into a course of action; if the opponent did not comply it 
would either have to back down or go through with the action to maintain credibility. 
Therefore, implied threats were made that did not force the US into setting in stone a 
course of action. However, once the US was fully embedded into Iraq its capacity and 
more importantly its political capital to engage in other military action was clearly 
reduced and therefore the credibility of these implied threats declined.  
 
The US did offer incentives in all of the episodes. Particularly in the case of Libya the 
use of incentives not only rewarded the recipient but enabled them to accept the deal 
without it looking like they were backing down to the implied threat of military force. 
Assurances were also issued; however, they were never fully articulated as an assurance 
that further demands would not follow. 
 
The episodes also demonstrate a fundamental difficulty with the assurances component 
of coercive diplomacy. If coercive diplomacy is seen as an option that works it becomes 
tempting to use the strategy again to achieve your next political objective. Coercive 
diplomacy through military strikes in 1986 was viewed a success in influencing Gaddafi 
to pull back from supporting international terrorism, therefore, it was asserted that 
‘Gaddafi would be responsive to pressure’ over the issue of WMD.24 Furthermore, it is 
difficult for democracies to give a credible promise that no issue in the future is not 
going to arise that would not lead future administrations/governments making demands.   
 
Moreover, Libyan and North Korean human rights abuses were always going to be an 
                                                          
24
 Author’s interview with Mr Douglas Feith former Deputy Secretary for Defence, in person, 13 March 
2013. 
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issue which would lead to subsequent US and international demands. US and UK 
specifically left the IAEA out of the negotiations with Gaddafi in 2003 as it 
was assessed that they would complicate the issue by adding additional demands. 
Having two close allies conducting the negotiation meant demands and policy could be 
closely coordinated. During the NK case the conflicting objectives of the US, South 
Korea and IAEA did impact upon the demands that were made of NK. 
 
The most frequent strategy that was adopted was the use of or threat of sanctions, 
incentives and assurances. There was also often an implied threat which arguably blurs 
the line between coercive diplomacy and deterrence. Libya Ep.1 was dominated by 
incentives and assurances; which is a strategy conforming to normal diplomatic 
bargaining along with the threat or use of sanctions. Therefore the approach used could 
be termed sanction based coercive diplomacy.  
 
Libya Ep.2 contained an implied threat of force, but without a deadline and clear 
demand of the target, it could be argued that it was in fact deterrence. The US had laid 
out a threat to all states of pre-emptive strike if they were caught crossing a red line. 
Once the interdictions of the BBC China demonstrated clearly the extent of Libya’s 
programme that is when deterrence failed and it became a strategy of coercive 
diplomacy as at that point it was more overtly demanding them to stop and undo their 
programme.  
 
In both NK episodes red lines were set, which is clearly a strategy of deterrence. 
However, a demand of stopping or undoing is typically classed as demand relating to 
coercive diplomacy. So if a target stops before a red line (i.e. does not move spent fuel 
rods) it could be viewed as either deterrence or coercive diplomacy working. It is only 
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when the demand to undo their programme is it clearly a strategy of coercive 
diplomacy.  
 
Another finding is that in all the episodes the opponent acted rationally in the pursuit of 
their objectives. The key objective of both NK and Libya was regime survival. For NK 
obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent or a bargaining chip to trade 
for the resources and money it required to exist. Even if it miscalculated US resolve and 
the crisis escalated into conflict it clearly had good reason to believe that it would be a 
limited conflict that the regime could weather and then use to its advantage internally. 
 
Jakobsen’s patterns (table 5.12) predict that force should not have threatened in the case 
of NK episode 1 and force should have been threatened in Libya episode 1.  
 
For NK Ep.1 the only pattern where the logic of the ideal policy would imply the threat 
to use force, even if the prospect of success is low, is where the vital interests are 
threatened. However, Clinton was actively considering a pre-emptive strike, or at the 
minimum UNSC resolution imposing sanctions that would have required a surge of a 
100,000 troops into the area to deter any aggressive action when sanctions were 
 Variables Predictions - 
Will to 
threaten and 
use of force? 
Was there 
a threat to 
use force? 
The nature of 
threatened 
interests 
The prospect 
of military 
success 
Domestic 
support 
Libya 
Ep.1  
High High Medium Yes No 
Libya 
Ep.2  
High High Medium Yes Yes 
NK 
Ep.1  
High Low Medium No Yes 
NK  
Ep.2  
High Low Low No No 
Same as Table 5.12 
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announced; this clearly was a threatening action that risked a war that could have led to 
high number of casualties.  
 
There are several reasons that this may result may have occurred. Firstly, again it could 
simply be that the context of this episodes involved psychological factors and 
asymmetric information that affected decision makers so they did not act rationally and 
conform to the way that Jakobsen’s theory predicted.  
 
Secondly, the assessment of how much of a threat to US interests and whether victory 
could be achieved at low cost may be overestimated. In fact the US may have deemed 
Libya as not enough of a threat to consider even a small number of US casualties or the 
expenditure of money, especially if it believed it could get what it wanted through 
diplomacy and sanctions at lower cost.   
 
The most likely explanation for the US not acting in Libya is that the Clinton did not 
view the nuclear issue as an immediate threat and were more concerned with the more 
immediate electoral damage that could be done by not dealing with the highly motive 
issue of reparations for the Lockerbie victims’ families. Raising the issue of nuclear 
weapons backed by the threat of force would clearly have complicated gaining 
compensation. Whereas gaining compensation first, then dealing with the less 
immediate, but important issue of Gaddafi’s emerging nuclear programme seemed a 
more logical strategy.  However, NK development of nuclear weapons would be a direct 
threat to key strategic allies, would seriously have damaged not only US nuclear 
proliferation policy but also perceptions of US power in the world; therefore the crisis 
in the US was deemed to be worth risking war over.   
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Lastly, as stated previously it may be that the Jakobsen's model is simply incorrect and 
that there are so few of these cases and that they are so context dependent that a model 
that would be sufficiently statistically verified to make confident predictions is not 
possible. More cases would need to be studied to build a statistical validation that would 
determine whether this is the case. But even this would be difficult due to the 
difficulties in ensuring that any subsequent studies analysed cases in a consistent way.  
As will be discussed in the next chapter it is highly unlikely to be possible to 
operationalise the ideal policy to the extent that consistency across those studying 
episodes could be achieved.  
 
Overall the comparison of the episodes does give a clear indication of why applying 
coercive diplomacy in the form of the ideal policy is more difficult than applying it over 
acts of aggression. Firstly, although the policy objective is always clearly to prevent the 
target attaining nuclear weapons, there are usually other security issues that are wrapped 
up in the ensuing demand. It is also difficult to have any demand backed by a clear 
deadline. The targets development of a nuclear weapon is an abstract threat until it is 
detected. Even upon detection the threat in these cases was still not seen as imminent.  
Therefore, the issuing of a deadline where force would be used as it would tie the 
coercer into action on the bases of credibility and it would be difficult for them to 
determine fully whether compliance has actually been achieved. Therefore the demands 
aimed at stopping its progression escalate slowly and tend to be backed by less 
restrictive deadlines.   
 
The next chapter will now look at how these findings relate and add to our current 
understanding of coercive diplomacy, critique in more depth the utility of the ideal 
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policy as strategy for preventing state attainment of nuclear weapons and the utility of 
the ideal policy as a framework to study these episodes. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the discipline of strategic studies in two 
distinct ways; firstly, it is the only study to critique Jakobsen’s ideal policy and his 
theory on when states are willing to threaten the use of force. Secondly, it is the only 
study that conducts a structured focussed comparison of NK and Libya using 
Jakobsen’s ideal policy as a framework. It also contains primary source evidence from 
interviews conducted with elite US and UK policy makers and coercive theorists.
1
 This 
research is significant as, although the thesis is primarily an evaluation of Jakobsen’s 
policy, it is examination of coercive diplomacy for preventing proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear proliferation, and the increasing possibility of state or non-state actor 
possession, is one of the most significant issues within international security. Therefore, 
analysis of strategies that seek to prevent proliferation and learning lessons from cases 
is of value to both academics and policy makers.   
 
The main finding of this thesis is that states do not adopt coercive diplomacy in the 
form of the ideal policy when trying to prevent other states from developing nuclear 
weapons. The key reason that the ideal policy is not implemented is that states are 
unwilling to set deadlines and make direct threats to states that are seeking to attain 
nuclear weapons. These elements of the ideal policy are not adopted as states do not 
want to limit their options and be forced into acting for the sole reason maintaining 
credibility. Secondly, I argue that the use of the ideal policy as an analytical framework 
is useful as a starting position to conduct a structured comparison of the cases; however, 
Jakobsen’s ideal policy cannot be used to form accurate predictions of exactly how 
states will behave. Fundamentally, this is because what is a rational decision is 
dependent on the objectives of the decision maker, the information they have access to 
                                                          
1
 A list of those interviewed who are quoted within this thesis can be found at Appendix A.  
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which in turn moulds their perception of the context of the crisis that they are within. 
Therefore, a rational model will form predictions based on the assumption that 
participants have full information of the context that they are making their decision 
within; which is rarely true and in most cases impossible. 
  
The key limitation of this study is the access to reports and individuals that would have 
revealed the inner working of the governments being studied. With access to this data it 
may be that different coding would have been given to the different variables within the 
cases studied. Furthermore, although there is a key attempt to operationalise the ideal 
policy, the codings are still broad enough that different analysts may interpret the same 
data differently and come to a different analysis. In other words the same study 
conducted by a different researcher with access to the same information could come up 
with a different interpretation.  
 
I will also highlight within this chapter other avenues for possible research such as 
examination of Iraq (1992-2003), Iran (1992-ongoing) and possible applying Jakobsen’s 
ideal policy to non-US coercive exchanges such as UK examples of coercive diplomacy 
during the Falklands campaign (1982) and Sierra Leone (Op Palliser 2001). This 
chapter will first provide a brief recap on the key finding of the study followed by 
answering the research questions. I will then examine whether the ideal policy meets the 
claims set up out by Jakobsen and then expand upon contribution and limitations of this 
thesis.   
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Key findings and comparison to Jakobsen’s assessments 
My findings from an analysis of the cases (2 Libyan and 2 NK) can be found in table 
6.1. 
 
There is insufficient evidence to categorically state whether there is correlation between 
the application the ideal policy and success. In only 1 of the cases (NK episode 2) did 
the outcome and prediction align. However, this result is discounted as there is a range 
of policies whose non-application could be argued to have led to failure.  
 
In none of the episodes did the US apply coercive diplomacy in the form of the ideal 
policy. The key element of the ideal policy that was not applied in any of the episodes 
was the issuing of a direct threat that force would be applied if the opponent did not 
comply by a set deadline. George would have termed the deadlines applied as ‘try and 
see’ or gradual ‘turn of the screw’. Although in three of the episodes studied it is 
assessed that there was a threat, or at least a partial threat, to use force, the threat was 
implied rather than clearly stated.  
 
The US did offer incentives in all of the episodes. Particularly in the case of Libya 
where the use of incentives not only rewarded the recipient but enabled them to accept 
the deal without it appearing as if they were backing down to the implied threat of 
  Threat 
to use 
force 
Deadline 
given 
Assurance 
given 
 
Incentives 
offered 
Ideal 
Policy 
Predicted 
outcome of 
CD 
Actual 
outcome 
of CD 
Will to 
threaten 
and use 
of force? 
Impact of 
org. 
Libya
Ep.1  
No Partial Partial Yes No Failure Partial 
Success 
Yes Sanctions 
only 
Libya 
Ep.2  
Yes No – 
implied 
Partial Yes No Failure Success Yes No impact 
NK 
Ep.1  
Yes No -
Implied  
Partial Yes No Failure Success No Negative 
NK  
Ep.2  
Partial 
– Yes 
at first 
No Partial Yes No Failure Failure No No impact 
Table 6.1  
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military force. Assurances were also issued; however, they were never fully articulated 
as an assurance that further demands would not follow.  
 
Allies and international organisations also clearly complicated US strategy in both 
cases. US and UK specifically left the IAEA out of the negotiations with Gaddafi in 
2003 as it was assessed that they would complicate the issue by adding additional 
demands. Having two close allies conducting the negotiations meant demands and 
policy could be closely coordinated. Throughout the NK cases the slightly conflicting 
objectives of the US, SK and IAEA did impact upon the demands that were 
made of the DPRK. 
 
The most frequent strategy that was adopted was the use of or threat of sanctions, 
incentives and assurances. There was also often an implied threat which arguably blurs 
the line between coercive diplomacy and deterrence. Libya Ep.1 was dominated by 
incentives and assurances; which is a strategy conforming to normal diplomatic 
bargaining along with the threat or use of sanctions. Therefore the approach used could 
be termed as sanction based coercive diplomacy.  
 
Libya Ep.2 contained an implied threat of force, but without a deadline and clear 
demand of the target, it could be argued that it was in fact deterrence. The US had laid 
out a threat to all states of pre-emptive strike if they were caught crossing a red line. 
Once the interdictions of the BBC China demonstrated clearly the extent of Libya’s 
programme that is when deterrence failed and it became a strategy of coercive 
diplomacy as at that point it was more overtly demanding them to stop and undo their 
programme.  
 
274 
 
In both NK episodes red lines were set, which is clearly a strategy of deterrence. 
However, a demand of stopping or undoing is typically classed as demand relating to 
coercive diplomacy. So if a target stops before a red line (i.e. does not move spent fuel 
rods) it could be viewed as either deterrence or coercive diplomacy working. It is only 
when the demand to undo their programme is it clearly a strategy of coercive 
diplomacy. 
 
Jakobsen’s patterns predict that force should not have threatened in the case of NK Ep.1 
and force should have been threatened in Libya Episode 1. For NK Ep.1 the only pattern 
where the logic of the ideal policy would imply the threat to use force, even if the 
prospect of success is low, is where the vital interests are threatened. However, Clinton 
was actively considering a pre-emptive strike, or at the minimum UNSC resolution 
imposing sanctions that would have required a surge of a 100,000 troops into the area to 
deter any aggressive action when sanctions were announced; this clearly was a 
threatening action that risked a war that could have led to high number of casualties.  
 
The most interesting of these results is the prediction that force should have been 
threatened where it actually was not (Libya Episode 1) and where force should not have 
been threatened but actually was (NK Episode 1). Any use of force of against NK had a 
high risk of escalating into a very costly conflict in both blood and treasure. In 
 Variables Predictions - 
Will to threaten 
and use of 
force? 
Was there a 
threat to 
use force? 
The nature of 
threatened 
interests 
The prospect of 
military success 
Domestic 
support 
Libya 
Ep.1  
High High Medium Yes No 
Libya 
Ep.2  
High High Medium Yes Yes 
NK Ep.1  High Low Medium No Yes 
NK  Ep.2  High Low Low No No 
Table 6.2 
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comparison threatening Libya with force would have had a lower risk of escalating into 
a more serious conflict and would have been significantly cheaper than a war with NK. 
Therefore, using the patterns of interests alone does not explain the differences in 
outcomes.  
 
Jakobsen did apply the ideal policy to the object of WMD with the results shown in 
table 6.3; although, the detailed analysis underpinning his assessments is not published. 
 
There are differences in the results of my analysis and that of Jakobsen are worth 
examining. Firstly, Jakobsen finds that coercive diplomacy applied to Libya between 
1992-1997 is a failure; whereas I find the coercive diplomacy applied between 1992-
2000 to be a partial success. The difference in the assessments can be explained by the 
time period that the exchange is being examined over. I have assessed the Clinton 
administration’s approach as partial success as the Libyans did respond to US demands 
over terrorists; expelling the Abu Nidal terrorist organization in 1999, breaking ties with 
                                                          
2
 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Coercive Diplomacy’, in Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.243. 
Western use of coercive diplomacy to suspend or end WMD programmes 1990-2005
2
 
Location Demand Adversary Coercive Strategy Outcome 
Libya 
Round 1 
1992-
1997 
End WMD programmes; 
cease terrorist activities; 
hand over terrorist 
suspects;  
provide compensation. 
Libya Sanctions,  
Weak threats of force 
Threats of regime change. 
Failure 
Round 2 
1997-
2003 
End WMD programmes; 
cease terrorist activities; 
hand over terrorist 
suspects;  
provide compensation. 
Libya Sanctions, Implicit threats of 
force, Carrot 
Assurances 
Cheap 
Success 
North Korea 
Round 1 
1993-
1994 
Freeze nuclear 
programme 
North Korea US Sanction, Threats of UN 
sanctions and force, 
Inducements, Assurances 
Temporary 
success 
Round 2 
1997-
2003 
End nuclear programme North Korea US sanctions, Indirect threats of 
force Inducements, Assurances 
? ongoing 
negotiations 
Table 6.3 
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other radical Palestinian groups, closing down training camps, and extraditing suspected 
terrorists to Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen.
3
 They also handed over Lockerbie suspects in 
April 1999.
4
 Furthermore, by October 1999 Libya had offered to join the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), including a pledge to comply with inspection and 
verification provisions. These actions happened after 1997; the end point of Jakobsen’s 
first coercive exchange. What this demonstrates is that the evaluation of success is 
partially dependent on the time frame that the analyst applies to the comparative study. 
 
It is also of note that Jakobsen states that:  
To qualify as a case of coercive diplomacy, explicit threats, sanctions or limited 
force have to be employed by a Western coercer. Cases involving implicit 
threats and shows of force such as the crisis between the United States and 
China over Taiwan have consequently been excluded from the list.
5
 
 
However, he does categorise Libya as a case of coercive diplomacy, and one leading to 
cheap success, even though he acknowledges that there was only an implicit threat 
applied. Therefore, Jakobsen does seem to recognise that implicit threats are still an 
element of a strategy of coercive diplomacy. 
 
My analysis adds to Jakobsen’s assessment of the NK Episode 2 exchange. At the time 
of Jakobsen’s assessment the NK second crisis was still ongoing, whereas when my 
research started it is a failure as a nuclear test is taken to be conducted in 2006. 
Furthermore, it adds to the key finding of both Jakobsen’s research which is that in none 
of the cases was the coercive diplomacy applied in the form of the ideal policy. 
Jakobsen asserts that this was because ‘it proved impossible to use force to deny the 
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adversary’s objectives quickly with little cost’. 6 The difficulty with this statement is 
that it is difficult to determine what little cost actually means; as the cost that a coercer 
is willing to bear is relative to perceived value of the object at that moment in time.   
 
My argument is that the primary reason states have not adopted coercive diplomacy in 
the form of the ideal policy is that they do not wish to limit their room to manoeuvre by 
making a direct threat backed by an explicit deadline. Making such a threat would force 
them either to act in order to maintain credibility or have to back down which would 
damage future coercive attempts. Furthermore, nuclear proliferation crises happen over 
a longer period of time than acts of aggression and within a sovereign states own 
borders. Therefore, it is more of an abstract threat to the domestic audience of the 
coercer and does not generally have the same urgency from the start. Because of the 
slower tempo of these crises demands and directness of the threats escalate over a 
longer period of time. This is unlike acts of aggression where there is more urgent 
pressure to make the aggressor comply in order to limit the damage and suffering that 
they are causing often in another sovereign state. 
 
In this section I have set out my key empirical findings and compared them to those 
presented in Jakobsen’s published work. I will now answer the thesis’ research 
questions.  
 
Research Question 1 - Does Jakobsen’s ideal policy remain valid when applied to 
the context of state attainment of nuclear weapons?  
Although the underpinning logic that Jakobsen ideal policy is based on is valid; there 
are contextual differences between using coercive diplomacy to stop/undo act of 
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aggression as opposed to stop/undo nuclear programmes that make it highly unlikely 
that coercive diplomacy in the form of the ideal policy will in practice be applied for the 
latter objective. The ideal policy is a valid set of questions to use in order to examine 
selected cases; however, it is not possible to determine if it is necessarily more valid 
than using questions derived from Schelling or George. This section will expand on the 
claims further. 
 
The comparison of the episodes does give a clear indication of why applying coercive 
diplomacy in the form of the ideal policy is more difficult than applying it over acts of 
aggression. Firstly, although the policy objective is always clearly to prevent the target 
attaining nuclear weapons, there are usually other security issues that are wrapped up in 
the ensuing demand. It is also difficult to have any demand backed by a clear deadline. 
The targets development of a nuclear weapon is an abstract threat until it is detected. 
Even upon detection the threat in these cases was still not seen as imminent. Therefore, 
the issuing of a deadline, that ties the coercer into action on the basis of credibility, was 
avoided. Furthermore, the covert nature of nuclear programmes means that it would be 
difficult for the initiator to determine fully whether their demands for compliance have 
actually been achieved. Therefore, the demands aimed at stopping its progression 
escalate slowly and tend to be backed by non-specific deadlines.  
 
However, the finding that states do not adopt the ideal policy to deal with nuclear 
proliferation crises does not necessarily make Jakobsen ideal policy invalid as there is 
not sufficient empirical evidence to verify that adoption of ideal policy leads to failure. 
As will be expanded upon in this chapter; the logic that the ideal policy is based on is 
valid, in that it is rational to assert that applying the correct balance of threat/limited use 
of force backed by a hard deadline, assurances and incentives should lead to the target 
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calculating to comply. However, clearly the actual context of the crisis is paramount and 
it is not possible to determine whether the absence/or application of Jakobsen’s ideal 
policy will necessarily lead to a predictable outcome. Non-adoption does not mean there 
is not utility in using the theory as an analytical framework to examine selected cases. 
Jakobsen makes several claims regarding the utility of the ideal policy as a tool for 
examining the strategies.  
 
The first claim is that it can explain coercive diplomacy outcomes more accurately with 
fewer variables.
7
 Although he states ‘explain’; an implied claim is that if both sides act 
rationally then the ideal policy will work; so it is actually a prediction of success. 
However, there is no obvious correlation between the predicted outcome and actual 
empirical outcome of coercive diplomacy for the studied cases. There are too many 
contextual factors in play that make prediction highly unlikely even if the ideal policy is 
applied. Firstly, even in the unlikely event that there is the level of information and 
understanding of the situation required to be able to accurately set the correct balance of 
sticks and carrots; it will also require the opponent to have the same level of information 
and understanding to realise that they should submit. Furthermore, leaders would have 
to be either immune to psychological biases or have the systems and culture of critical 
thinking in place that most closed dictatorships are highly unlikely to tolerate. This is 
another reason that decision makers are unlikely to commit to applying the ideal policy 
as unless they are truly confident that their calculations are correct and that the target 
will comply rationally, they would be limiting their options. However, the strength of 
the framework is that with fewer variables than Schelling and particularly George’s 
theories it does enable a deeper explanation of why the ideal policy was not adopted and 
why the outcome of coercive diplomacy exchange occurred.    
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The second claim is that ‘it can explain coercive diplomacy outcomes just as accurately 
but with fewer conditions representing the operationalisation of Schelling’s five 
necessary conditions and George and Simons ‘particularly significant’.8 Furthermore 
that operationalisation enables policy-makers to decide whether they are present or not 
in a given crisis.
9
 The difficulty with testing this claim is that to verify the first element 
it would be necessary to examine several case studies using different frameworks; such 
as those proposed by Schelling or George. Then the analysis would need to be 
compared in order to attempt to determine which framework yields the most accurate 
analysis. However, it would be difficult to determine which analysis is closer to reality, 
or the truth, to benchmark this assessment against. Therefore, it is not possible to verify 
this claim accurately.   
 
The second element of this claim is that by operationalising the conditions where a 
successful outcome may occur will enable policy makers to decide whether they are 
present or not is difficult to validate empirically. Firstly, Jakobsen’s ideal policy is not 
operationalised to the extent that it is always clear whether an element is present or not.  
It is not easily determined what a state would consider as cheap in terms of blood and 
treasure to achieve a political objective. It is not clear whether domestic support is 
required to start an operation or if it is whether domestic support could be swayed to 
support an operation once it has started; these are contextual elements that are judged by 
the decision maker at the time. Furthermore, this is an element that would seem prone to 
cognitive dissonance or confirmation bias with policy makers interpreting the data 
available to them to come to the answer that they want. Therefore, although Jakobsen 
does go further than Schelling and George in terms of operationalising the conditions 
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that may lead to success; it is not possible to reduce cases to a simple calculation of 
factors to come to an accurate policy. Policy making will remain an art based on the 
judgement and skill of the decision maker; an analysis of previous cases and a 
framework can only aid in developing these skills.  
 
Furthermore, Jakobsen’s assertion of clarity for policy makers by clearly 
operationalising the variables is over emphasised as there is still an element of 
subjectivity. For example what exactly constitutes a threat? The US on occasion makes 
statements such as ‘I will take no options off the table’10, this is clearly an implied threat 
that force may be used, but does it meet the criteria for the ideal policy? This perhaps 
emphasised by the difference in findings between this research and Jakobsens discussed 
earlier. Where Jakobsen viewed Libya episode 1 as a failure, I assessed this to be partial 
success. As I do not have access to the underpinning analysis that went into Jakobsen’s 
assessment it is not possible to determine what exactly leads to the difference. However, 
if the ideal policy is as operationalised as Jakobsen claims such differences in analysis 
should not arise. Therefore although logically these claims are not invalid it is unlikely 
that in reality it will significantly aid policy makers; skill and judgement will still be 
required.   
 
The third claim is that the ideal policy framework is testable. This is a valid claim as 
this study shows that you can test the policy against selected cases. However, the 
accuracy of the test is dependent on the information available to an analyst, 
interpretation of the data and their skill in synthesising the results. Furthermore, as 
coercion is a dynamic process; decisions as to what time periods to analyse the cases 
                                                          
10
 Barack Obama, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union," 24 January 
2012, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=99000, accessed 21 March 2015. 
282 
 
over may lead to differing results. Therefore, although testable it is unclear whether 
tests by other analysts would be consistent. Strategic theories cannot be tested in the 
same manner as theories within the physical sciences. It is not possible to study the 
phenomena in a controlled environment, like a laboratory, where the factors and 
variables can be isolated and a methodology applied that would lead to the same 
outcome, or at least one within the standard deviation. Testing theories on cases has to 
be open to the fact that even what are presented as the controlled variables are not 
identical and there are always differences that may cause variation in outcome. 
Moreover, it is not possible to repeat the test to arrive at statistically verified results. 
That is not to say that testing is not worthwhile as clearly it is the only way to ascertain 
whether there is any accuracy to the theory; and the act of conducting the analysis 
improves our understanding of the phenomena being studied.     
 
The fourth claim is that the focus on implemented policy avoids the mixture of 
contextual variables and success conditions that limit the explanatory power of George 
and Simons’ framework. Again without, testing George and Simons’ framework against 
the given cases and then comparing the results against the ideal policy this claim cannot 
be fully verified. Furthermore, it is not possible to avoid contextual variables as the 
implemented policy is designed based on the policy makers understanding of the 
context. Therefore, whether the policy implemented looks like the ideal policy will 
depend on the context that the policy maker perceives.  
 
The fifth claim is that keeping messages clear and simple reduces the scope for 
misperception and miscalculation.
11
 This would seem a logical claim. However, the 
simplicity of the message is also dependent on the context and complexity of the crisis 
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that it is being applied to and the interpretation of the opponent of the signal. For acts of 
aggression it is easy to see the opponent’s response to demands i.e. the withdraw or 
halting of an advance. However, in the case of nuclear proliferation it may not be 
possible to fully verify compliance. The increased uncertainty of such crises makes 
signalling more difficult and increases the chances of miscalculation and misperception.  
 
The final claim is that ‘the framework requires little knowledge about the opponent’ and 
that ‘one can explain and predict outcomes of coercive diplomacy attempts against 
aggressors by focusing on the policy pursued by the coercer and black boxing the 
opponent’. Jakobsen further asserts that: 
To test this part of my argument I only need to determine whether the 
implementation of the ideal policy results in success and its absence in failure. 
There is no need to analyse the behaviour of the opponent in great detail. The 
only thing I need to decide in the case studies is whether the opponent 
understands the game of coercion to ensure that both players are playing the 
same game.
12
 
 
 
Although it is recognised that ‘incorporating the behaviour of the coercer and opponent’ 
would lead to increased accuracy the limit of information on targets does lead to 
assumptions and educated guesses on the opposition.
13
 Whilst this approach is 
understandable in a vacuum of data on the opponent, it does limit the depth of analysis 
that can be done and the explanatory power of the ideal policy. It also limits 
determination of whether the ideal policy worked because of the implementation of the 
policy or because of another reason. However, in order to determine whether it was 
truly the coercer’s choice to comply the opponent has to be examined in depth and 
incorporated into the analysis as much as possible.   
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The logic that the ideal policy is based on is valid. However, as discussed previously 
there are contextual differences between using coercive diplomacy to stop/undo acts of 
aggression in comparison to stop/undo nuclear programmes that make it highly unlikely 
that states will adopt the ideal policy for this objective. Furthermore, many of the claims 
that Jakobsen makes about the ideal policy are also difficult to validate without also 
analysing the cases using other analytical frameworks; even then it would be difficult to 
determine which analysis was in fact closer to the reality. However, as an analytical 
framework through which to examine the cases Jakobsen’s framework is valid and can 
provide useful insight into the use of coercive diplomacy for the goal of preventing 
nuclear attainment.  
 
Research question 2 - What are the factors, conditions and variables unique to 
coercive diplomacy being employed against states seeking nuclear weapons that 
may need to be incorporated into the ideal policy?  
There are several factors that are unique or different to coercive diplomacy being 
employed against states seeking nuclear weapons as opposed to act of aggression; 
which in turn need to be considered.  
 
Firstly, the clandestine nature of nuclear programmes means that they are well hidden 
and not easily detectable. Therefore, it is not easy to determine whether they have a 
programme in the first place. It is then difficult to know how advanced the programme 
is. This makes it difficult to issue credible demands. Demanding that they stop enriching 
Uranium or processing spent fuel rods is of little use if they have already obtained 
enough material to make a bomb. This issue is further complicated by the dual 
technological nature of most nuclear equipment. As it becomes difficult to make 
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legitimate demands that are calibrated to prevent the nuclear programme but not inhibit 
the peaceful and legal development of civilian nuclear technology. 
 
Secondly, due to the deterrent capability of nuclear weapons there is a strategic window 
where coercive diplomacy, or even force, can be applied as an effective strategy to stop 
a programme. Once a state has a nuclear weapon and a viable delivery system it has a 
credible deterrent which significantly complicates the ability to coerce or use force 
against the target.  
 
Thirdly, the longer time frame of nuclear crisis compared to acts of aggression means 
that demands and the developments of threats are more gradual. Therefore, it is more 
difficult to justify why action needs to be taken immediately and a willingness to look in 
slower time for less coercive options will always be strongly argued.  
 
Fourthly, nuclear weapons are developed within the borders of a sovereign state. 
Therefore, you need significant evidence to justify breaking a state’s sovereignty by 
intervening within its borders. Furthermore, it can be difficult to find evidence that the 
nuclear programme is specifically military and not civilian. It can be difficult to justify 
to domestic audiences as the threat is abstract; especially if it is not even certain it 
exists. This is damaged further by instances such as the Iraq War where the public and 
international community were told that Saddam posed an immediate threat due to WMD 
that could be launched within 45 minutes. Finding no WMD and proof that this claim 
had been exaggerated shows the difficulty. Moreover, the resulting insurgency in Iraq 
has probably significantly damaged the likelihood that domestic audiences within 
democracies, at least in the short term, will support any recommendation of launching 
overt strikes on states that are seeking WMD. 
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Research Question 3 - How can the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy be 
improved in order to prevent states attaining nuclear weapons? 
States do not adopt a policy of coercive diplomacy that conforms to that of the ideal 
policy in order to stop/undo a target state’s nuclear programme. The form of coercive 
diplomacy that is generally adopted to prevent nuclear proliferation is what George 
would have termed ‘turning of the screw’ and utilisation of economic and other non-
violent sanctions. However this does not mean that this is in fact the best policy that 
could be implemented. 
 
Elements that would aid a strategy of coercive diplomacy are as follows: Firstly, 
increased efforts to obtain sound intelligence. It is only with sound evidence of 
capability and intent of the opponent can states make the threat real enough to garner 
the required domestic and international support to take action within the identified 
strategic window. Therefore, the cornerstone of nuclear proliferation policy should be 
obtaining intelligence on suspected proliferators. The intelligence that led to BBC China 
being interdicted under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was clearly the final 
straw that pushed Libya to surrender its programme, as Gaddafi believed a more 
coercive US policy would follow. More evidence would also enable states to remove 
the abstract nature of the threat and frame the domestic and international debate that 
brings the level of immediacy that may lead to more coercive strategies.  
 
Secondly, there needs to be a clearer international consensus and agreement on the 
unacceptability of a state to have a nuclear weapons programme. If states were 
committed to acting against states that were clearly in breach of IAEA protocols then it 
would strengthen economic sanctions. It would strengthen the credibility of any threats 
being made. However, it is acknowledged that this is an idealistic point of view and that 
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creating such a culture is difficult, if not impossible. It is rarely possible to gain the 
required international consensus as other political issues will always influence the view 
point of key states. For example China most likely did not want NK to have a nuclear 
weapon capability; however, it was unwilling to exert the required pressure to stop it as 
it most likely feared the consequences of a DPRK collapse that may result from such 
external pressure. Furthermore, the consistent belief of US administrations that China 
has influence over NK in itself gives China a position of influence with the US that it 
may rather maintain than resolve the fundamental issues.  
 
There is an element of hypocrisy in the P5 being allowed to maintain nuclear arsenals 
that makes it difficult to achieve international consensus on nuclear weapons. Whilst 
established nuclear states argue that the weapons are the fundamental guarantor of their 
nation’s security14 it is difficult to see why other states would not want such a 
guarantee. Therefore, states that perceive themselves to be under a direct threat, where a 
nuclear weapon would be of deterrent value to them (i.e. Iran, NK), may in fact garner 
covert support or at least neutrality from some states over the issue of their weapons 
programme.  
 
If an established power, such as the UK or France, who are under less immediate direct 
threat, were to surrender their capability, and other states such as Russia and US made a 
significant reduction or even disarmed completely, it would lessen the hypocrisy. 
However, decreasing the hypocrisy itself would be unlikely to stop a state such as NK 
from pursuing a nuclear weapon. But it would increase the established powers 
motivation to ensure that others did not proliferate which would increase the credibility 
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of any threat that they gave to proliferators. If states cannot rely on nuclear deterrence, 
as they would have given up their deterrent, they would be more motivated to ensure, 
with allies, that no one cheats and develops such a capability. Whereas by maintaining a 
nuclear weapon they always leave the calculation in the mind of the opponent that they 
will be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon as the opposition would rather rely on 
moving to a deterrent posture than enact a threat. This can be seen in the case of NK, as 
the US was not willing to take a hard stand prior to the first test despite its final rhetoric 
in 2005; and now the US effectively relies on nuclear deterrence of NK. 
  
The elimination of nuclear weapons would also lessen the perception that these 
weapons are a great power status symbol. For example if the UK surrendered its nuclear 
weapon capability it would be difficult to make an argument for others to remove it 
from the UNSC without consolidating the perception that these weapons are of value 
and bring status in the world. However, it is recognised that again this is idealistic and it 
is highly unlikely that any state, such as the UK, will surrender its nuclear weapon 
capability. The primary reason for this is the same issue of rationality that affects how 
policy makers implement a strategy of coercive diplomacy. Whilst it is rational in a 
short to medium term for a state to hold onto such weapons as it cannot be sure what 
threat it may face in the future; the status quo is highly likely to lead to more states 
possessing nuclear weapons and increase the chance of a future nuclear exchange that 
could escalate into a global catastrophe. Therefore, whilst it may be rational for a single 
state to keep its nuclear weapons and not to commit a radical act of disarmament that 
may lessen the chance of further proliferation; what may be rational for the long term 
survival of mankind (which includes that state) would be for such a state to surrender its 
capability and set in motion, or at least create an opportunity, for an international 
environment less tolerant of such weapons.  
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Another way of strengthening coercive diplomacy in the long term would be to 
punish a state that obtains a nuclear weapon by subjecting them to extreme punishment 
in the form of either large scale conventional or even nuclear attack. Clearly this would 
be ethically dubious, against international norms and unlikely to be palatable to 
domestic audiences. Furthermore, the resulting collapse within the target state would 
most likely lead to an even deeper crisis in the short to medium term. However, clear 
resolve and overwhelming punishment on a state for attainment of a nuclear weapon 
would make all other states considering attaining nuclear weapons in contravention to 
international norms rethink their position. The invasion of Iraq over issues of WMD did 
influence Gaddafi to believe he was next and give power to US/UK negotiators. The 
getting bogged down in the country and trying to achieve other strategic aims, such as 
attempting to set up a liberal democracy, eventually led to a weakening of US coercive 
power. 
 
States could also look to further develop, or at the minimum, maintain their coercive 
military capabilities. This would involve investment more in capabilities such as carrier 
strike, amphibious forces, Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAV), weaponised satellites and 
long range precision munitions. These capabilities can poise and threaten the possibility 
of action without necessarily committing fully to an action. It is unlikely that additional 
capabilities would have affected either of the cases studied; Libya was already willing 
to surrender its nuclear capability and NK would have carried on anyway. However, if 
the US did not have these capabilities it is less likely that either side would have 
complied without increased incentives. If the US had the capability and intelligence to 
detect and accurately strike at nuclear plants it may raise doubts in the minds the targets 
whether starting or maintaining such a programme was viable. 
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Increasing non-violent costs of developing nuclear programmes would also increase the 
potency of coercive diplomacy. Increasing the effectiveness of regimes such as the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) would aid in increasing the costs of not only 
obtaining the material and equipment for a programme but the chance of detection that 
may in turn affect the cost-benefit analysis of states seeking such weapons. Again 
though this is reliant on how the international community views the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons as the PSI’s effectiveness is dependent on states volunteering to join it and 
then meeting their obligations under the initiative.   
   
Larger incentives could be offered to adjust the cost calculation of the opponent.  
However, the difficulty is how this is sold to the domestic audiences. Larger incentives 
are most likely to be accused of being appeasement and rewarding bad behaviour. 
Therefore, opposition political parties will try to tear the policy down in the domestic 
arena. Furthermore, they could in fact lead to further aggressive behaviour as the target 
state feels it needs to keep the stakes high in order to obtain more rewards. Moreover, 
the rewards may in fact bolster the regime and maintain a system that left in isolation 
would most likely collapse. This is particularly the case for NK; where the incentives 
the regime received as part of the Agreed Framework (AF) aided its survival.  
 
The offer of security assurances to states that if they cease seeking to attain nuclear 
weapons that forcible regime change or further advances is perhaps the most pragmatic 
element to adopt. However, democracies are often inconsistent in their dealings with 
dictatorships; which in turn damages their credibility in future exchanges. Attempts to 
gain a domestic consensus can be attempted, but are often difficult to achieve and even 
more difficult to maintain. This can clearly be seen in both cases. The Republicans from 
the outset were clear that the AF had to be torn up and Gaddafi’s overthrow in 2011 was 
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effectively aided by the same states that negotiated with him over the surrender of his 
nuclear programme in 2003 and gave him at least a tacit security assurance.  
 
Limitations and criticism of the research 
There are clear limitations to this thesis. Firstly, I have only studied 4 episodes which 
are not enough to derive any statistically viable relationship between prediction and 
outcome. If this is to be achieved, as more cases of this nature arise they will need to be 
studied. 
 
I have only had access to open source material and experts who were willing to be 
interviewed. I have then had to make judgements and interpretations of what this 
limited data means in relation to Jakobsen’s ideal policy. This process increases the risk 
that my conclusions diverge from reality/truth. If I had access to key members of the 
Libyan and North Korean governments and their internal documents I would perhaps 
have arrived at a different interpretation of events. Every time I have made a judgement 
or interpretation there is a risk that an error has been introduced. 
 
One criticism that could be levelled at this study is that it is immoral as it is looking at 
methods that more powerful states can develop strategies to influence less powerful 
states through the use of threats of force. Furthermore, that coercive diplomacy as a 
threat based strategy is illegitimate as it specifically states within the UN charter: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
15
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Both these points are valid arguments but are actually irrelevant to this research. The 
research is primarily focussed on testing Jakobsen’s ideal policy; therefore, is theory 
testing and a valid academic pursuit, examining phenomena that already are in 
existence. Secondly, those lessons that may be taken by policy makers are likely to 
improve the ability to stop nuclear proliferation which in itself can only be 
advantageous to international security.  
 
Furthermore, there is value in studying illegitimate phenomena. It would seem strange 
not to study crimes; even if such studies offer criminals lessons on how to improve their 
undertakings, as it usually provides greater insights into how these crimes could be dealt 
with or prevented. Improving our understanding of coercive diplomacy may in fact lead 
states to try more innovative upstream prevention measures as it is clear that coercive 
diplomacy is difficult to implement successfully.   
 
The use of Coercive Diplomacy as a strategy to prevent nuclear proliferation 
Coercive diplomacy remains as Jakobsen points out a difficult strategy to employ.  
Furthermore, I firmly agree with Jakobsen that the best approach for states is to seek to 
avoid using coercive diplomacy by using other strategies to prevent nuclear 
proliferation. Primarily through reduction in established states nuclear stocks, increased 
international agreements backed by initiatives such as the PSI and the use of diplomatic 
bargaining and the offering of security assurances. Offering incentives has a place, but 
there is a risk that this in fact incentivises states to obtain or carry out nuclear hedging. 
The use of positive rewards will make some see the actual act of having a programme as 
a way to rewards. This in turn will increase the likelihood that in sometime in the future 
they will cross the nuclear threshold; as spending money on developing a programme to 
drop it for little gain would be a waste; therefore, momentum will keep the programme 
going if no rewards are forthcoming. 
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It is highly unlikely that states, in particular democracies, will be able to significantly 
improve their attempts at coercive diplomacy. Democracies will be rarely willing to 
make direct threats of force that will be sufficiently credible and backed by a clear 
deadline; they will be unlikely to be able to offer incentives that will not be difficult to 
sustain with domestic audiences; they will find it difficult to provide assurances that 
subsequent governments will abide by. This is also most likely the lessons that 
proliferators are obtaining from study of these cases.    
 
Implications for Coercive theory 
The key implication for theory is that states do not adopt coercive diplomacy in the 
form of the ideal policy when trying to prevent state proliferation of nuclear weapons . 
However, the question still remains if they did would it be successful as a strategy?  
However there are several issues that make this question difficult to answer.  Primarily, 
it is impossible to determine empirically what would have happened if it had been 
adopted. It is straight forward to reason that the threat of force applied at the right time 
should logically lead to compliance. But unless it is attempted and an empirical pattern 
emerges it is not possible to know whether there are other variables that would make an 
ideal policy result in failure. For example it maybe that psychological biases and 
miscalculation are always going to be present to an extent that the ideal policy rarely 
works. If this was a case applying a rational formed ideal policy may be 
counterproductive as the threat leads to increased motivation to develop a deterrent, or 
at least progress the capability to the point where a deterrent could be obtained rapidly. 
 
Another finding of theoretical note is that in all the episodes the opponent acted 
rationally in the pursuit of their objectives. The key objective of both NK and Libya was 
regime survival. For NK obtaining a nuclear weapon would give them a deterrent or a 
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bargaining chip to trade for the resources and money it required to exist. Even if it 
miscalculated US resolve and the crisis escalated into conflict it clearly had good reason 
to believe that it would be a limited conflict that the regime could weather and then use 
to its advantage internally. Furthermore, the determination of whether an act was 
rational is very dependent on where you conduct the analysis from and the objectives of 
the actor being assessed. Individuals construct their reality based on the information that 
is given to them and then rationality can only be judged by assessing whether under that 
construct did they carryout actions that led them closer to achieving their objective.  
Therefore, the ideal policy based on deductive logic will determine that a different 
rational outcome will occur compared to that of the actual actor. This finding strongly 
confirms Freedman’s concluding point that  
The study of coercion cannot be considered to be simply about the design of 
efficient threats. It must also consider the way that strategic actors construct 
reality, and in particular their grasp of how their opponents construct their own 
reality.
16
 
 
I also strongly agree with George
17
 that context is important. There is no one strategy 
that can be applied like a mathematical formula that will lead to success. The differing 
context of the case studies and in particular the motivation of the leaders and strategic 
position of the states involved hugely impacted on the outcomes. This is particular 
evident in the cases willingness to use force. The rational formulae determined by 
Jakobsen would indicate that Clinton should have threatened force against Libya and 
not NK.  In fact he was at the brink of making a decision that could have easily 
escalated to a costly war with the DPRK and did not threaten Gaddafi directly with 
force. The context, psychology of the main actors and data available to them all played 
into producing an outcome different from that a detached rational calculation would 
                                                          
16
 Freedman, Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases, pg. 36. 
 
17
 Alexander L George, Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics, in Alexander L George & 
William E Simmons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Second Edition, (Boulder, Colo.:Westview 
Press, 2nd
 
revised edn, 1994), pg. 291. 
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predict. Studying and comparing these cases is only useful, in far as it gives us 
guidelines that may work, it does not immediately provide the solution to all future 
success. 
 
Another point that backs up theoretical points raised by many scholars
18
 is that there is a 
clear blurring between coercive diplomacy and deterrence when looking at the demands 
made in the case of nuclear proliferation. Telling a target that there is a red line that if 
they cross will result in a reaction would commonly be taken as a deterrent threat.  
However, if you are telling someone to stop an action that they have already started that 
is taken as being a threat related to coercive diplomacy. Therefore, telling someone to 
not pass a certain point of a nuclear programme (i.e. do not enrich Uranium to 80% or 
move spent fuel rods) sits in a blurred line between these strategies.  They have moved 
towards the line, but not necessarily moved across it.  
 
I also argue that regarding nuclear proliferation there is a strategic window where 
coercive diplomacy is viable strategy. This window starts at the moment that enough 
intelligence can be obtained to make a convincing case to gain the international and 
domestic backing to be able to implement an effective strategy of coercive diplomacy.  
It finishes the moment that the target demonstrates or is believed to hold an effective 
delivery system and nuclear weapon; as at that point coercive diplomacy becomes too 
expensive and deterrence becomes the most likely course of action. 
 
I would also add caution to Jakobsen’s argument that ‘that a good understanding of the 
adversary and accurate intelligence is necessary for coercive success must be 
                                                          
18
 Douglas Peifer, ‘Risk-free Coercion? Technological Disparity and Coercive Diplomacy’, European 
Security, Vol 18, No.1(2009), pg.14; Byman&Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, pg.8;  
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abandoned’ as essentially it ‘is possible to coerce opponents you do not understand’.19  
Whilst it is possible to coerce states without good understanding; coercion would be far 
more effective if you know what to target, what to offer and what to assure. As will be 
discussed in a moment good intelligence is a coercive multiplier. 
  
Implications for policy 
Coercive diplomacy is a particularly difficult strategy to adopt for the purpose of 
preventing nuclear proliferation. Fundamentally it is reliant on receiving enough 
intelligence to give policymakers the confidence that they can build a case against the 
opposing side and justify if required a more coercive strategy. Furthermore, if a 
coercive strategy is to be implemented it has to be done in the strategic window between 
detection and the target achieving a nuclear weapon and delivery system. Therefore, 
policymaker’s primary aim should be to collect intelligence on suspected proliferators 
and seek to develop stronger international regimes that engender a more hostile 
international environment for proliferators and tolerance for the possession of nuclear 
weapons. A radical, but highly unlikely, way that this shift in international acceptance 
of nuclear weapons could be instigated would be for a recognised nuclear power to 
surrender its own nuclear weapons. But it is more likely that reduction programmes 
would be the most that could be achieved.  
 
Future Research avenues 
The most obvious avenue of research would be to build upon this study through an 
examination of US coercive diplomacy against Iran and Iraq. This would aid in 
confirming or disproving the theoretical findings within this thesis. Jakobsen did state 
that the ideal policy could also be applied to terrorism. Therefore, another avenue of 
                                                          
19
 Op.cit, Jakobsen, (2011), pg.165. 
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research could be to test the ideal policy to stopping, or undoing, terrorists/insurgents 
campaigns.  
 
The study of coercive diplomacy within this thesis, and most of the literature, has 
focussed on the US as the coercer. Further studies could look to examine other states 
use of coercive diplomacy. The UK’s use of coercive diplomacy; in particular the 
Falkland’s Campaign and Sierra Leone, could reveal interesting differences in strategic 
culture and approaches.  
 
Furthermore, neuroscience and psychology are rapidly advancing and increasingly 
revealing cognitive biases that decision makers are prone to and how people can be 
influenced. This emerging discipline could offer the development of more accurate 
models that could be used to underpin influence strategies such as coercive diplomacy. 
These studies would all enrich our understanding of coercive diplomacy and how it 
could be developed as an effective strategy. 
 
Nuclear proliferation remains one of the greatest threats to international security and 
mankind. Whilst the hope of a world without nuclear powers remains remote, the 
utmost needs to be done in order to ensure that the incentive to attain these weapons is 
minimised. One can only have faith that leaders and the will of the people will at some 
stage combine to shape an international system where such weapons will be perceived 
by all to have no utility.
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Appendix A – Interview Strategy 
 
The aim of this section is to briefly discuss some of the key issues regarding elite 
interviews, followed by an explanation of the approach that was adopted within this 
thesis. A full review of the literature on elite interviewing has not been conducted as it 
is deemed to be beyond the scope of this thesis, but clearly as the research involves elite 
interviews a consideration of some of the key issues is required. 
 
Stedward argues that the first question a researcher should ask themselves, before 
conducting interviews, is whether it is the ‘best’ or only way available to obtain the 
required information.
1
 Secondly, Stedward points out that some researcher may not 
have the personal qualities to conduct effective interviews; therefore interviewing for 
some individuals will practically not be a suitable research strategy. George argues that 
the value of interviews, along with other forms of qualitative sources, is that ‘the 
researcher may inductively discover independent variables that previous theories may 
have overlooked’.2 Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill also argue that the use of research 
interviews ‘enables the collection of a rich and detailed set of data’. 3 However, as will 
be discussed there a criticisms of interviews and the value of data collected via this 
approach.
  
  
 
Whilst there are many different styles of interviews, I have focused specifically on 
‘elite’ interviews; as that is the approach adopted for this research. Stedward states that:  
                                                          
1
 Gail Stedward, , On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing, in Peter Burnham eds, Surviving the 
Research Process, (London, Pinter, 1997), pg 152. 
 
2
 George&Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pg.18. 
 
3
 Saunders&Lewis&Thornhill, Research for buisnes students, pg.35. 
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The ‘elite’ interview is, as the name suggests, often (but not exclusively) 
conducted with a person of some status or influence within an organisation. The 
interviewee responds to the interviewers’ inquiries, and unlike a tightly structured 
interview of the sort used in consumer research , the interviewee is encouraged to 
introduce her/his own ideas, not just in response to the questions but in suggesting 
areas of enquiry to the researcher.
4
  
 
She further adds that they ‘generally take the form of an unstructured or semi-structured 
conversation between interviewer and interviewee’.5 However, Lancaster argues ‘that 
the term ‘elite’ is not always defined within the literature, but is generally used to 
describe individuals or groups who ostensibly have closer proximity to power or 
particular professional expertise’.6  
 
One of the first problems for a researcher is to gain access to elites. The literature 
contains various individual tips for achieving this. A controversial suggestion by 
Stedward is that research students do not reveal themselves as a student, without lying, 
until the actual interview, where they then should be clear their status.
7
 Lancaster argues 
‘that the difficulties associated with gaining access and establishing rapport may have 
been ‘exaggerated’ within the literature, while other (potentially more problematic) 
aspects of ‘studying up’ remain relatively underexplored.8   
                                                          
4
 Gail Stedward, , On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing, in Peter Burnham eds, Surviving the 
Research Process, (London, Pinter, 1997), pg 152 
 
5
 Ibid. 
 
6
 Kari Lancaster, ‘Confidentiality, anonymity and power relations in 
elite interviewing: conducting qualitative policy research in a politicised domain’, International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology, (2016) , pg.1, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13645579.2015.1123555 accessed 28 May 2016. 
 
7
 Gail Stedward, , On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing, in Peter Burnham eds, Surviving the 
Research Process, (London, Pinter, 1997), pg 153 
 
8
 Kari Lancaster, ‘Confidentiality, anonymity and power relations in 
elite interviewing: conducting qualitative policy research in a politicised domain’, International 
Journal of Social Research Methodology, (2016) , pg.3 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13645579.2015.1123555 accessed 28 May 2016. 
300 
 
Key to a good interview is the questions that are asked. Stedward argues that questions 
should be thought out prior and should be designed with the following in mind: 
1. What sort of information will this question provide? 
2. Can I get this information from elsewhere? 
3. Do I really need this information? 9 
 
Clift also emphasises that before conducting interviews you should draft the questions 
and select the most ‘pertinent’.  Furthermore, that the most complex questions do not 
come right at the start.
10
  He also emphasises they should be open-ended questions and 
that the answers should not be pre-empted.   Furthermore, that they should ‘aim to find 
out how respondents perceive situations, what they feel is of central importance’.11 
 
A common criticism of interviews is that ‘researchers often had predetermined 
hypotheses based on theory or prior research, and they used the research interview as an 
opportunity to test the validity of their hypotheses’.12 George similarity relates to this 
stating that: 
Scholars are not immune from the general tendency to attach particular 
significance to an item that supports their pre-existing or favoured interpretation 
and, conversely, to downplay the significance of an item that challenges it.  As 
cognitive dissonance theory reminds us, most people operate with a double 
                                                          
9
 Gail Stedward, ‘On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing’, in Peter Burnham eds, Surviving the 
Research Process, (London, Pinter, 1997), pg 155. 
 
10
 Ben Clift, ‘Elite interviewing: Drafting your questions’, 18th November 2014,  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/phd/academic/po961/interviewshandout2014.pdf
, accessed 29 May 2016. 
 
11
 Ben Clift, ‘Elite interviewing: Drafting your questions’, 18th November 2014,  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/phd/academic/po961/interviewshandout2014.pdf
, accessed 29 May 2016. 
 
12
 James Joseph Scheurich, ‘A postmodernist critique of research 
Interviewing’, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, Vol.8, No.3 (1995), pg.241.  
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standard in weighing evidence. They more readily accept new information that is 
consistent with an existing mind-set and employ a much higher threshold for 
giving serious consideration to discrepant information that challenges existing 
policies or preferences.
13
 
 
 
Scheibelhofer in particular points out that due to their reliance on themes; ‘semi-
structured interviews are highly structured by the researcher’s concerns. Thus, a 
profound goal of qualitative research—that is, to be open to the social world we study 
without implicitly imposing our own ideas—can be at risk’.14  Scheurich argues that: 
This plethora of baggage, in the guise of the interviewer, interacts with an 
interviewee, who, of course, brings her or his own baggage to the interaction. 
That the written result, the final interpretation of the interview interaction, is 
overloaded with the researcher's interpretive baggage is inevitable. In a very 
important sense, this written representation is largely, though not completely, 
only a mirror image of the researcher and her or his baggage.
15
 
 
Clift also point out that is important to check between the interviewee’s account and 
other sources as the interviewee may be ‘presenting a particular self-image, perhaps 
involving a selective memory, retrospective perspicacity or even deceit’.16  Key to 
avoiding this is the process of ‘Triangulation’ with other sources.  As stated: 
One never treats interviewee’s account at face value as factual data. It is 
important not to rely on a single respondent. It is incumbent upon the researcher 
to verify the information supplied by interviewee. Thus research designs should 
attempt to incorporate the analysis, interpretation and evaluation of other sources 
- other interviewees, and also other research techniques e.g. archival research, 
                                                          
13
 George&Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pg.99 
 
14
 Elisabeth Scheibelhofer, ‘Combining Narration‐Based Interviews with 
Topical Interviews: Methodological Reflections on Research Practices’, International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology, Vol.11, No.5 (2008), pg.406. 
 
15
 James Joseph Scheurich, ‘A postmodernist critique of research interviewing’, International Journal of 
Qualitative Studies in Education, Vol.8, No.3 (1995), pg.249. 
 
16
 Ben Clift, Elite interviewing: Drafting your questions, 18th November 2014,  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/phd/academic/po961/interviewshandout2014.pdf
, accessed 29 May 2016. 
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documentary analysis. This triangulation process can also include the secondary 
literature, in addition to other forms of primary data collection. 
17
 
 
My Approach 
All interviews conducted as part of this research were semi-structured. Interviewees 
were selected based on their expertise; most were identified from reports and secondary 
sources during the initial research of the cases. Interviewees were provided, in the initial 
request, with the questions/themes that formed the structure of the subsequent interview.  
The questions and themes were tailored specifically to the individual and there 
particular area of expertise or experience. The pre-warning an individual of the 
questions that would be asked was done in order to encourage busy ‘elites’ to 
participate and give them a clear understanding of what would be talked about.  During 
the interviews, questions often led quickly to a more in-depth discussion. Prior to each 
interview, the interviewee was asked whether they were content to be recorded on a 
digital voice recorder. Only one of the interviewees, whose material was used, was not 
content to be recorded. For this interview notes were taken, which were subsequently 
written up after the interview had concluded. Where an interviewee did agree to be 
recorded, a detailed transcript of the interview was produced after the interview.   
 
The interviewees were sent the specific quotes to be used within the thesis.  Whilst it is 
recognised this gives significant power to the interview as they were given the chance to 
amend their words; it was seen as practically necessary to offer this control in order to 
obtain interviews with the selected ‘elites’.  Interviewees were asked to confirm whether 
their quotes could be attributed. On occasion this led to slight amendments, via e-mail. 
Three interviewees have not responded to confirm whether their quotes could be 
                                                          
17
 Ben Clift, Elite interviewing: Drafting your questions, 18th November 2014,  
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/phd/academic/po961/interviewshandout2014.pdf
, accessed 29 May 2016. 
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attributed; therefore, they are unattributed (cited as Source A, B & C). For each of the 
unattributed sources I have a recording of their interview.  Of the 125 ‘elites’ that were 
sent interview request letters/approached, 30 agreed to be interviewed. Quotes from 24 
of those interviewed have been used within the thesis. 
 
Written summaries and interview recordings were kept on my personal laptop which is 
kept in a safe location. All the quotations used in the thesis are semi-verbatim as all 
umms, ahh’s, stuttering and false starts have been removed. 
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Interviews undertaken as part of 
research 
 
Status of individual Length of 
interview 
Location of 
interview 
Mr Robert Carlin 4 March 
2013 
Bob Carlin is a Visiting Scholar at CISAC. From both in and 
out of government, he has been following North Korea since 
1974 and has made 25 trips there. He recently co-authored a 
lengthy paper to be published by the London International 
Institute of Strategic Studies, entitled "Politics, Economics and 
Security: Implications of North Korean Reform." 
Carlin served as senior policy advisor at the Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from 2002-2006, 
leading numerous delegations to the North for talks and 
observing developments in-country during the long trips that 
entailed. 
From 1989-2002, he was chief of the Northeast Asia Division 
in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department 
of State. During much of that period, he also served as Senior 
Policy Advisor to the Special Ambassador for talks with North 
Korea, and took part in all phases of US-DPRK negotiations 
from 1992-2000. From 1971-1989, Carlin was an analyst at the 
Central Intelligence Agency, where he received the 
Exceptional Analyst Award from the Director of Central 
Intelligence.
1
 
82 mins In person, 
Washington DC 
                                                          
1
 Robert Carlin Bio, Stanford, http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/people/Robert_Carlin/, accessed 10 January 2016. 
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Mr Jack David 15 March 
2013 
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Negotiations Policy.  
79 mins In person, at his 
home, United 
States. 
Ms Paula DeSutter  18 March 
2013 
Paula Adamo DeSutter was United States Assistant Secretary 
of State for Verification, Compliance, and 
Implementation from 2002 to 2009. 
3 hours In person, 
Fredericksburg, 
United States 
Ambassador Joseph 
DeTrani  
12 March 
2013 
President of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance 
(INSA). Previously, he served as the Senior Advisor to the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and as 
the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center 
(NCPC) of the ODNI. At the NCPC, Ambassador DeTrani was 
the National Intelligence Manager for Counter proliferation 
(CP) and the North Korea Mission Manager. Prior to his tenure 
at the ODNI, Ambassador DeTrani worked at the Department 
of State as both the Special Envoy for Negotiations (the Six-
Party Talks) with North Korea and as the U.S. Representative 
to the Korea Energy Development Organization. Before his 
service at the State Department, he held numerous positions in 
the CIA, including Director of East Asia Operations.
2
 
 
31 mins Telephone 
interview 
Mr Chuck Downs  9 March 
2013 
Chuck Downs is a former senior foreign and defence policy 
adviser for the Republican Policy Committee in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and author of Over the Line, North 
Korea’s Negotiating strategy. 
 
120 mins In person, At his 
home,  
                                                          
2
 Ambassador Joseph DeTrani Bio, http://www.icasinc.org/bios/detranij.html, accessed 10 January 2016. 
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Dr Nicholas 
Eberstadt   
3 April 
2013 
Nicholas Eberstadt, a political economist and a demographer 
by training, is also a senior adviser to the National Bureau of 
Asian Research, a member of the visiting committee at the 
Harvard School of Public Health, and a member of the Global 
Leadership Council at the World Economic Forum. He 
researches and writes extensively on economic development, 
foreign aid, global health, demographics, and poverty. He is 
the author of numerous monographs and articles on North and 
South Korea, East Asia, and countries of the former Soviet 
Union.
3
  
 
56 mins Telephone 
interview 
Mr Douglas Feith  13 March 
2013 
Douglas J. Feith is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center 
for National Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute. Mr. 
Feith is the author of War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at 
the Dawn of the War on Terrorism, published in April 2008 by 
HarperCollins. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 
July 2001 until August 2005, he helped devise the U.S. 
government's strategy for the war on terrorism and contributed 
to policy making for the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns.
4
 
 
30 mins (not 
recorded) 
In person, 
Hudson Institute, 
Inc. 1015 15th 
Street, N.W. 6th 
Floor 
Washington, DC 
20005. 
Dr Mark Fitzpatrick  7 February 
2013 
Executive Director, IISS-US.  26-year career in the US 
Department of State, where for the previous ten years he 
focused on non-proliferation issues. In his last posting, he 
served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation 
(acting), responsible for policies to address the proliferation 
problems posed by Iran, North Korea, Libya, Iraq, South Asia 
and other regions of concern. Among his duties, he also 
34 mins In person, 
IISS offices, 
13-15 Arundel 
Street 
Temple 
Place, London 
WC2R 3DX 
                                                          
3
 Dr Nicholas Eberstadt Bio, http://www.aei.org/scholar/nicholas-eberstadt/ , accessed 10 January 2015.  
 
4
 Mr Douglas Feith Bio, http://www.dougfeith.com/bio.html, accessed 10 January 2015. 
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oversaw implementation of the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, advanced conventional arms and technology 
controls, proliferation sanctions, and export control 
cooperation programmes.
5
  
Ambassador Robert 
Gallucci  
12 Feb 2013 Robert L. Gallucci was appointed Dean of Georgetown 
University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service in 
1996.  He had just completed 21 years of government service, 
serving since August 1994 with the Department of State as 
Ambassador at Large. In 1998 he became the State 
Department's Special Envoy to deal with the threat posed by 
the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction. In 1991 he was appointed deputy Executive 
Chairman of the UN Special Commission overseeing the 
disarmament of Iraq.  In 1992, he became Senior Coordinator 
for nonproliferation and nuclear safety initiatives in the former 
Soviet Union. Later in 1992 Dr. Gallucci was confirmed as the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs.
6
   
 
41 mins Telephone 
interview. 
Ambassador Martin 
Indyk  
14 March 
2013 
Executive vice president of the Brookings Institution and a 
former U.S. ambassador to Israel. He was the founding 
director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at 
Brookings. During the Clinton administration Indyk served as 
assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, special 
32 mins In person, 
Brookings 
Institution, 
1775 
Massachusetts 
                                                          
5
 Mark Fitpatrick, https://www.iiss.org/en/persons/mark-s-fitzpatrick, accessed 10 January 2016. 
 
6
 Dr Robert Gallucci, https://sfs.georgetown.edu/faculty-bio/robert-gallucci/, accessed 10 January 2016. 
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assistant to the president, and senior director for Near East and 
South Asia in the U.S. National Security Council.
7
 
Ave NW, 
Washington, DC 
20036 
Professor Jentleson  11 April 
2013 
Bruce Jentleson is Professor of Public Policy and Political 
Science at Duke University, where he previously served as 
Director of the Terry Sanford Institute (now Sanford School) 
of Public Policy. He is a leading scholar of American foreign 
policy and has served in a number of U.S. policy and political 
positions. From 2009-11 he was Senior Advisor to the U.S. 
State Department Policy Planning Director. In 2012 he served 
on the Obama 2012 campaign National Security Advisory 
Steering Committee.  
He also served as a senior foreign policy advisor to Vice 
President Al Gore in his 2000 presidential campaign, in the 
Clinton administration State Department (1993-94), and as a 
foreign policy aide to Senators Gore (1987-88) and Dave 
Durenberger (1978-79). He also has served on a number of 
policy commissions, most recently the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) Working Group co-chaired by Madeleine 
Albright (2011-13).
8
 
 
31 mins Telephone 
Conversation 
Ambassador Robert 
Joseph  
11 March 
2013 
Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public 
Policy.  Prior to July 2007, Ambassador Joseph served as U.S. 
Special Envoy for Nuclear Non-proliferation. From May 2005 
until March 2007, he was Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security. In this capacity, he reported 
46 mins In person, 
National Institute 
for Public Policy 
offices 
9302 Lee Hwy 
                                                          
7
 Martin S Indyk, http://www.brookings.edu/experts/indykm, accessed 10 January 2016. 
 
8
 Dr Bruce Jentleson, https://www.coursera.org/instructor/~921, accessed 10 January 2016. 
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directly to the Secretary of State as the principal State 
Department officer for non-and counterproliferation matters, 
arms control, arms transfers, regional security and defence 
relations, and security assistance. His management 
responsibilities included oversight of three major bureaus 
headed by Assistant Secretaries of State: International Security 
and Non-proliferation; Political and Military Affairs; and 
Verification, Compliance and Implementation. 
Previously, from January 2001 through November 2004, Dr. 
Joseph served in the National Security Council as Special 
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation 
Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense.  He 
was responsible, under the supervision of the National Security 
Advisor, for developing and coordinating U.S. policies and 
strategies for preventing, deterring and defending against 
threats to the United States from weapons of mass destruction.
9
 
#750, Fairfax, 
VA 22031, 
United States 
 
Ambassador James T 
Laney  
11 April 
2013 
President Emeritus of Emory University and former United 
States ambassador to South Korea. 
 
In 1993 he was appointed ambassador to South Korea by 
President Bill Clinton and was instrumental in helping defuse 
the nuclear crisis with North Korea in 1994. In 1997 he 
returned to the US and served for two years as special 
presidential envoy in Asia.
10
 
 
45 mins Telephone 
interview 
                                                          
9
 Ambassador Robert Joseph,  http://www.nipp.org/professional-staff/amb-robert-joseph/, accessed 10 January 2016. 
 
10
 James T Laney, http://www.icasinc.org/bios/laney_jt.html, accessed 10 January 2016. 
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Dr Robert Litwak  12 March 
2013 
Vice President for Scholars and Director of International 
Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre 
for Scholars in Washington. He is also an Adjunct Professor at 
Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and a 
Consultant to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Litwak 
served on the National Security Council staff as Director for 
Non-proliferation in the first Clinton administration. His most 
recent books are Outlier States: American Strategies to 
Contain, Engage, or Change Regimes; Regime Change: U.S. 
Strategy through the Prism of 9/11; and Rogue States and U.S. 
Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War.
11
  
39 mins In person, 
Woodrow 
Wilson 
International 
Center for 
Scholars, 
1300 
Pennsylvania 
Ave NW, 
Washington, DC 
20004, United 
States 
Ambassador Donald 
Mahley  
14 March 
2013 
Currently serving as Special Negotiator for Non-proliferation, 
on an as needed basis, currently with responsibilities for the 
Arms Trade Treaty Open Ended Working Group. He is also a 
member of the United Nations Secretary General’s 
Disarmament Advisory Board. Prior to his April 2008 
retirement, Ambassador Mahley served as Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls, and 
Negotiations. As such, he had the responsibility for chemical 
and biological weapons threat reduction, missile threat 
reduction, conventional weapons threat reduction, and export 
controls. 
Before that, Ambassador Mahley was the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Arms Control Implementation in the Arms 
Control Bureau of the Department of State. He served as the 
44 mins In person, 
Department of 
State, 
2201 C St NW, 
Washington, DC 
                                                          
11
 Robert S Litwak, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/robert-s-litwak, accessed 10 January 2016. 
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Special Negotiator for Chemical and Biological Arms Control 
issues from April 1999 to September 2002.
12
 
Mr Stephen 
Rademaker 
6 March 
2013 
Former assistant secretary of state, headed three bureaus of the 
State Department, including the Bureau of Arms Control and 
the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. 
Served as Chief Counsel for the House Select Committee on 
Homeland Security of the US House of Representatives and as 
Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel of the House 
Committee on International Relations.
13
 
 
60 mins 
In person, 
Podesta group 
offices, 1001 G 
St NW Ste 
1000w, 
Washington, DC 
20001 
 
Professor Thomas 
Schelling  
7 March 
2013 
American economist and professor of foreign policy, national 
security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of 
Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He was 
awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic 
Sciences.  Author of Arms and Influence.
14
  
 
87 mins In person, 
At his home, 
Washington DC 
Mr David Slinn  23 April 
2013 
UK Ambassador to North Korea 2002-2006. 23 mins Telephone 
interview 
Mr Jack Straw  14 June 
2013 
British politician who served as the Member of 
Parliament (MP) for Blackburn from 1979 to 2015. Straw 
served in the Cabinet from 1997 to 2010. Home 
Secretary from 1997 to 2001 and Foreign Secretary from 2001 
16 mins Telephone 
interview 
                                                          
12
 Mahley, Donald A. Ambassador (ret.), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/75286.htm, accessed 10 January 2016. 
13
 Stephen Rademaker, http://www.podesta.com/talent/stephen-rademaker, accessed 10 January 2016. 
 
14
 Thomas C. Schelling – Biographical, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2005/schelling-bio.html, accessed 10 January 2016. 
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to 2006. From 2007 to 2010 he served as Lord Chancellor and 
the Secretary of State for Justice.
15
 
 
Ambassador David 
Welch  
15 April 
2013. 
President of Bechtel’s Europe, Africa, and Middle East region. 
He was U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs 
from 2005 to 2008, U.S. ambassador to Egypt from 2001 to 
2005. Welch also served the U.S. government as assistant 
secretary for international organizations and as chargé 
d'affaires of the U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia. In addition, he 
served on the National Security Council staff at the White 
House 1989-91 and in a variety of roles in Jordan, Syria, and 
Pakistan.
16
  
37 mins In person, 
Bechtel’s offices, 
11 Pilgrim St, 
London EC4V 
6RN 
Mr Joel Wit  6 March 
2013. 
Concurrently a Visiting Scholar at US-Korea Institute at SAIS 
and a Senior Research Fellow at Columbia University 
Weatherhead Institute for East Asian Studies. 
He has served as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Robert L. 
Galluci from 1993-1995, where he developed strategies to help 
resolve the crisis over North Korea’s weapons program, and as 
Coordinator for the US-North Korea’s weapons program and 
as Coordinator for the US-North Korea Agreed Framework 
from 1995-1999, where he was the official in charge of 
implementation. He was also a key participant in the 
establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO). 
50 mins In person, IISS 
offices 
13-15 Arundel 
Street 
Temple 
Place, London 
WC2R 3DX 
                                                          
15
 Jack Straw, http://www.britannica.com/biography/Jack-Straw, accessed 10 January 2016. 
 
16
 Ambassador David Welch, http://www.tgais.com/speaker/ambassador-david-welch/, accessed 10 January 2016.  
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Prior to his efforts on the Agreed Framework, Wit was 
assigned to the State Department’s Office of Strategic Nuclear 
Policy, where he was responsible for U.S. policy on a range of 
issues related to nuclear arms control and weapons 
proliferation. In that capacity from 1988 to 1992, Wit helped 
negotiate strategic arms control agreements with the former 
Soviet Union and participated in the Nunn-Lugar program to 
dismantle its nuclear weapons. 
He was also a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institute from 
1999-2001.
 17
 
Source A 4 March 
2013 
Former Senior member of the first Bush Administration 29 mins In person, 
Washington DC 
Source B 5 March 
2013 
Academic North Korean expert. 45 mins In person, 
Washington DC 
Source C 5 March 
2013 
Retired US senior military officer. 26 mins In person, 
Washington DC 
 
                                                          
17
 Wit, Joel S,   http://uskoreainstitute.org/research/visiting-scholars/joel-wit/, accessed 10 January 2016. 
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Appendix B – Ideal policy Assessment Questions 
 
Assessment Question 1 - What was the US policy objective and demand? 
Assessment Question 2 - Was there a threat of force to defeat the opponent or 
deny him his objectives quickly with little cost? 
Assessment Question 3 - Was a deadline for compliance offered? 
Assessment Question 4 – Was there an assurance given to the adversary against 
future demands? 
Assessment Question 5 – Was there an offer of carrots for compliance? 
Assessment Question 6 – Did the opponent prefer to comply rather than go to 
war? 
Assessment Question 7 – Did the opponent act rationally, miscalculate or suffer 
from misperception? 
Assessment Question 8 - Does credible implementation of the ideal policy lead 
to compliance? 
Assessment Question 9 - Does failure to implement the ideal policy lead to non-
compliance? 
Assessment Question 10 - Was compliance caused by fear that the threatened 
action would be carried out? 
Assessment Question 11 - Are one of the four hypothesised patterns present 
when states threaten and use force? 
Assessment Question 12 - Are all the hypothesised patterns absent when states 
lack the will to threaten and use force? 
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Assessment Question 13 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of 
force result from leadership by one or more states, and/or a shared perception 
that important interests are threatened? 
Assessment Question 14 - Does coalitional consensus concerning threats of 
force fail to emerge when none of the above conditions are met? 
Assessment Question 15 - Do international organisations make it easier for 
leading states to mobilise support for policies involving threats and use of force? 
Assessment Question 16 - Did the issuing of a threats increase the motivation of 
the coerced to develop nuclear weapons? 
 
316 
 
Appendix C – Case Selection 
State Description Criteria All Criteria 
met – 
Possible 
Selected as 
case Y/N 
  The coercer 
must send a 
message 
asking the 
target State to 
stop/or undo 
their nuclear 
programme. 
 
 
A threat to 
punish non-
compliance 
must 
accompany this 
demand.  This 
threat may or 
may not be 
accompanied by 
a carrot for 
compliance 
The selected 
case must 
have 
developed, or 
have been 
perceived by 
the USA too 
have 
developed, a 
nuclear 
programme 
since 1964 
The USA must 
be the primary 
coercer of the 
selected case.  By 
maintaining the 
US as the 
primary coercer 
it reduces the 
variables, as 
different states 
will have a 
different 
capabilities, 
strategic culture 
and political 
systems that may 
affect the cost 
calculus within it. 
Outcome is 
complete – 
successful or 
failure 
North Korea 
(1993 – 2006) 
US coercive diplomacy failed as 
Nuclear test conducted in 2006
1
. 
Y Y Y Y Failure Y 
Libya (1992-2003) US coercive diplomacy apparently 
succeeded 
Y Y Y Y Success Y 
Iran (2002- )  Y Y Y Y Ongoing N 
 Iraq (1992-2003)  Y Y Y Y Failure Y 
                                                          
1
 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘Coercive Diplomacy’, in Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), pg.243. 
317 
 
South Africa 
(1975-1989)
2
 
Voluntarily surrendered covert nuclear 
programme after developing 6 nuclear 
weapons 
 
 
N N N N N N 
South Korea (1970 
– 2004) 
US demands and withdrawal of aid. 
threat of cutting off political, military, 
and economic support to South Korea 
was extremely potent  
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Israel Throughout most of the 1960s, the 
U.S. made a quiet effort to halt the 
Israeli program, primarily relying on 
arms sales and vague warnings as 
carrots and sticks. 
Y Y – vague 
warnings 
Y Y not confirmed N 
Sweden
3
 Swedish nuclear-weapons plans are 
analysed during the period 1945–1968. 
By the end 
of this period, Sweden had in place a 
nuclear program capable of producing 
nuclear 
weapons within a few years. But for a 
combination of reasons—among them 
N N N N N N 
                                                          
2
 Terence Mcnamee & Greg Mills, ‘Denuclearizing a Regime: What South Africa's Nuclear Rollback Might Tell Us About Iran’, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol 22, 
No.3 (2006).  
 
3
 Thomas Jonter, ‘The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons,1945–1968: An Analysis of the Technical Preparations’, Science & Global Security, Vol.18, No.2 
(2010).  
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rising 
public opposition to nuclear weapons, 
tension between civilian nuclear power 
goals and 
the goal of maintaining freedom of 
action with respect to nuclear 
weapons, the US policy 
to discourage the Swedes from 
building the bomb, and strengthening 
of international 
non-proliferation norms—the program 
was abandoned in 1968 when Sweden 
joined the 
Non-proliferation Treaty as a non-
weapon state. 
Taiwan (1960-
1980) 
US threatened use of withdrawal of 
economic and military aid. 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Kazakhstan Nuclear Rollback – no coercive 
diplomacy
4
 Transferred all weapons to 
Russia 1995 
N N N N N N 
Ukraine Nuclear rollback - By 1996, Ukraine 
had voluntarily disposed of all nuclear 
weapons within its territory, 
transferring them to Russia
5
. 
N N N N N N 
                                                          
4
 Kassymzhomart Tokaev, ‘Kazakhstan: From Renouncing Nuclear Weapons to Building Democracy’, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol.26, No.2 (2004). 
 
5
 Ukraine Special Weapons, The Nuclear Information Project, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ukraine, accessed 10 January 2016. 
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Belarus Nuclear rollback - They were all 
transferred to Russia by 1996. Belarus 
has signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty
6
. 
N N N N N N 
India  Nuclear test in 1974 – covert 
programme prior. 
N N N N N N 
Pakistan
7
 (1976-
1998) 
US Sanctions and withdrawal of aid - 
demands (not threats) to cease. 
Y Y Y Y N - Failure Y 
China NPT stated nuclear power discounted   N   N 
United Kingdom NPT stated nuclear power discounted   N   N 
Russia (Formerly 
USSR) 
NPT stated nuclear power discounted   N   N 
United States NPT stated nuclear power discounted   N N  N 
France NPT stated nuclear power discounted   N   N 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Belarus nuclear weapons, The Nuclear Information Project, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/belarus/index.html, accessed 10 January 2016. 
 
7
 Case studies in sanctions and Terrorism, Peterson Institute for International Economics, http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/pakistan.cfm, accessed 10 
January 2016.  
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